Learning in counterinsurgency: what do we really know?

Since the publication in 2002 of John Nagl's Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, organizational learning has been widely presumed an important ingredient for success in counterinsurgency. But sampling the literature from before and after this time shows remarkably little analytical treatment of the issue of learning and even confusion over what it may mean. This article considers the theories, hypotheses, research strategies, threats to validity, methods of measurement, treatments of time, and general lack of statistical analysis in the work to date and recommends a course for future research.     

How and why Boko Haram blossomed: examining the fatal consequences of treating a purposive terrorist organisation as less so

Boko Haram (BH) is an insurgent group that operates mainly in northeastern Nigeria. Its stated aim is to establish an Islamic state, and it employs terrorism as its strategy. Earlier interests of security analysts centred on the drivers of BH uprising and the possibility of its internationalisation. Today's concerns relate more to why the rebellion has lasted this long. In toeing the same line, this article demonstrates that BH is a purposive terror group against which the government has evolved no viable strategy. It examines some gains of BH over the past six years and how it benefitted from the government's underestimation of its capacity and determination. It concludes that to effectively engage BH, the Nigerian government must revaluate its threat and sincerely pursue an expanded strategy beyond the current military-centric approach. To be effective, government's response must be packaged in such a way as to enhance human security in the region.     

Constructive Ambiguity and the Peace Process in Northern Ireland

The Belfast Agreement of 1998 was hailed at the time as a breakthrough in conflict resolution both in Northern Ireland and as a model for international emulation. In fact it has turned out to be neither; rather it has been a sad exercise in surrendering to terrorism and the cause of increased sectarian segregation and enmity. The core of the problem lies in the 'constructive ambiguity' at the heart of the Agreement - that is, a form of words that all could sign up to because each party could interpret them differently. This may have enabled everyone to sign up, but also implied they were signing up to different things and therefore were not in agreement. Consequently clever word games and spin by politicians and senior civil servants have created an, in some ways, worse situation, largely because real, substantive issues were ducked. This in turn has its roots in postmodernism, whose baleful influence can be seen throughout not only the Agreement but most government policy over the past 20 odd years.