A mixed-model multilevel manufacturing facility running under a just-in-time (JIT) production system is controlled by setting the production schedule for the highest level in the facility, which is usually a mixed-model final assembly line. The schedule is set to achieve the goals of the organization, which under JIT are (1) to keep a constant rate of part usage, and (2) to maintain a smooth production load. In this article we extend earlier work in the literature, which focused on the first goal, by developing scheduling procedures which satisfy both goals. Properties of the resulting production schedules are analyzed and illustrative examples are presented. 相似文献
America's Secret Power: the CIA in a Democratic Society. By Loch K. Johnson. Oxford University Press, New York (1989), ISBN 0–19–505490–3, $24.95
The Bundeswehr and Western Security. Edited by Stephen F. Szabo. Houndmills, Basingstoke, and Macmillan, London (1990), ISBN 0–333–49880–1, £45.00
Symbolic Defense: the Cultural Significance of the Strategic Defense Initiative. By Edward Tabor Linenthal. University of Illinois Press, Chicago, IL (1989), ISBN 0–252–01619‐X, $19.95
Rethinking European Security. Edited by Furio Cerutti and Rodolfo Ragionieri. Crane Russak, New York (1990), £29.00
Alternative Conventional Defense Postures in the European Theater, Vol. 1: The Military Balance and Domestic Constraints. Edited by Hans Günter Brauch and Robert Kennedy, Crane Russak, New York (1990), £32.00
The Gulf War. Edited by Hanns Maull and Otto Pick. Pinter, London (1989), ISBN 0–86187–763–2, £36.00 相似文献
This paper deals with the sequencing problem of minimizing linear delay costs with parallel identical processors. The theoretical properties of this m-machine problem are explored, and the problem of determining an optimum scheduling procedure is examined. Properties of the optimum schedule are given as well as the corresponding reductions in the number of schedules that must be evaluated in the search for an optimum. An experimental comparison of scheduling rules is reported; this indicates that although a class of effective heuristics can be identified, their relative behavior is difficult to characterize. 相似文献
This essay re-examines coalition warfare during the Napoleonic era by looking at the three eastern European powers – Austria, Prussia and Russia – how they interacted over time with France as well as each other, and how they managed French preponderance on the Continent. Before 1812, coalition warfare was dominated by eighteenth-century military and diplomatic attitudes: overall foreign political goals were ill-defined and were characterised by deep mistrust. The result was that the eastern powers pursued their own interests with little regard to coalition cohesion. If the coalition held together in 1813 and 1814, on the other hand, it was largely because individual powers' self-interest coincided with the overall objectives of the coalition – an increased determination to defeat Napoleon – along with a never before seen numerical superiority in allied troops. In this, Austria and especially Chancellor Metternich's role in juggling conflicting interests between the allies so that they could present, for the first time, a united front against France was fundamental. 相似文献