三维静磁场Lipschitz区域上Robin问题广义解的存在与唯一性

近年来,电磁场边值问题的数值解法取得了飞速的发展．由于电磁场边值问题是一类非线性偏微分方程,研究解的存在性、唯一性具有较大的困难．前人已讨论了B-H间的几个基本不等式,并由之证明了三雏静磁场带零边值问题广义解的存在与唯一性,作者也曾利用给出的B-H间的不等式证明了三维静磁场Neumann问题和二维时变场第一边值初值问题广义解的存在与唯一性．由于在一般区域讨论存在困难,作者利用Sobolev空间理论及单调算子理论证明了三雏静磁场Lipschitz区域上Robin问题广义解的存在与唯一性．     

武器装备系统效能评估的几种方法

介绍了层次分析法、美国工业界武器系统效能咨询委员会方法、指数方法、专家调查法和SEA计5种评估武器装备系统效能的方法．只有熟练地掌握和正确运用这些方法才能对不同类型武器系统效能评估作出准确的判断,从而为武器装备的研制、采购提供客观的、定量的数据,避免造成人力、物力、财力的浪费．     

测定Kevlar-49环氧复合材料纤维含量方法的研究

本文介绍了测定Kevlar-49环氧复合材料纤维含量的一种改进的方法。通过试验研究,作者在美国New Mexico Sandia验室所报导的方法基础上进行了改进。改进的方法在快速、经济、低毒和准确性等方面均较Sandia原方法优越。     

充分发展湍流管道内壁边界的红外定量识别

基于导热的管道内壁边界识别已发展成熟,但更贴合实际的湍流管道内壁边界的定量识别尚未见报道。通过关联COMSOL和MATLAB,利用有限元方法和Levenberg-Marquardt算法对二维轴对称充分发展的湍流管道内壁边界形状的稳态识别进行研究。数值实验证明了本方法的有效性。结果表明,在含内壁缺陷的湍流管道中,外壁最大温差和由缺陷引起的绝对温差并不是同步增加的;在进行内壁边界反问题识别时,由于绝对温差中负增长的出现,绝对温差越大,识别结果未必越好;识别精度在不规则内壁终点处略微变差。     

An exact branch‐and‐price algorithm for multitasking scheduling on unrelated parallel machines

We consider the multitasking scheduling problem on unrelated parallel machines to minimize the total weighted completion time. In this problem, each machine processes a set of jobs, while the processing of a selected job on a machine may be interrupted by other available jobs scheduled on the same machine but unfinished. To solve this problem, we propose an exact branch‐and‐price algorithm, where the master problem at each search node is solved by a novel column generation scheme, called in‐out column generation, to maintain the stability of the dual variables. We use a greedy heuristic to obtain a set of initial columns to start the in‐out column generation, and a hybrid strategy combining a genetic algorithm and an exact dynamic programming algorithm to solve the pricing subproblems approximately and exactly, respectively. Using randomly generated data, we conduct numerical studies to evaluate the performance of the proposed solution approach. We also examine the effects of multitasking on the scheduling outcomes, with which the decision maker can justify making investments to adopt or avoid multitasking.     

采用随机几何工具的终端直通通信接入控制方法

针对现有具备终端直通（Device-to-Device, D2D）功能的蜂窝网络的干扰管理问题,提出一种新型的采用随机几何工具的D2D通信接入控制方法。利用随机过程理论以及随机几何工具建立模型分析邻近基站和D2D通信对蜂窝通信的影响,并推导蜂窝业务接入失败概率表达式。基于该表达式能够计算网络允许的最大D2D用户密度,辅助D2D通信接入控制实现干扰管理。仿真证明基于所提数值计算方法获得的估计结果与蒙特卡洛仿真结果相符,且通过合理限制D2D用户密度和D2D用户发射功率可满足指定的蜂窝业务接入失败概率要求。     

