The German campaign in Norway 1940 as a joint operation

The German invasion in Norway in April 1940 was unique in that it was the first major ‘triphibious’ campaign. It was an operation that was equally dependent upon naval, air and ground forces for success. Norway had long been of interest to German strategists, especially naval thinkers. However, no serious Wehrmacht plans for occupying Norway were even started until December 1939. A small group of staff officers of the three services put together a comprehensive plan in a matter of weeks. The article examines the effectiveness of the German interservice co‐operation and OKW leadership in a very tough and close run campaign. Although there were numerous problems, interservice co‐operation was fairly effective at the tactical and operational levels. Indeed, the Germans won the campaign largely because their services worked together much better than their Allied opponents.     

Uncharted Waters: Information in the First Modern Joint Campaign – Norway 1940

The 1940 Norway campaign was the first truly modern joint operation in which ground, sea and air forces all played major roles. With three services involved over a huge theater of war, the normal friction in obtaining and disseminating intelligence and information that one finds in a joint operation was multiplied. As the two sides were fairly evenly matched, effective use of intelligence and information provided a decisive advantage. This paper analyzes the use of information and intelligence of both sides at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Both sides performed poorly at the strategic level but the Germans proved far superior to the British at the operational and tactical levels. The paper challenges several common assumptions on the importance of intelligence and information in joint campaigns.     

Dying to prove a point: The methodology of Dying to Win

Dying to Win is one of the most important works on suicide terrorism. It purports to unravel the strategic, social, and individual logic that gives suicide terrorism its coercive value. The methodology that Pape uses to support his various assertions is problematic for three reasons. First, he defines his key terms in such a way as to artificially set suicide terrorism apart from other forms of political violence. Second, in a number of cases Pape selects data from single sources to support particular assertions when other sources of data, used together, could provide more rigorous and useful insights into the phenomenon of suicide bombing. Finally, Pape codes his data on suicide attacks according to a loose set of criteria which, if recoded, calls into question some of his broader conclusions about the strategic utility of suicide terrorism campaigns.     

Selecting T for a periodic review inventory model with staggered deliveries

Consider a single‐item, periodic review, infinite‐horizon, undiscounted, inventory model with stochastic demands, proportional holding and shortage costs, and full backlogging. Orders can arrive in every period, and the cost of receiving them is negligible (as in a JIT setting). Every T periods, one audits the current stock level and decides on deliveries for the next T periods, thus incurring a fixed audit cost and—when one schedules deliveries—a fixed order cost. The problem is to find a review period T and an ordering policy that satisfy the average cost criterion. The current article extends an earlier treatment of this problem, which assumed that the fixed order cost is automatically incurred once every T periods. We characterize an optimal ordering policy when T is fixed, prove that an optimal review period T** exists, and develop a global search algorithm for its computation. We also study the behavior of four approximations to T** based on the assumption that the fixed order cost is incurred during every cycle. Analytic results from a companion article (where μ/σ is large) and extensive computational experiments with normal and gamma demand test problems suggest these approximations and associated heuristic policies perform well when μ/σ ≥ 2. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 47: 329–352, 2000     

Mimetic and normative isomorphism in the establishment and maintenance of independent air forces

Why do countries have air forces? Organizational alternatives, such as maintaining separate air arms for the army and navy, have become quite rare. The conventional narrative advanced by advocates of independent air forces stress that the primacy of airpower in modern warfare mandates centralized control of most military aviation. In this view, political–military uncertainty has driven mimetic isomorphism – pressure on national governments to organize as others organize so as to fight or deter war just as effectively. However, working from a set of 56 countries that were politically independent within a few years of the establishment of the first ever independent air force (the Royal Air Force) in 1918, and continuing through nearly the present, there is no clear pattern of external military pressure prompting this particular reorganization. Rather, from anecdotal evidence, the cause has more likely been normative isomorphism – a professional craving to look as others look to foster political or personal legitimacy. For whatever reason, though, choices of structures tend to lead to specific choices of policies. Thus, the result suggests that defense ministries looking for more effective or less costly organizational schemas may reasonably consider alternatives to the tripartite army–navy–air force structure.     

Estimating the probability of a diffusing target encountering a stationary sensor

The problem addressed is that of estimating the probability of a moving particle (called the target) avoiding detection by a stationary sensor to time t. The target follows a diffusion path and is constrained to remain within a square region R. The detecting sensor is fixed at the center of A. Two expressions for this probability are given. The first results from an approximation to the exact solution of the diffusion equation and the second from experimentation with a Monte Carlo simulation of the diffusion process.