Solving partially observable agent‐intruder games with an application to border security problems

In this paper, we introduce partially observable agent‐intruder games (POAIGs). These games model dynamic search games on graphs between security forces (an agent) and an intruder given possible (border) entry points and high value assets that require protection. The agent faces situations with dynamically changing, partially observable information about the state of the intruder and vice versa. The agent may place sensors at selected locations, while the intruder may recruit partners to observe the agent's movement. We formulate the problem as a two‐person zero‐sum game, and develop efficient algorithms to compute each player's optimal strategy. The solution to the game will help the agent choose sensor locations and design patrol routes that can handle imperfect information. First, we prove the existence of ?‐optimal strategies for POAIGs with an infinite time horizon. Second, we introduce a Bayesian approximation algorithm to identify these ?‐optimal strategies using belief functions that incorporate the imperfect information that becomes available during the game. For the solutions of large POAIGs with a finite time horizon, we use a solution method common to extensive form games, namely, the sequence form representation. To illustrate the POAIGs, we present several examples and numerical results.     

Optimal layered search

This article investigates the problem of planning an optimal layered search for a stationary target. A search is layered if it assigns each point in the search space an integer number of glimpses or looks. General necessary and sufficient conditions and an existence theorem are obtained. The special case in which the initial target distribution is bivariate normal is considered in detail.     

Stochastic duels with bursts

In this analysis we extend the theory of stochastic duels to include the situation where one of the contestants fires a single infinitely long burst at a fixed rate of fire and secondly where he fires fixed-length, fixed-rate of fire bursts randomly spaced. In both cases the opponent fires single rounds randomly spaced. Special cases and parameter effects are considered.     

Tree-search algorithms for quadratic assignment problems

Problems having the mathematical structure of a quadratic assignment problem are found in a diversity of contexts: by the economist in assigning a number of plants or indivisible operations to a number of different geographical locations; by the architect or indusatrial engineer in laying out activities, offices, or departments in a building; by the human engineer in arranging the indicators and controls in an operators control room; by the electronics engineer in laying out components on a backboard; by the computer systems engineer in arranging information in drum and disc storage; by the production scheduler in sequencing work through a production facility; and so on. In this paper we discuss several types of algorithms for solving such problems, presenting a unifying framework for some of the existing algorithms, and dcscribing some new algorithms. All of the algorithms discussed proceed first to a feasible solution and then to better and better feasible solutions, until ultimately one is discovered which is shown to be optimal.     

A generalized inspection game

The paper addresses the problem of a patrol trying to stop smugglers who are attempting to ship a cargo of perishable contraband across a strait in one of M time units. The situation was modeled as a two-person zero-sum game of exhaustion by Thomas and Nisgav and this article extends their results. The game has many characteristics in common with the Inspection Game in Owen's book on Game Theory; this Inspection Game is generalized and the relations between the two games are discussed.     

The Shifting Determinants of Defense Spending Preferences Between 1980 and 2008

This paper analyzes defense spending preferences using ordered logit regression analysis of American National Election Survey data from 1980 through 2008. Our results indicate that as opposed to having the ideology of isolationism, political party identification towards the Republican Party or having economic stakes in defense spending always play a significant role in increased preference towards defense spending. Demographic groups such as Native Americans, Hispanics, and retired women, a demographic subgroup, display generally positive preferences towards defense spending. Somewhat surprisingly, another demographic subgroup, ‘security moms,’ do not show a preference. Our analysis also displays lower (higher) preference in the early 1990s (2000s) for defense spending compared to the year 2008.