Does Income Inequality Derive the Separatist Terrorism in Turkey?

Separatist terrorism has been a severe problem for Turkey since the mid-1980s. The conventional wisdom contends that economic deprivation in southeastern Turkey is the fundamental reason for the long-running battle against the Kurdish rebels. Considering that there is limited empirical literature on the roots of terrorism in Turkey, yielding conflicting results about the claim that the main cause of terrorism is deprived economic conditions, this study aims to answer whether there is a causal relationship between income inequality and separatist terrorism in Turkey. To this end, the Global Terrorism Data Base for the period of 1973–2006, two Theil indices of pay inequality as proxy for income inequality, and the vector autoregression and Autoregressive Moving Average (ARMA) methods are utilized. The results support the early findings that income inequality, a particular focus in this paper and an essential indicator of economic deprivation, is not a main cause of escalation of separatist terrorism in Turkey.     

The Demand for Turkish Defence Expenditure

Although a number of studies concerning Turkish defence-growth relation have been published in recent years, little attention is given the demand for Turkish defence expenditure. This is an important issue for understanding which variables contribute to the determination of the demand for military expenditure. However, it is difficult to develop a general theory or a standard empirical approach for the determination of the demand military expenditure. This study models and estimates the demand for Turkish defence expenditure for the period 1951-1998 using autoregressive distributed lag approach to cointegration (ARDL) following the methodology outlined in Pesaran and Shin (1999). This procedure can be applied regardless of the stationary properties of the variables in the sample and allows for inferences on long-run estimates, which is not possible under alternative cointegration procedures. The findings suggest that Turkish defence spending is determined by NATO's defence spending, Greece's defence spending and some security considerations.     

THE MORAL PERMISSIBILITY OF AUTOMATED RESPONSES DURING CYBERWARFARE

Automated responses are an inevitable aspect of cyberwarfare, but there has not been a systematic treatment of the conditions in which they are morally permissible. We argue that there are three substantial barriers to the moral permissibility of an automated response: the attribution, chain reaction, and projection bias problems. Moreover, these three challenges together provide a set of operational tests that can be used to assess the moral permissibility of a particular automated response in a specific situation. Defensive automated responses will almost always pass all three challenges, while offensive automated responses typically face a substantial positive burden in order to overcome the chain reaction and projection bias challenges. Perhaps the most interesting cases arise in the middle ground between cyber-offense and cyber-defense, such as automated cyber-exploitation responses. In those situations, much depends on the finer details of the response, the context, and the adversary. Importantly, however, the operationalizations of the three challenges provide a clear guide for decision-makers to assess the moral permissibility of automated responses that could potentially be implemented.     

The Telefunken Affairand the internationalisation of the Algerian War, 1957–59

Between 1957 and 1959 the West German company Telefunken and the Bonn government became prime targets in the French army's campaign against the Front de Libération Nationale's (FLN) efforts to establish communications networks. To the French military, the prevention of sales of Telefunken equipment to the FLN or its allies constituted a matter of strategic importance. To the Germans, it was an act of economic protectionism that exposed France's continued misgivings of Germany. The problem exerted a considerable strain between Paris and Bonn, and even threatened to harm German-Arab relations. The Telefunken affair thus highlights the Algerian war's international ramifications. It further reveals the responsibility of the French military in the internationalisation of that war.     

Book reviews

Frank Zimmer, Bismarcks Kampf gegen Kaiser Franz Joseph Konigsgratz und seine Folgen. Graz, Vienna, Cologne: Styria Verlag 1996. Pp.203,49 illus., 1 map. OS 350/DM 49. ISBN 3–222–12377–2.

Saul Zadka, Blood in Zion: How the Jewish Guerrillas drove the British out of Palestine. London and Washington: Brassey's, 1995. Pp.227, chron., illus., index. £19.95. ISBN 1–85753–136–1.

Theodore L. Gatchel, At the Water's Edge: Defending against the Modern Amphibious Assault. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996. Pp.xvi+217, notes, biblio, index. $36.95. ISBN 1–55750–308–7.

Max G. Manwaring and William J. Olson (eds.) Managing Contemporary Conflict: Pillars of Success. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996. Pp.269, no index. $65 (cloth); $25 (paper). ISBN 0–8133–8969 and 9978–5

Chris Seiple, The US Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions, Carlisle Barracks, PA: The

Richard L. Millett and Michael Gold‐Biss (eds.) Beyond Praetorianism: The Latin American Military in Transition. University of Miami: North/South Center Press; Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996. Pp.xv +317, index. $24.95. ISBN 1–5745–000–9.

Rudolph C. Barnes Jr, Military Legitimacy: Might and Right in the New Millennium. London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1996. Pp.199, select biblio., index. £27.50/$39.50, ISBN 0–714–4624–5.     

Limiting behavior of the stochastic sequential assignment problem

The stochastic sequential assignment problem (SSAP) considers how to allocate available distinct workers to sequentially arriving tasks with stochastic parameters such that the expected total reward obtained from the sequential assignments is maximized. Implementing the optimal assignment policy for the SSAP involves calculating a new set of breakpoints upon the arrival of each task (i.e., for every time period), which is impractical for large‐scale problems. This article studies two problems that are concerned with obtaining stationary policies, which achieve the optimal expected reward per task as the number of tasks approaches infinity. The first problem considers independent and identically distributed (IID) tasks with a known distribution function, whereas in the second problem tasks are derived from r different unobservable distributions governed by an ergodic Markov chain. The convergence rate of the expected reward per task to the optimal value is also obtained for both problems. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013