Safety in international security: a view point from the practice of accident investigation

While security points to a deliberate harming of humans and/or the environment, safety refers to unintended damage. In this view point, I will analyse how the distinction between safety and security matters in the practice of accident investigation and I will argue that the division between the fields is problematic for the assessment of security-related safety risks. Drawing on the case of the our accident investigation into the downing of flight MH17 above Ukraine in 2014, I highlight key dilemmas the Dutch Safety Board dealt with.     

Military expenditure,economic growth and structural instability: a case study of South Africa

This paper contributes to the growing literature on the milex-growth nexus, by providing a case study of South Africa and considering the possibility of structural breaks by applying newly developed econometric methods. Using full sample bootstrap Granger non-causality tests, no Granger causal link is found between military expenditure and GDP for 1951–2010, but parameter instability tests show the estimated VARs to be unstable. Using a bootstrap rolling window estimation procedure, however, finds evidence of bidirectional Granger causality in various subsamples. This implies standard Granger non-causality tests, which neither account for structural breaks nor time variation may be invalid.     

Less than Meets the Eye

Observers of United States (US) interventions have almost universally characterized the 1994 Haiti intervention as multilateral, a model for how international cooperation can achieve common security goals. A closer analysis of the intervention reveals that the planning and execution of the intervention were almost entirely unilateral and therefore cost the US few if any of the theoretical costs of coalition warfare, including interoperability and policy compromise. Mapped onto the unilateral strategy and operation of the intervention, however, was a multilateral diplomatic effort that secured United Nations Security Council authorization and provided a cover for an intervention that the US had already planned and intended to execute with or without that authorization. That the US sought a multilateral cover for an intervention that it could easily accomplish unilaterally shows the importance of two factors: A domestic audience that opposed unilateral peacekeeping but would accept using US resources as part of a broader multilateral operation, and a local population that would be more responsive to a multilateral coalition than a use of force that was perceived to be unilateral. The Haiti intervention shows that the determinants of success in operations other than war are as much political as military. When the US already has overwhelming military superiority vis-à-vis its adversary, building military coalitions becomes as much about enlisting political support as aggregating material capability.     

Building Trust in the Mission Area: a Weapon Against Terrorism?

Military units on missions abroad face, among other challenges, terrorism. Terrorists are hard to recognize since they operate non-uniformed. Detection of terrorists in the area of operation can best be done by winning the trust of the local population, who can provide information. However, since the military rotates its units regularly, it is hard to build up a trusting relationship with the local population. Other players in the field of international operations are civil aid organisations. They remain in the area for a lengthy period of time, and often build up trusting relationships with the local population. Trust between civil aid organisations and the military is a triple edged sword, as it enables co-operation: the civil aid organisations get the protection they need from the military, the military gets the information it needs through civil aid organisations and the local population is supported in rebuilding society by repressing terrorism.     

Models for production planning under power interruptions

We present a robust optimization model for production planning under the assumption that electricity supply is subject to uncertain interruptions caused by participation in interruptible load contracts (ILCs). The objective is to minimize the cost of electricity used for production while providing a robust production plan which ensures demand satisfaction under all possible interruption scenarios. The combinatorial size of the set of interruption scenarios makes this a challenging problem. Furthermore, we assume that no probabilistic information is known about the supply uncertainty: we only use the information given in the ILC to identify an uncertainty set that captures the possible scenarios. We construct a general robust framework to handle this uncertainty and present a heuristic to compute a good feasible solution of the robust model. We provide computational experiments on a real‐world example and compare the performance of an exact solver applied to the robust model with that of the heuristic procedure. Finally, we include the operational impact of interruptions such as “recovery modes” in the definition of the uncertainty set. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

HARNESSING GLOBAL TRADE DATA FOR BIOLOGICAL ARMS CONTROL

Unlike treaties dealing with nuclear and chemical weapons, the Biological Weapons Convention still lacks formal verification measures, 31 years after entering into force. Here we propose a global export-import monitoring system of biological dual-use items as an additional measure for a web of biological arms controls that could complement traditional export controls. We suggest that such a measure may help to guide consultation or verification processes in the biological area.     

A Territorial Conflict: Trade-offs and Strategies

We study a war scenario in which the winner occupies the loser’s territory. Attacking a territory increases the chance of winning, but also causes harm, which in turn decreases the territory’s value (i.e. the reward of winning). This paper highlights the effects of this trade-off on the equilibrium strategies of the warring states in a contest game with endogenous rewards. Providing both static and dynamic models, our analysis captures insights regarding strategic behavior in asymmetric contests with such conflict.     

Group testing procedures with quantitative features and incomplete identification

We present a group testing model for items characterized by marker random variables. An item is defined to be good (defective) if its marker is below (above) a given threshold. The items can be tested in groups; the goal is to obtain a prespecified number of good items by testing them in optimally sized groups. Besides this group size, the controller has to select a threshold value for the group marker sums, and the target number of groups which by the tests are classified to consist only of good items. These decision variables have to be chosen so as to minimize a cost function, which is a linear combination of the expected number of group tests and an expected penalty for missing the desired number of good items, subject to constraints on the probabilities of misclassifications. We treat two models of this kind: the first one is based on an infinite population size, whereas the second one deals with the case of a finite number of available items. All performance measures are derived in closed form; approximations are also given. Furthermore, we prove monotonicity properties of the components of the objective function and of the constraints. In several examples, we study (i) the dependence of the cost function on the decision variables and (ii) the dependence of the optimal values of the decision variables (group size, group marker threshold, and stopping rule for groups classified as clean) and of the target functionals (optimal expected number of tests, optimal expected penalty, and minimal expected cost) on the system parameters.© 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011     

Inventory pooling games for expensive,low‐demand spare parts

We consider several independent decision makers who stock expensive, low‐demand spare parts for their high‐tech machines. They can collaborate by full pooling of their inventories via free transshipments. We examine the stability of such pooling arrangements, and we address the issue of fairly distributing the collective holding and downtime costs over the participants, by applying concepts from cooperative game theory. We consider two settings: one where each party maintains a predetermined stocking level and one where base stock levels are optimized. For the setting with fixed stocking levels, we unravel the possibly conflicting effects of implementing a full pooling arrangement and study these effects separately to establish intuitive conditions for existence of a stable cost allocation. For the setting with optimized stocking levels, we provide a simple proportional rule that accomplishes a population monotonic allocation scheme if downtime costs are symmetric among participants. Although our whole analysis is motivated by spare parts applications, all results are also applicable to other pooled resource systems of which the steady‐state behavior is equivalent to that of an Erlang loss system. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2012