S. D. Durham  J. D. Lynch  W. J. Padgett 《海军后勤学研究》1989,36(5):655-661

A general model for the failure of fibrous composite materials is described. It is shown to contain some of the well-known models in the literature. The composite material is viewed as a coherent system of independent identically distributed component strengths. Under the assumption that the applied load is redistributed “homotonically” to the unfailed components upon the failure of a component (an individual fiber segment) and that the distributions of component strengths are IFRA, it is shown that the system (composite) strength distribution is also IFRA. Examples are given using carbon reinforced composite data to illustrate the IFRA property.  相似文献   

    

J. George Shanthikumar 《海军后勤学研究》1989,36(6):797-806

The two purposes of this article are to illustrate the power and simplicity of level crossing analysis and to present a conservation identity for M/G/1 priority queues with server vacations. To illustrate the use of level crossing analysis we apply it to preemptive (resume) priority M/G/1 queues with single- and multiple-server vacations considered by Kella and Yechiali (1986) and to non-preemptive priority M/M/c queues considered by Kella and Yechiali (1985). The conservation identity presented here states that the ratios of mean waiting times in an M/G/1 queue with and without server vacation policies are independent of the service discipline for first come first served, shortest processing time, shortest processing time within generations and non-preemptive priority service disciplines.  相似文献   

    

Michael J. Brusco  Larry W. Jacobs 《海军后勤学研究》1993,40(1):69-84

This article presents the application of a simulated annealing heuristic to an NP-complete cyclic staff-scheduling problem. The new heuristic is compared to branch-and-bound integer programming algorithms, as well as construction and linear programming-based heuristics. It is designed for use in a continuously operating scheduling environment with the objective of minimizing the number of employees necessary to satisfy forecast demand. The results indicate that the simulated annealing-based method tends to dominate the branch-and-bound algorithms and the other heuristics in terms of solution quality. Moreover, the annealing algorithm exhibited rapid convergence to a low-cost solution. The simulated annealing heuristic is executed in a single program and does not require mathematical programming software. © 1993 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.  相似文献   

    

James V. Jucker  Meir J. Rosenblatt 《海军后勤学研究》1985,32(4):537-550

Quantity discounts are considered in the context of the single-period inventory model known as “the newsboy problem.” It is argued that the behavioral implications of the all-units discount schedule are more complex and interesting than the literature has suggested. Consideration of this behavior and the use of marginal analysis lead to a new method for solving this problem that is both conceptually simpler and more efficient than the traditional approach. This marginal-cost solution procedure is described graphically, an algorithm is presented, and an example is used to demonstrate that this solution procedure can be extended easily to handle complex discount schedules, such as some combined (simultaneously applied) purchasing and transportation cost discount schedules.  相似文献   

    

J. F. Lawless  K. Singhal 《海军后勤学研究》1980,27(2):323-334

This paper discusses situations in which the distribution of a lifetime response variable T is taken to depend upon a vector x of regressor variables. We specifically consider the case in which T, given x , has an exponential distribution, and in which x represents levels of fixed factors in an experimental design. Methods of analyzing data under this type of model are discussed, with maximum likelihood and least squares methods being presented and compared.  相似文献   

    

M. J. Fischer 《海军后勤学研究》1978,25(4):667-679

In this paper, we consider the analysis of two M/G/1 queueing systems sharing the same finite waiting room. An exact analysis is given for several special cases, and then an algorithm is developed which approximates the system behavior for the general problem. Comparisons are made between the special cases and the algorithm.  相似文献   

    

SHACTER J 《Military review》1948,28(8):55-62

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Elizabeth J. Durango‐Cohen  Liad Wagman 《海军后勤学研究》2014,61(3):244-267

Recent supply‐chain models that study competition among capacity‐constrained producers omit the possibility of producers strategically setting wholesale prices to create uncertainty with regards to (i.e., to obfuscate) their production capacities. To shed some light on this possibility, we study strategic obfuscation in a supply‐chain model comprised of two competing producers and a retailer, where one of the producers faces a privately‐known capacity constraint. We show that capacity obfuscation can strictly increase the obfuscating producer's profit, therefore, presenting a clear incentive for such practices. Moreover, we identify conditions under which both producers' profits increase. In effect, obfuscation enables producers to tacitly collude and charge higher wholesale prices by moderating competition between producers. The retailer, in contrast, suffers a loss in profit, raises retail prices, while overall channel profits decrease. We show that the extent of capacity obfuscation is limited by its cost and by a strategic retailer's incentive to facilitate a deterrence. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 244–267, 2014  相似文献   

    

Richard J. Kilroy Jr 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2014,25(5-6):1063-1065

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J. Atsu Amegashie 《Defence and Peace Economics》2014,25(4):381-400

I study a two-period model of conflict with two combatants and a third party who is an ally of one of the combatants. The third party is fully informed about the type of her ally but not about the type of her ally’s enemy. In a signaling game, I find that if the third party is unable to give a sufficiently high assistance to her ally, then there exists a unique separating equilibrium in which the third party’s expected intervention causes her ally’s enemy to exert more effort than in the absence of third-party intervention; this worsens the conflict.  相似文献