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871.
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001 and Hurricane Katrina, the United States government has spent tens of billions of dollars to improve the nation's ability to respond to a natural disaster or terrorist attack, but the emphasis on immediate first response has left many long-term environmental, political, and technological challenges unaddressed. Although a dirty bomb attack is unlikely to yield the same amount of physical devastation and death as caused by Katrina or a nuclear weapon, the social, psychological, and economic impact would be enormous. At present, however, the United States lacks the technology necessary to decontaminate a large, densely populated urban area under time, political, and economic constraints. This article reviews past cleanup experiences and current decontamination capabilities to consider the long-term implications of a dirty bomb, identifies weaknesses in America's existing response capabilities, notes possible areas of political friction, and considers the implications of the failure to adequately prepare. Having the appropriate decontamination techniques established and long-term plans in place before an incident occurs will significantly improve the government's ability to protect public and environmental security, establish a viable decontamination strategy, allow residents to return to their homes, and get the local economy back on its feet. 相似文献
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Some have argued that the transatlantic rancor over the Iraq war made cooperation, especially on nonproliferation, unlikely. In contrast, this article, documents post-invasion instances of nonproliferation cooperation, with particular emphasis on the Proliferation Security Initiative and the EU-3 Initiative—the British, French, and German negotiations with Iran over its suspected nuclear activities. In addition to documenting French and British participation in these initiatives, the article analyzes why they have chosen to participate and argues that France and Britain have participated in both efforts because they are committed to avoiding future Iraq-like preventive wars. 相似文献
876.
Randall R. Dipert 《Journal of Military Ethics》2013,12(1):34-53
Almost all discussions of cyberwarfare, other cyber-attacks, and cyber-espionage have focused entirely on the Internet as the chief means of damage – the Internet as a ‘vector,’ using a term from the theory of infectious diseases. However there are a variety of means, some of which have already been used, that involve cyber-exploitation using vectors other than the Internet. Malware can be installed in the integrated circuits of computers and servers, but also in any devices attached to them – thumb drives, CDs, printers, scanners, and so on. One can also use various forms of electromagnetic radiation at a distance of meters or more to exfiltrate data or to infiltrate corrupt data. I call this large and diverse family of unwanted interference with the functioning of information processing systems other-than-Internet (OTI) attacks on information systems. Stuxnet, and probably the 2007 Israeli corruption of Syrian air defenses, were OTI attacks. Such OTI techniques are more difficult to develop than creating malware, requiring electronic manufacturing facilities or novel technologies, and are thus accessible only to larger corporations and technologically sophisticated countries. Particularly vulnerable would be countries (like the United States and Europe) whose information processing devices are mainly produced outside of the country. Once exploitations via the Internet become harder to perpetrate, OTI exploitations are certain to grow dramatically, eventually requiring equipment for critical uses to be expensively fabricated in (and transported using) secure facilities; expensive detection measures will have to be instituted. This will create challenges for policy, law, and ethics, as well as greatly increasing the cost of many electronic devices. 相似文献
877.
Recent supply‐chain models that study competition among capacity‐constrained producers omit the possibility of producers strategically setting wholesale prices to create uncertainty with regards to (i.e., to obfuscate) their production capacities. To shed some light on this possibility, we study strategic obfuscation in a supply‐chain model comprised of two competing producers and a retailer, where one of the producers faces a privately‐known capacity constraint. We show that capacity obfuscation can strictly increase the obfuscating producer's profit, therefore, presenting a clear incentive for such practices. Moreover, we identify conditions under which both producers' profits increase. In effect, obfuscation enables producers to tacitly collude and charge higher wholesale prices by moderating competition between producers. The retailer, in contrast, suffers a loss in profit, raises retail prices, while overall channel profits decrease. We show that the extent of capacity obfuscation is limited by its cost and by a strategic retailer's incentive to facilitate a deterrence. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 244–267, 2014 相似文献
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J. Atsu Amegashie 《Defence and Peace Economics》2014,25(4):381-400
I study a two-period model of conflict with two combatants and a third party who is an ally of one of the combatants. The third party is fully informed about the type of her ally but not about the type of her ally’s enemy. In a signaling game, I find that if the third party is unable to give a sufficiently high assistance to her ally, then there exists a unique separating equilibrium in which the third party’s expected intervention causes her ally’s enemy to exert more effort than in the absence of third-party intervention; this worsens the conflict. 相似文献
880.
Stephen J. Cimbala 《Defense & Security Analysis》2014,30(1):29-43
US nuclear deterrence and arms control policy may be moving, by design and by inadvertence, toward a posture of strategic “defensivism”. Strategic “defensivism” emphasizes the overlapping and reinforcing impact of: (1) reductions in US, Russian and possibly other strategic nuclear forces, possibly down to the level of “minimum deterrence,” (2) deployment of improved strategic and/or theater antimissile defenses for the US, NATO allies and other partners; and (3) additional reliance on conventional military forces for some missions hitherto preferentially assigned to nuclear weapons. This article deals with the first two of these aspects only: the interaction between missile defenses and offensive force reductions in US–Russian strategy and policy. The findings are that stable deterrence as between the USA and Russia is possible at lower than New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty levels, but reductions below 1000 deployed long-range weapons for each state, toward a true minimum deterrent posture, will require multilateral as opposed to bilateral coordination of arms limitations. Missile defenses might provide some denial capability against light attacks by states with small arsenals, but they still fall short of meaningful damage limitation as between powers capable of massive nuclear strikes. 相似文献