SLOWING DOWN TO KEEP THE LEAD IN MILITARY TECHNOLOGY

We develop a model of military technology competition among states. States can choose to introduce new military technology, mimic rivals’ level of technology, or withdraw from the contest. States can choose to implement any level of technology within their current feasible technologies. We find that states with significant technological leads should sometimes withhold new technologies, only strategically releasing them to trump rivals’ efforts. We develop the model by refining Admiral Jackie Fisher’s roughly articulated concept of ‘plunging’. We then use this refined argument to reanalyze the case of naval rivalries among European powers between the Crimean War and the First World War. Finally, we conclude by discussing the model’s implications for current US military force structure planning.     

U.S. policy on preventive war and preemption

In the aftermath of September 11, 2001 and Hurricane Katrina, the United States government has spent tens of billions of dollars to improve the nation's ability to respond to a natural disaster or terrorist attack, but the emphasis on immediate first response has left many long-term environmental, political, and technological challenges unaddressed. Although a dirty bomb attack is unlikely to yield the same amount of physical devastation and death as caused by Katrina or a nuclear weapon, the social, psychological, and economic impact would be enormous. At present, however, the United States lacks the technology necessary to decontaminate a large, densely populated urban area under time, political, and economic constraints. This article reviews past cleanup experiences and current decontamination capabilities to consider the long-term implications of a dirty bomb, identifies weaknesses in America's existing response capabilities, notes possible areas of political friction, and considers the implications of the failure to adequately prepare. Having the appropriate decontamination techniques established and long-term plans in place before an incident occurs will significantly improve the government's ability to protect public and environmental security, establish a viable decontamination strategy, allow residents to return to their homes, and get the local economy back on its feet.     

IF YOU WANT IT DONE RIGHT,DO IT YOURSELF

Some have argued that the transatlantic rancor over the Iraq war made cooperation, especially on nonproliferation, unlikely. In contrast, this article, documents post-invasion instances of nonproliferation cooperation, with particular emphasis on the Proliferation Security Initiative and the EU-3 Initiative—the British, French, and German negotiations with Iran over its suspected nuclear activities. In addition to documenting French and British participation in these initiatives, the article analyzes why they have chosen to participate and argues that France and Britain have participated in both efforts because they are committed to avoiding future Iraq-like preventive wars.     

The Iraq Survey Group: From Weapons of Mass Destruction to Counterinsurgency

The discovery and elimination of Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was a focal point of the Coalition's strategy and operations in the aftermath of Operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’. Despite the failure of the WMD mission to meet expectations after almost two years of intensive operations, the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) was able to integrate multinational and multi-agency forces to provide detailed intelligence regarding the history of Iraq's WMD programs and to assist in the battle against insurgents. The ISG's experience raises the question of whether a standing intelligence force could become a key component in future counterproliferation and counterterrorism efforts around the world.1 ¹The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Dept. of Defense, or the US Government. View all notes     

Whose Hearts and Whose Minds? The Curious Case of Global Counter-Insurgency

Traditionally regarded as a secondary activity in military thinking and practice, the notion of counter-insurgency (COIN) has undergone a remarkable renaissance. This analysis traces the origins of this renaissance to two distinctive schools: a neo-classical school and a global insurgency school. The global insurgency school critiques neo-classical thought and presents itself as a more sophisticated appreciation of current security problems. An examination of the evolution of these two schools of counter-insurgency reveals how the interplay between them ultimately leaves us with a confused and contradictory understanding of the phenomenon of insurgency and the policies and strategies necessary to combat it.     

Reviews

Ian Castle and Ian Knight, Fearful Hard Times: The Siege and Relief of Eshowe, 1879. Greenhill Books, London 1994, Pp.256, 85 illus, 6 maps, index. £17.95. ISBN 1–85367–180–0.

Michael E. Brown (ed.), Ethnic Conflict and International Security. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993, Pp.263, selected biblio, index. $45/£30 (cloth); $14.95/£12.95 (paper). ISBN 0–691–03368 and 00068–9.

Deborah Poole and Gerardo Renique, Peru: Time of Fear. London: Latin American Bureau (Research and Action) Ltd., 1992. Pp.212, 7 maps, photographs, glossary, sources/further reading, index. £17.99 ISBN 0–906156–70‐X and ‐71–8.

David A. Charters (ed.), Peacekeeping and the Challenge of Civil Conflict Resolution. Center for Conflict Studies, University of New Brunswick, 1994. Pp.viii+220. NP.

Joachim Remak, A Very Civil War: The Swiss Sonderbund War of 1847. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993. Pp.xvi+221, 6 map's, 68 illus, biblio, index. $24.95/£16.95.     

Military Debt: Perspectives from the Experience of Arab Countries

The sectoral production function model of Feder (1983) has been widely used to examine the link between defence spending and economic growth. In this paper, the model, for which too much has been claimed in some past work, is examined, and the case is made for using growth in real non‐defence output rather than growth in real aggregate output (inclusive of military spending) as the dependent variable. Attention is restricted to a small group of OECD countries for which reliable labour force and capital stock (as well as defence) data are obtainable. With non‐defence output as the dependent variable and using only high quality data, no evidence in favour of the underconsumptionist (as opposed to the defence as a burden) position is found.