End effects in capacity expansion models with finite horizons

Capacity expansion models are typically formulated in the context of some finite horizon. Because the firm lasts longer than the horizon, a bias can enter into the optimal solution from the model horizon chosen. Recently, Grinold [8] has proposed a “dual-equilibrium method” for ameliorating possible distortions. Although the dual-equilibrium method has superior analytical properties to other methods, it is conceptually more complex. In this paper it is shown that there are situations where the “primal-equilibrium” approach of Manne [15] provides equivalent results and that the use of annualized capital costs in the objective function, although somewhat less efficient, results in a similar model.     

IED casualties mask the real problem: it's us

Casualty figures suggest that the US/Allied Counter Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) policy and the present allocation of national assets, resources, and intellectual capital have not been very successful. A number of explanations for why this has been the case are discussed and critiqued here.     

On the reduction of total‐cost and average‐cost MDPs to discounted MDPs

This article provides conditions under which total‐cost and average‐cost Markov decision processes (MDPs) can be reduced to discounted ones. Results are given for transient total‐cost MDPs with transition rates whose values may be greater than one, as well as for average‐cost MDPs with transition probabilities satisfying the condition that there is a state such that the expected time to reach it is uniformly bounded for all initial states and stationary policies. In particular, these reductions imply sufficient conditions for the validity of optimality equations and the existence of stationary optimal policies for MDPs with undiscounted total cost and average‐cost criteria. When the state and action sets are finite, these reductions lead to linear programming formulations and complexity estimates for MDPs under the aforementioned criteria.© 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 66:38–56, 2019     

Optimal control of price through restricted production

Consider a regulated monopolist whose current profits would be maximized if they could charge a price p?, where p? exceeds the current market price. By reducing production below current consumer demand the monopolist can create an illusion of a shortage and induce the regulator to allow a price increase. Conditions are given for which the production rate that maximizes the monopolist's expected discounted profits over an infinite horizon will have the property that the amount of unsatisfied consumer demand will be a non-increasing function of current market price.     

A generalized inspection game

The paper addresses the problem of a patrol trying to stop smugglers who are attempting to ship a cargo of perishable contraband across a strait in one of M time units. The situation was modeled as a two-person zero-sum game of exhaustion by Thomas and Nisgav and this article extends their results. The game has many characteristics in common with the Inspection Game in Owen's book on Game Theory; this Inspection Game is generalized and the relations between the two games are discussed.     

Military Maladaptation: Counterinsurgency and the Politics of Failure

Tactical learning is critical to battlefield success, especially in a counterinsurgency. This article tests the existing model of military adaption against a ‘most-likely’ case: the British Army’s counterinsurgency in the Southern Cameroons (1960–61). Despite meeting all preconditions thought to enable adaptation – decentralization, leadership turnover, supportive leadership, poor organizational memory, feedback loops, and a clear threat – the British still failed to adapt. Archival evidence suggests politicians subverted bottom-up adaptation, because winning came at too high a price in terms of Britain’s broader strategic imperatives. Our finding identifies an important gap in the extant adaptation literature: it ignores politics.     

On the economic application of airlift to product distribution and its impact on inventory levels

In many resupply situations, the decisionmaker has the option of “purchasing” faster replenishment leadtimes. For example, a premium may be paid for delivery by parcel post rather than slower but less expensive delivery by railway express. It may be economically advantageous to pay shipment premiums for faster leadtimes when considering the possible cost reductions in pipeline (on-order) inventory and safety stock levels. This paper develops a decision rule which, for any given item, will indicate whether it is economically advantageous to purchase a faster leadtime. The general methodology is then applied to a peacetime military resupply operation involving several million items, each requiring a decision as to whether the item should be shipped by air or sea.     

Effects of cueing in cooperative search

We consider the effects of cueing in a cooperative search mission that involves several autonomous agents. Two scenarios are discussed: one in which the search is conducted by a number of identical search‐and‐engage vehicles and one where these vehicles are assisted by a search‐only (reconnaissance) asset. The cooperation between the autonomous agents is facilitated via cueing, i.e., the information transmitted to the agents by a searcher that has just detected a target. The effect of cueing on the target detection probability is derived from first principles using a Markov chain analysis. In particular, it is demonstrated that the benefit of cueing on the system's effectiveness is bounded. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006     

A search game with a protector

A classic problem in Search Theory is one in which a searcher allocates resources to the points of the integer interval [1, n] in an attempt to find an object which has been hidden in them using a known probability function. In this paper we consider a modification of this problem in which there is a protector who can also allocate resources to the points; allocating these resources makes it more difficult for the searcher to find an object. We model the situation as a two‐person non‐zero‐sum game so that we can take into account the fact that using resources can be costly. It is shown that this game has a unique Nash equilibrium when the searcher's probability of finding an object located at point i is of the form (1 − exp (−λ_ix_i)) exp (−μ_iy_i) when the searcher and protector allocate resources x_i and y_i respectively to point i. An algorithm to find this Nash equilibrium is given. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 47:85–96, 2000