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891.
ABSTRACTThis paper examines the importance of closer co-operation in defence-related procurement. Led by the decision that Belgium will lead the procurement of 12 Mine CounterMeasures Vessels (MCMV), the case of a potential Belgian naval construction cluster is discussed. The feasibility of a potential cluster is investigated by looking at key elements of a successful naval construction cluster, the Dutch naval construction cluster, and comparing those key elements to the current Belgian situation. Forming a sustainable Belgian naval construction cluster will be difficult. Most of the procurement process of the MCMVs is set on a European tender. In the long run, due to the absence of both a launching customer and leader firms, no party is able to carry the cluster with investments and knowledge spill-overs. In order to keep public support for large defence-related investments, clustering around the MCMV integration system and proactive cluster support is recommended. 相似文献
892.
David J. Lonsdale 《Journal of Military Ethics》2020,19(1):20-39
ABSTRACT Cyber attack against Critical National Infrastructure is a developing capability in state arsenals. The onset of this new instrument in national security has implications for conflict thresholds and military ethics. To serve as a legitimate tool of policy, cyber attack must operate in accordance with moral concerns. To test the viability of cyber attack, this paper provides a new perspective on cyber ethics. Cyber attack is tested against the criteria of the common good. This involves identifying the four core components of the common good from a conflict perspective: respect for the person; social wellbeing; peace and security; and solidarity. The fate of these components is assessed in relation to the six key characteristics of cyber attack from a moral standpoint: security; the role or absence of violence; discrimination; proportionality; cyberharm; and the threshold of conflict. It is concluded that the common good must be incorporated into developing state cyber strategies. 相似文献
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James J. Wirtz 《Defense & Security Analysis》2020,36(1):88-100
ABSTRACTA call for innovation as a means to outpace the acceleration of technological change and to bolster capabilities quickly is a central theme of contemporary U.S. Naval Strategy. The need for innovation is accepted, but the integration of readily available technologies into the Fleet is slow. Innovation unfolds according to “Navy-Time,” a cycle lasting between a long-decade and thirty-years. To accelerate the innovation process in the U.S. Navy, the article offers a Concept of Operations for Innovation that outlines how a deliberate process of analysis, weaponisation and integration can move new ideas and weapons into the Fleet in a strategically relevant time-frame. 相似文献
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ABSTRACTNo issue deserves more scrutiny than the mechanisms whereby popular unrest unleashes civil wars. We argue that one institution – two-tiered security systems – is particularly pernicious in terms of the accompanying civil war risk. These systems’ defining characteristic is the juxtaposition of small communally stacked units that protect regimes from internal adversaries with larger regular armed forces that deter external opponents. These systems aggravate civil war risks because stacked security units lack the size to repress widespread dissent, but inhibit rapid regime change through coup d’état. Regular militaries, meanwhile, fracture when ordered to employ force against populations from which they were recruited. 相似文献