Exact expected values of variance estimators for simulation

We formulate exact expressions for the expected values of selected estimators of the variance parameter (that is, the sum of covariances at all lags) of a steady‐state simulation output process. Given in terms of the autocovariance function of the process, these expressions are derived for variance estimators based on the simulation analysis methods of nonoverlapping batch means, overlapping batch means, and standardized time series. Comparing estimator performance in a first‐order autoregressive process and the M/M/1 queue‐waiting‐time process, we find that certain standardized time series estimators outperform their competitors as the sample size becomes large. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Pricing bridges to cross a river

We consider a pricing problem in directed, uncapacitated networks. Tariffs must be defined by an operator, the leader, for a subset of m arcs, the tariff arcs. Costs of all other arcs in the network are assumed to be given. There are n clients, the followers, and after the tariffs have been determined, the clients route their demands independent of each other on paths with minimal total cost. The problem is to find tariffs that maximize the operator's revenue. Motivated by applications in telecommunication networks, we consider a restricted version of this problem, assuming that each client utilizes at most one of the operator's tariff arcs. The problem is equivalent to pricing bridges that clients can use in order to cross a river. We prove that this problem is APX‐hard. Moreover, we analyze the effect of uniform pricing, proving that it yields both an m approximation and a (1 + lnD)‐approximation. Here, D is upper bounded by the total demand of all clients. In addition, we consider the problem under the additional restriction that the operator must not reject any of the clients. We prove that this problem does not admit approximation algorithms with any reasonable performance guarantee, unless P = NP, and we prove the existence of an n‐approximation algorithm. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

A produce‐to‐stock system with advance demand information and secondary customers

We consider a manufacturer (i.e., a capacitated supplier) that produces to stock and has two classes of customers. The primary customer places orders at regular intervals of time for a random quantity, while the secondary customers request a single item at random times. At a predetermined time the manufacturer receives advance demand information regarding the order size of the primary customer. If the manufacturer is not able to fill the primary customer's demand, there is a penalty. On the other hand, serving the secondary customers results in additional profit; however, the manufacturer can refuse to serve the secondary customers in order to reserve inventory for the primary customer. We characterize the manufacturer's optimal production and stock reservation policies that maximize the manufacturer's discounted profit and the average profit per unit time. We show that these policies are threshold‐type policies, and these thresholds are monotone with respect to the primary customer's order size. Using a numerical study we provide insights into how the value of information is affected by the relative demand size of the primary and secondary customers. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Some rectangular games with a two-man team

Certain zero-sum games are examined in which an individual player is opposed by a two-man team. The members of the team have identical interests, but must act separately during play. Most of the paper is devoted to instances in which one teammate has an opportunity to communicate to the other about their mutual opponent's strategy; but he may only be able to transmit a limited amount of information and his choice of a “message” may affect the payoff. The team must thus make economically efficient use of a limited communication opportunity. The present paper treats a variety of models, all of which are formulated as rectangular (matrix) games. Related models, some of which cannot be so formulated either because of restrictions on the team's opportunities to use mixed strategies or because they are non-zero-sum games, will be treated in another paper.     

Stochastically minimizing the makespan in flow shops

In this article, we are concerned with scheduling stochastic jobs in a flowshop with m machines and zero intermediate storage. We assume that there are n - 2 identically distributed and 2 fast stochastic jobs. Roughly, the main result states that the makespan is stochastically minimized by placing one of the fast jobs first and the other last.     

Clustering in defence-related procurement: the case of a Belgian naval construction cluster

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the importance of closer co-operation in defence-related procurement. Led by the decision that Belgium will lead the procurement of 12 Mine CounterMeasures Vessels (MCMV), the case of a potential Belgian naval construction cluster is discussed. The feasibility of a potential cluster is investigated by looking at key elements of a successful naval construction cluster, the Dutch naval construction cluster, and comparing those key elements to the current Belgian situation. Forming a sustainable Belgian naval construction cluster will be difficult. Most of the procurement process of the MCMVs is set on a European tender. In the long run, due to the absence of both a launching customer and leader firms, no party is able to carry the cluster with investments and knowledge spill-overs. In order to keep public support for large defence-related investments, clustering around the MCMV integration system and proactive cluster support is recommended.     

Traffic channeling under uncertain conversion rates on e-commerce platforms

Traffic is the lifeblood of every e-commerce platform. The question of how to channel traffic to merchants operating on a platform lies at the heart of platform management. We consider a platform on which two independent merchants sell their products. Merchants compete on inventory in the sense that some of the unmet demand at one merchant will spill over to the other. The platform channels traffic based on products' conversion rates to maximize the total sale on the platform. We show that traffic channeling plays three roles. First, it allows more efficient allocation of traffic; that is, the merchant with a high conversion rate is given a higher priority in receiving traffic. Second, it allows the platform to control demand spillover between the merchants to maximize total sales. The platform either facilitates or prevents demand spillover, depending on product substitutability. Third, traffic channeling intensifies competition between the merchants and hence increases the total inventory. More efficient allocation of traffic and the increase in inventory increase sales inequality between the merchants. In contrast, demand spillover decreases sales inequality. While the platform always benefits from traffic channeling, the merchants do not benefit when their products are moderately substitutable. Interestingly, when the two products are owned and sold by the same merchant, the opposite happens–traffic channeling always benefits the merchant but may hurt the platform. Our study provides a basis for informed discussions on how platforms should channel traffic in response to conversion rates, and how traffic channeling affects the welfare of merchants and platforms.