Cultural Conflict within Civil-Military Cooperation: A Case Study in Bosnia

In peace-support operations, employees of international humanitarian organisations often clash with those of the military. A lack of familiarity with each other's practices and values, embedded in their respective organisational cultures, is often seen as the culprit. This article presents and illustrates a road map to manage such cultural differences between cooperating organisations. We found that the military culture, in our Bosnian case study, was seen to operate as a hierarchical culture (characterised by formalisation, stability, predictability and efficiency). The culture of international humanitarian organisations, on the other hand, was depicted as clan-type (characterised by teamwork, participation and consensus). To facilitate the creation of cultural awareness as well as respect for, and reconciliation of, cultural differences we recommend several concrete actions that could improve civil-military cooperation.     

Service levels in distribution systems with random customer order size

An approximate method for measuring the service levels of the warehouse-retailer system operating under (s, S) policy is presented. All the retailers are identical and the demand process at each retailer follows a stationary stuttering Poisson process. This type of demand process allows customer orders to be for a random number of units, which gives rise to the undershoot quantity at both the warehouse and retailer levels. Exact analyses of the distribution of the undershoot quantity and the number of orders place by a retailer during the warehouse reordering lead time are derived. By using this distribution together with probability approximation and other heuristic approaches, we model the behavior of the warehouse level. Based on the results of the warehouse level and on an existing framework from previous work, the service level at the retailer level is estimated. Results of the approximate method are then compared with those of simulation. © 1995 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

On a ruckle problem in discrete games of ambush

The following zero-sum game is considered. Red chooses in integer interval [1, n] two integer intervals consisting of k and m points where k + m < n, and Blue chooses an integer point in [1, n]. The payoff to Red equals 1 if the point chosen by Blue is at least in one of the intervals chosen by Red, and 0 otherwise. This work complements the results obtained by Ruckle, Baston and Bostock, and Lee. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 44: 353–364, 1997     

Note: Minimizing the variability of the waiting times in a globally gated elevator polling system

A polling system comprising n queues and a single server is considered. Service is performed according to an elevator scheme under the globally gated regime. The problem of arranging the channels to minimize a measure of the variability of the waiting times is addressed. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 44: 605–611, 1997     

TRENDS AND MARKERS

The twin concepts of secrecy and transparency are central to any discourse on the freeness and fairness of elections, because they are universally accep ted yardsticks of the degree to which elections can be said to be legitimate. Without challenging this truism, this paper explores these concepts as both theoretical constructs and as manifes ted in empirical situations. It will highlight their ideological function and argue that they have an alienating effect in practice. The article will also attempt to show how secrecy and transparency have helped to shape Lesotho's electoral process and the mode of its management, and will also discuss the issues and questions that it raises. Next, the most critical issues in any debate concerning Lesotho's elections and their management are raised, followed by the recommendation of an ideal way of managing elections to serve the interest of voters better. Lastly, the paper demonstrates the danger of depoliticising elections and relegating them to the legal sphere, which only the courts of law are competent to interpret.     

Book reviews

The Political Economy of Military Spending in the United States, Alex Mintz (ed), London and New York: Routledge, 1992, pp x, 334; ISBN 0–415–07595–5

Penser La Guerre, Penser L'Economie, Christian Schmidt, (Paris: Odile Jacob, 1991), 350p.

Military Production and Innovation in Spain, Jordi Molas‐Gallart, Chur (CH): Harwood Academic Publishers, 1992, pp. vii, 212; ISBN 3–7186–5280–3     

GLOBALIZING REAGAN'S INF TREATY

When it was concluded more than a quarter century ago, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union was hailed as a disarmament watershed, eliminating entire classes of nuclear missiles from the arsenals of the arms-racing Cold War superpowers. Over the intervening decades, there have been repeated calls to convert this legacy treaty into a new international norm against nuclear and missile proliferation by broadening it into a global prohibition on ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. Indeed, variations on this proposal have been knocking around for so long and with so little success that the entire concept has come to be dismissed by many knowledgeable insiders as something of a farce. Looking beyond its inauspicious pedigree, however, this viewpoint suggests that the time is opportune for Washington to give the idea a fresh look. Drawing on a detailed review of the history of “Global INF” and an analysis of the contemporary context, the author recommends that the Obama administration consider a simple declaratory approach that promises modest initial benefits, avoids previous and foreseeable pitfalls, and plausibly lays a solid foundation for achieving significant long-term progress.     

NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS AND MIDDLE EAST STABILITY

The United States faces a series of strategic and policy conundrums as it attempts to promote strategic stability in the Persian Gulf and the wider Middle East. This article examines the relationship between a reduced US nuclear arsenal and strategic stability in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. It argues that a series of interrelated political and military factors play a much more significant role in regional security and stability than the US strategic arsenal, which has never, with a few extraordinary exceptions, played a direct role in maintaining regional security. The United States has constructed a system of regional stability based on conventional deterrence and defense that has seen it forward base forces at various installations in the region in combination with efforts to arm, train, and equip host-nation militaries. Nuclear weapons have never played a prominent role in this regional system. Evidence presented in this article suggests that there is no compelling reason for the United States to abandon and/or modify the defensive system of conventional deterrence and defense by adding nuclear-backed guarantees to the mix.