The German campaign in Norway 1940 as a joint operation

The German invasion in Norway in April 1940 was unique in that it was the first major ‘triphibious’ campaign. It was an operation that was equally dependent upon naval, air and ground forces for success. Norway had long been of interest to German strategists, especially naval thinkers. However, no serious Wehrmacht plans for occupying Norway were even started until December 1939. A small group of staff officers of the three services put together a comprehensive plan in a matter of weeks. The article examines the effectiveness of the German interservice co‐operation and OKW leadership in a very tough and close run campaign. Although there were numerous problems, interservice co‐operation was fairly effective at the tactical and operational levels. Indeed, the Germans won the campaign largely because their services worked together much better than their Allied opponents.     

Uncharted Waters: Information in the First Modern Joint Campaign – Norway 1940

The 1940 Norway campaign was the first truly modern joint operation in which ground, sea and air forces all played major roles. With three services involved over a huge theater of war, the normal friction in obtaining and disseminating intelligence and information that one finds in a joint operation was multiplied. As the two sides were fairly evenly matched, effective use of intelligence and information provided a decisive advantage. This paper analyzes the use of information and intelligence of both sides at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Both sides performed poorly at the strategic level but the Germans proved far superior to the British at the operational and tactical levels. The paper challenges several common assumptions on the importance of intelligence and information in joint campaigns.     

Counterinsurgency and the limits of state-building: An analysis of Colombia's policy of territorial consolidation, 2006–2012

Since 2002 the Colombian government has been implementing a series of policy initiatives that have sought to coordinate state resources in a neo-classical counterinsurgency approach to fight the country's main insurgent group, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), and recover and consolidate the territory. Despite impressive operational successes against the insurgency and other illegal groups, the government has been unable to reassert its control and build legitimacy via the state-building effort known as ‘Consolidación’, in some of the most recalcitrant areas of the country. This article examines two areas where government efforts at consolidation appear to be failing to discuss the limits of COIN theory and practice.     

Virtual War in the Ice Jungle: ‘We don't know how to do this’

The Cold War at sea expanded in many realms, including the frigid and treacherous waters of the Arctic Ocean. The US Navy pioneered these efforts with the visit of USS Nautilus to the North Pole in 1958. During the latter stages of the Cold War, however, Soviet naval strategists began to conceptualize the polar ice cap as a strategic asset for cloaking the operations of its nuclear missile submarines. As under-ice operations afforded the Soviet submarine fleet advantages of stealth, proximity to target and tighter lines of communications, both navies were forced to try to develop tactics for combat under these extremely complex and arduous conditions.     

Dying to prove a point: The methodology of Dying to Win

Dying to Win is one of the most important works on suicide terrorism. It purports to unravel the strategic, social, and individual logic that gives suicide terrorism its coercive value. The methodology that Pape uses to support his various assertions is problematic for three reasons. First, he defines his key terms in such a way as to artificially set suicide terrorism apart from other forms of political violence. Second, in a number of cases Pape selects data from single sources to support particular assertions when other sources of data, used together, could provide more rigorous and useful insights into the phenomenon of suicide bombing. Finally, Pape codes his data on suicide attacks according to a loose set of criteria which, if recoded, calls into question some of his broader conclusions about the strategic utility of suicide terrorism campaigns.     

Waypoint analysis for command and control

Command and Control (C2) in a military setting can be epitomized in battles‐of‐old when commanders would seek high ground to gain superior spatial‐temporal information; from this vantage point, decisions were made and relayed to units in the field. Although the fundamentals remain, technology has changed the practice of C2; for example, enemy units may be observed remotely, with instruments of varying positional accuracy. A basic problem in C2 is the ability to track an enemy object in the battlespace and to forecast its future position; the (extended) Kalman filter provides a straightforward solution. The problem changes fundamentally if one assumes that the moving object is headed for an (unknown) location, or waypoint. This article is concerned with the new problem of estimation of such a waypoint, for which we use Bayesian statistical prediction. The computational burden is greater than an ad hoc regression‐based estimate, which we also develop, but the Bayesian approach has a big advantage in that it yields both a predictor and a measure of its variability. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004