全文获取类型
收费全文 | 567篇 |
免费 | 14篇 |
出版年
2019年 | 12篇 |
2017年 | 17篇 |
2016年 | 10篇 |
2015年 | 14篇 |
2014年 | 15篇 |
2013年 | 109篇 |
2012年 | 5篇 |
2011年 | 5篇 |
2010年 | 8篇 |
2009年 | 11篇 |
2007年 | 6篇 |
2006年 | 8篇 |
2005年 | 9篇 |
2004年 | 11篇 |
2003年 | 5篇 |
2002年 | 10篇 |
2001年 | 4篇 |
2000年 | 7篇 |
1999年 | 6篇 |
1998年 | 12篇 |
1997年 | 6篇 |
1996年 | 8篇 |
1995年 | 4篇 |
1994年 | 15篇 |
1993年 | 15篇 |
1992年 | 8篇 |
1991年 | 14篇 |
1990年 | 8篇 |
1989年 | 14篇 |
1988年 | 14篇 |
1987年 | 15篇 |
1986年 | 16篇 |
1985年 | 12篇 |
1984年 | 8篇 |
1983年 | 7篇 |
1982年 | 7篇 |
1981年 | 8篇 |
1980年 | 5篇 |
1979年 | 10篇 |
1978年 | 12篇 |
1976年 | 7篇 |
1975年 | 6篇 |
1974年 | 9篇 |
1973年 | 7篇 |
1972年 | 9篇 |
1971年 | 4篇 |
1970年 | 9篇 |
1969年 | 6篇 |
1968年 | 4篇 |
1967年 | 6篇 |
排序方式: 共有581条查询结果,搜索用时 62 毫秒
501.
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001 and Hurricane Katrina, the United States government has spent tens of billions of dollars to improve the nation's ability to respond to a natural disaster or terrorist attack, but the emphasis on immediate first response has left many long-term environmental, political, and technological challenges unaddressed. Although a dirty bomb attack is unlikely to yield the same amount of physical devastation and death as caused by Katrina or a nuclear weapon, the social, psychological, and economic impact would be enormous. At present, however, the United States lacks the technology necessary to decontaminate a large, densely populated urban area under time, political, and economic constraints. This article reviews past cleanup experiences and current decontamination capabilities to consider the long-term implications of a dirty bomb, identifies weaknesses in America's existing response capabilities, notes possible areas of political friction, and considers the implications of the failure to adequately prepare. Having the appropriate decontamination techniques established and long-term plans in place before an incident occurs will significantly improve the government's ability to protect public and environmental security, establish a viable decontamination strategy, allow residents to return to their homes, and get the local economy back on its feet. 相似文献
502.
503.
On War’s unfinished state has been a source of difficulties for interpretation for 180 years. By establishing a hierarchy of revision among the parts, we propose a criterion that can bring any part of On War in line with the most advanced stage of Clausewitz’s thinking. We exemplify the utility, illustrate the underpinnings and appreciate the potential of this criterion. We argue that the criterion offers the prospect of a shared, coherent, fully consistent and faithful rendering of Clausewitz’s theory of war. 相似文献
504.
505.
Jakub J Grygiel 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(2):187-216
After World War II, the US Navy confronted the challenge of adapting to dramatically altered geopolitical circumstances. Moscow did not have an ocean-going fleet, and early Cold War strategy was dominated by the salient position of nuclear strategic bombing – a mission thought to be outside the purview of the navy. Traditional roles, such as protecting sea lines of communication and supporting ground forces ashore, quickly proved indispensable. However, the navy eventually also succeeded in fielding dramatic technological and institutional innovations, for example, the strategic missile submarine, which enabled the US to successfully leverage maritime power against the continental power of the USSR. 相似文献
506.
Wallace J. Thies 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(4):51-76
Does proliferation increase the risk of war between new nuclear powers? Two schools of thought ‐ proliferation pessimists and optimists ‐ offer very different answers. The former stress the first‐strike danger of nuclear‐armed ballistic missiles and the resulting crisis instability as a cause of preemptive war. The latter stress the caution‐inducing effects of nuclear warheads and fear of retaliation as a check on would‐be attackers. To bridge the gap between these two schools, Daniel Ellsberg's concept of critical risk is used to show how the likelihood of war changes as new nuclear powers enlarge and improve their missile forces. Ellsberg's framework suggests that the danger of war is low between recent proliferators but rises as nuclear stockpiles grow, thereby changing the payoffs associated with striking first or striking second and increasing the danger of war due to accidents, miscalculations, and uncontrollable interactions between rival nuclear forces. Ellsberg's framework also suggests that the transition from weaponization to secure second strike force is likely to be long and difficult, in part because short‐range missiles like India's Prithvi are better suited to strike first than to strike second, and in part because negative control procedures reduce the value of striking second, thereby increasing the attraction of a preemptive strike. 相似文献
507.
Richard J Shuster 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(2):229-256
The discovery and elimination of Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was a focal point of the Coalition's strategy and operations in the aftermath of Operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’. Despite the failure of the WMD mission to meet expectations after almost two years of intensive operations, the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) was able to integrate multinational and multi-agency forces to provide detailed intelligence regarding the history of Iraq's WMD programs and to assist in the battle against insurgents. The ISG's experience raises the question of whether a standing intelligence force could become a key component in future counterproliferation and counterterrorism efforts around the world.1 相似文献
508.
509.
510.
Myriame T.I.B Bollen Col Eric T. Linssen Ir. Sebastiaan J.H. Rietjens 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(4):437-448
This chapter discusses the impact Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have on the security situation in Afghanistan, specifically in countering the terrorist threat and in counter-narcotics. The Afghan people define the lack of security as their country's greatest problem. The terrorist activities of groups opposed to the central government and the political process compounded by violence related to the opium trade are seen as the main sources of insecurity. The authors argue that, currently, PRTs should not assume active counterterrorism as an additional main area of operation. The complexity of Afghanistan's security environment and the pressure to have PRTs involved in the counter-narcotics effort underscore the necessity of local knowledge and experience in the PRTs. Participation of indigenous actors, such as NGOs, in the PRT-organisational structure could provide this required expertise. 相似文献