Purchase and retrieval competition for seasonal produce

We study the competition problem of purchase and multiretrieval of perishable seasonal produce, where wholesalers purchase and stock their products in the first period, and then retrieve and sell them in subsequent periods. We first consider the duopoly case and assume that the prices are exogenous and fluctuate. In each period, after the price realization, the wholesalers retrieve some stock from their warehouses to satisfy their demands. One wholesaler's unsatisfied customers can switch to another and be satisfied by its left retrieved products. Any unsold retrieved stock has no salvage value and any unsatisfied demand is lost. The unretrieved stock is carried to the next period at a perishable rate. The wholesalers compete for the substitute demand by determining their own purchase and retrieval quantities. We show the existence and uniqueness of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, and that the Nash equilibrium strategy has the simple “sell-down-to” structure. We also consider the general N-person game and show the existence of the Nash equilibrium, and characterize the structure of the equilibrium strategy for the symmetric case. In addition, we consider the case with endogenous prices, and show that the problem reduces to a repeated newsvendor game with price and inventory competition. We derive the conditions under which a unique Nash equilibrium exists and characterize the equilibrium strategy. Finally, we conduct numerical studies to examine the impacts of the model parameters on the equilibrium outcomes and to generate managerial insights.     

Optimal policies for stochastic clearing systems with time-dependent delay penalties

We study stochastic clearing systems with a discrete-time Markovian input process, and an output mechanism that intermittently and instantaneously clears the system partially or completely. The decision to clear the system depends on both quantities and delays of outstanding inputs. Clearing the system incurs a fixed cost, and outstanding inputs are charged a delay penalty, which is a general increasing function of the quantities and delays of individual inputs. By recording the quantities and delays of outstanding inputs in a sequence, we model the clearing system as a tree-structured Markov decision process over both a finite and infinite horizon. We show that the optimal clearing policies, under realistic conditions, are of the on-off type or the threshold type. Based on the characterization of the optimal policies, we develop efficient algorithms to compute parameters of the optimal policies for such complex clearing systems for the first time. We conduct a numerical analysis on the impact of the nonlinear delay penalty cost function, the comparison of the optimal policy and the classical hybrid policy (ie, quantity and age thresholds), and the impact of the state of the input process. Our experiments demonstrate that (a) the classical linear approximation of the cost function can lead to significant performance differences; (b) the classical hybrid policy may perform poorly (as compared to the optimal policies); and (c) the consideration of the state of the input process makes significant improvement in system performance.     

典型航天装备试验鉴定总体策略研究

航天装备具有面向任务、科研性强、全系统的技术状态难以固定,以及小子样等特点,在全寿命周期内的试验策略与常规武器装备的差异很大。本文在介绍装备试验鉴定模式改革的基础上,分析了航天装备试验鉴定按照新模式进行的相应调整,重点给出了卫星系统、运载火箭和航天测控装备等典型航天装备的全寿命周期模型,设计了新体制下全寿命周期内的试验阶段和关键时间节点、主要试验类型、决策支持依据、试验方式方法,以及与原试验要求的继承关系等总体策略;同时,鉴于航天装备试验鉴定数据量小等特殊性,给出了有别于常规装备的数据采信原则。该试验鉴定总体策略和数据采信原则可为航天装备试验鉴定顶层设计、组织实施、数据分析和决策支持提供参考。     

Impacts of sequential acquisition,market competition mode,and confidentiality on information flow

We investigate information flow in a setting in which 2 retailers order from a supplier and sell to a market with uncertain demand. Each retailer has access to a signal. The retailers can disclose signals to each other (horizontal information sharing), while the supplier can solicit signals by offering retailers differential payments as incentives for signal disclosure (vertical information acquisition). In the base setting, market competition is in quantity, and a retailer can fully infer the signal that the other retailer discloses to the supplier. We show that the supplier prefers to sequentialize the procedure for information acquisition. Moreover, vertical information acquisition by the supplier is a strategic complement to horizontal information sharing between the retailers to establish information flow. In the equilibrium, the retailers have no incentive to exchange signals, but system wide information transparency can be realized through a combination of information acquisition and inference. We further study the signaling effect, whereby the supplier utilizes wholesale pricing as an instrument to affect the retailers' inference of the shared signals, and price competition to explore their impacts on the supplier's preference for sequential acquisition and the sustainability of information flow.