The salvo combat model with area fire

This article analyzes versions of the salvo model of missile combat where area fire is used by one or both sides in a battle. Although these models share some properties with the area fire Lanchester model and the aimed fire salvo model, they also display some interesting differences, especially over the course of several salvos. Although the relative size of each force is important with aimed fire, with area fire, it is the absolute size that matters. Similarly, although aimed fire exhibits square law behavior, area fire shows approximately linear behavior. When one side uses area fire and the other uses aimed fire, the model displays a mix of square and linear law behavior. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 60: 652–660, 2013     

Bounded flexibility in days‐on and days‐off scheduling

This article presents a flexible days‐on and days‐off scheduling problem and develops an exact branch and price (B&P) algorithm to find solutions. The main objective is to minimize the size of the total workforce required to cover time‐varying demand over a planning horizon that may extend up to 12 weeks. A new aspect of the problem is the general restriction that the number of consecutive days on and the number of consecutive days off must each fall within a predefined range. Moreover, the total assignment of working days in the planning horizon cannot exceed some maximum value. In the B&P framework, the master problem is stated as a set covering‐type problem whose columns are generated iteratively by solving one of three different subproblems. The first is an implicit model, the second is a resource constrained shortest path problem, and the third is a dynamic program. Computational experiments using both real‐word and randomly generated data show that workforce reductions up to 66% are possible with highly flexible days‐on and days‐off patterns. When evaluating the performance of the three subproblems, it was found that each yielded equivalent solutions but the dynamic program proved to be significantly more efficient. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 60: 678–701, 2013     

Book reviews

John Horsfield, The Art of Leadership in War. The Royal Navy From the Age of Nelson to the End of World War II. Westport, Conn. and London: Greenwood Press, 1980. Pp. 240; £14.75.

John Joseph Timothy Sweet, Iron Arm: The Mechanization of Mussolini's Army, 1920–1940. Westport, Connecticut &; London: Greenwood Press. 1980. Pp. 207; £15.50.

Peter H. Merkl, The Making of a Stormtrooper. Princeton, N.J: Princeton U.P., 1980. Pp. 328; £8.60.

Greg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War 1945–1950. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980. Pp. 425; $15.00.

Geoffrey Smith and Nelson W. Polsby, British Government and its Discontents. New York: Basic Books, and London: Harper and Row, 1981. Pp. 202; £7.95.

Seweryn Bialer (ed.), The Domestic Context of Soviet Foreign Policy. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press and London: Croom Helm, 1981. Pp. 441; £14.95.

Jerry F. Hough, Soviet Leadership in Transition. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution and Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1981. Pp. 175; £12.00 (hb.) and £3.95 (pb.)

Edward F. Mickolus, Transnational Terrorism: A Chronology of Events 1968–1979. London: Aldwych Press, 1980. Pp. 967; £39.95.

Barry Rubin, The Great Powers in the Middle East, 1941–47; The Road to the Cold War, London: Frank Cass, 1980. Pp. 254; £14.50;

Daniel Heradstveit, The Arab‐Israeli Conflict; Psychological Obstacles to Peace. Oslo: Universittsforlaget, 1979. Pp. 234; £11.60;

Janice Gross Stein, and Raymond Tanter, Rational Decision‐making; Israel's Security Choices 1967. Columbus. Ohio; Ohio State University Press, 1980. Pp. 399; $35.     

Warning of Terror: Explaining the Failure of Intelligence Against Terrorism

Many scholars and analysts have studied intelligence failure and surprise and developed theories to explain disasters such as the attack on Pearl Harbor. Others, especially since the 9/11 attacks, have examined the rising threat of terrorism and see it as posing a particularly difficult challenge for the intelligence community. But little work has been done to integrate the earlier literature on intelligence failure with the newer threat of terrorist attack. This article attempts such an integration, by examining the bombing of the US Marine Barracks in Beirut in 1983; it concludes that most studies of the Beirut bombing are mistaken in their assessment of the role played by intelligence in that disaster, and suggests that our understanding of intelligence failure against surprise attacks needs to be revised in the age of terrorism.     

The concept of logistics derived from Clausewitz: All that is required so that the fighting force can be taken as a given

This article assesses the existing literature on logistics in war, concluding that there is no satisfactory conceptual definition of logistics. It proposes a concept of logistics derived from Clausewitz's theory of war to fill that void. This is presented as a derivation because Clausewitz's distinction between (1) the use of the fighting forces (tactics and strategy) and (2) all other activities in war that were required so that forces could be taken as a given. The latter, left unnamed by Clausewitz, corresponds to a concept of logistics that proves to be an analytical peer to Clausewitz's categories of politics, tactics and strategy.