Michael J. Armstrong 《海军后勤学研究》2007,54(1):66-77

This article considers two related questions of tactics in the context of the salvo model for naval missile combat. For a given set of targets, how many missiles should be fired to produce an effective attack? For a given available salvo size, how many enemy targets should be fired at? In the deterministic version of the model I derive a simple optimality relationship between the number of missiles to fire and the number of targets to engage. In the stochastic model I employ the expected loss inflicted and the probability of enemy elimination as the main performance measures and use these to derive salvo sizes that are in some sense “optimal.” I find that the offensive firepower needed for an effective attack depends not only on a target's total strength but also on the relative balance between its active defensive power and passive staying power. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007  相似文献   

    

Daniel R. Jeske  Ashwin Sampath 《海军后勤学研究》2004,51(5):720-740

The Signal‐to‐Interference‐plus‐Noise Ratio (SINR) is an important metric of wireless communication link quality. SINR estimates have several important applications. These include optimizing the transmit power level for a target quality of service, assisting with handoff decisions and dynamically adapting the data rate for wireless Internet applications. Accurate SINR estimation provides for both a more efficient system and a higher user‐perceived quality of service. In this paper, we develop new SINR estimators and compare their mean squared error (MSE) performance. We show that our new estimators dominate estimators that have previously appeared in the literature with respect to MSE. The sequence of transmitted bits in wireless communication systems consists of both pilot bits (which are known both to the transmitter and receiver) and user bits (which are known only by the transmitter). The SINR estimators we consider alternatively depend exclusively on pilot bits, exclusively on user bits, or simultaneously use both pilot and user bits. In addition, we consider estimators that utilize smoothing and feedback mechanisms. Smoothed estimators are motivated by the fact that the interference component of the SINR changes relatively slowly with time, typically with the addition or departure of a user to the system. Feedback estimators are motivated by the fact that receivers typically decode bits correctly with a very high probability, and therefore user bits can be thought of as quasipilot bits. For each estimator discussed, we derive an exact or approximate formula for its MSE. Satterthwaite approximations, noncentral F distributions (singly and doubly) and distribution theory of quadratic forms are the key statistical tools used in developing the MSE formulas. In the case of approximate MSE formulas, we validate their accuracy using simulation techniques. The approximate MSE formulas, of interest in their own right for comparing the quality of the estimators, are also used for optimally combining estimators. In particular, we derive optimal weights for linearly combining an estimator based on pilot bits with an estimator based on user bits. The optimal weights depend on the MSE of the two estimators being combined, and thus the accurate approximate MSE formulas can conveniently be used. The optimal weights also depend on the unknown SINR, and therefore need to be estimated in order to construct a useable combined estimator. The impact on the MSE of the combined estimator due to estimating the weights is examined. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004  相似文献   

    

Erik J Dahl 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(1):31-55

Many scholars and analysts have studied intelligence failure and surprise and developed theories to explain disasters such as the attack on Pearl Harbor. Others, especially since the 9/11 attacks, have examined the rising threat of terrorism and see it as posing a particularly difficult challenge for the intelligence community. But little work has been done to integrate the earlier literature on intelligence failure with the newer threat of terrorist attack. This article attempts such an integration, by examining the bombing of the US Marine Barracks in Beirut in 1983; it concludes that most studies of the Beirut bombing are mistaken in their assessment of the role played by intelligence in that disaster, and suggests that our understanding of intelligence failure against surprise attacks needs to be revised in the age of terrorism.  相似文献   

    

J. N.C. Hill 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(1):4-31

The aim of this article is to consider how Algeria's most prized achievement and treasured memory – the FLN's victory over the French in the war of liberation – has helped stimulate and sustain the violence that has blighted the country since independence. It argues that successive governments have propagated a legend of the war that encourages and legitimises rebellion and armed resistance. By celebrating the actions and achievements of a committed band of revolutionaries they have established a precedent whereby it is every citizen's duty to oppose and resist an unjust government. Time and again therefore, insurgent groups like the FFS, MIA, and AIS have justified their actions and won popular support by portraying themselves as the early FLN's natural heir.  相似文献   

    

Matthew J. Morgan 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(2):147-169

The Western way of warfare has not prepared the US Army or American society for appreciating an approach to national security that does not yield decisive and measurable outcomes. This proclivity may have significant consequences given the changing nature of the international security environment in the twenty-first century. In order to preserve national security and global stability, American strategic thinkers must understand the evolution of the national strategic culture. Then adjustments must be made to deal effectively with the challenges of a changed world order. Rather than limiting the use of force to decisive means and outcomes, the American military profession must be seriously prepared for success in less dramatic stability and support missions.  相似文献   

    

Prof. Dr. Domício Proença Júnior  E. E. Duarte 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(4):645-677

This article assesses the existing literature on logistics in war, concluding that there is no satisfactory conceptual definition of logistics. It proposes a concept of logistics derived from Clausewitz's theory of war to fill that void. This is presented as a derivation because Clausewitz's distinction between (1) the use of the fighting forces (tactics and strategy) and (2) all other activities in war that were required so that forces could be taken as a given. The latter, left unnamed by Clausewitz, corresponds to a concept of logistics that proves to be an analytical peer to Clausewitz's categories of politics, tactics and strategy.  相似文献   

    

Christopher J. Eberle 《Journal of Military Ethics》2013,12(1):54-67

My aim in this paper is to reflect on a very narrow question: under what conditions might a cyber-attack provide a just cause for war? I begin by articulating what makes for a just cause, briefly address the problem of attribution, and then discuss three broad categories of cyber-attack: those that clearly do not satisfy the just cause requirement, those that clearly do satisfy the just cause requirement, and three ambiguous cases – the destruction of property, the emplacement of logic bombs, and the failure to prevent cyber-attacks. My conclusions are exploratory and suggestive rather than definitive, partly by virtue of the extreme paucity of literature on the moral assessment of cyberwar.  相似文献   

    

Bradley J. Strawser 《Journal of Military Ethics》2013,12(1):1-3

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M. J. Williams 《Defense & Security Analysis》2013,29(2):170-171

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NORAD and binational nuclear alert: Consultation and decisionmaking in the integrated command     

David J. R. Angell 《Defense & Security Analysis》1988,4(2):129-146

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