全文获取类型
收费全文 | 240篇 |
免费 | 3篇 |
出版年
2020年 | 5篇 |
2019年 | 5篇 |
2018年 | 4篇 |
2017年 | 10篇 |
2016年 | 6篇 |
2015年 | 3篇 |
2014年 | 5篇 |
2013年 | 71篇 |
2011年 | 3篇 |
2010年 | 3篇 |
2009年 | 3篇 |
2008年 | 2篇 |
2007年 | 2篇 |
2006年 | 2篇 |
2005年 | 4篇 |
2004年 | 2篇 |
2003年 | 2篇 |
2002年 | 2篇 |
2001年 | 3篇 |
2000年 | 2篇 |
1999年 | 2篇 |
1998年 | 3篇 |
1997年 | 2篇 |
1996年 | 2篇 |
1995年 | 6篇 |
1994年 | 4篇 |
1993年 | 3篇 |
1992年 | 7篇 |
1991年 | 9篇 |
1989年 | 4篇 |
1988年 | 2篇 |
1987年 | 6篇 |
1986年 | 4篇 |
1985年 | 6篇 |
1984年 | 3篇 |
1983年 | 2篇 |
1980年 | 4篇 |
1979年 | 1篇 |
1978年 | 4篇 |
1977年 | 2篇 |
1976年 | 2篇 |
1975年 | 3篇 |
1974年 | 6篇 |
1973年 | 4篇 |
1972年 | 1篇 |
1971年 | 1篇 |
1970年 | 3篇 |
1969年 | 1篇 |
1968年 | 2篇 |
1967年 | 1篇 |
排序方式: 共有243条查询结果,搜索用时 296 毫秒
91.
92.
James G. Taylor 《海军后勤学研究》1979,26(2):365-375
This paper develops new “simple” victory-prediction conditions for a linear Lanchester-type model of combat between two homogeneous forces with superimposed effects of supporting fires not subject to attrition. These simple victory-prediction conditions involve only the initial conditions of battle and certain assumptions about the nature of temporal variations in the attrition-rate coefficients. They are developed for a fixed-force-ratio-breakpoint battle by studying the force-ratio equation for the linear combat model. An important consideration is shown to be required for developing such simple victory-prediction conditions: victory is not guaranteed in a fixed-force-ratio-breakpoint battle even when the force ratio is always changing to the advantage of one of the combatants. One must specify additional conditions to hold for the cumulative fire effectivenesses of the primary weapon systems in order to develop correct victory-prediction conditions. The inadequacy of previous victory-prediction results is explained by examining (for the linear combat model without the supporting fires) new “exact” victory-prediction conditions, which show that even the range of possible battle outcomes may be significantly different for variable-coefficient and constant-coefficients models. 相似文献
93.
This paper examines the dependence of the structure of optimal time-sequential fire-support policies on the quantification of military objectives by considering four specific problems, each corresponding to a different quantification of objectives (i.e. criterion functional). We consider the optimal time-sequential allocation of supporting fires during the “approach to contact” of friendly infantry against enemy defensive positions. The combat dynamics are modelled by deterministic Lanchester-type equations of warfare, and the optimal fire-support policy for each one-sided combat optimization problem is developed via optimal control theory. The problems are all nonconvex, and local optima are a particular difficulty in one of them. For the same combat dynamics, the splitting of supporting fires between two enemy forces in any optimal policy (i.e. the optimality of singular subarcs) is shown to depend only on whether the terminal payoff reflects the objective of attaining an “overall” military advantage or a “local” one. Additionally, switching times for changes in the ranking of target priorities are shown to be different (sometimes significantly) when the decision criterion is the difference and the ratio of the military worths (computed according to linear utilities) of total infantry survivors and also the difference and the ratio of the military worths (computed according to linear utilities) of total infantry survivors and also the difference and the ratio of the military worths of the combatants' total infantry losses. Thus, the optimal fire-support policy for this attack scenario is shown to be significantly influenced by the quantification of military objectives. 相似文献
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
Terence Holmes 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(4):663-684
This article challenges the view that Schlieffen tried to evade the tactical conundrum of the modern battlefield by resorting to the operational level of war. On that view, the outflanking strategy of the Schlieffen Plan, with its supposed avoidance of frontal attack, betokened a failure to come to terms with the firepower revolution that had so enormously strengthened the tactical defensive. But Schlieffen did in fact engage directly with this problem by creating a mobile heavy artillery to improve the offensive tactical capability of the German army. Moreover, the Schlieffen Plan was not based exclusively on the outflanking principle. Schlieffen reckoned that the envelopment of Paris could succeed only in conjunction with a frontal assault on the whole line between Paris and Verdun, an immense tactical undertaking crucially supported by the mobile heavy artillery. 相似文献
99.
100.
Anthony James Joes 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(3):17-45
The struggle between the peasant population of the Vendee and the revolutionary government in Paris during the 1790s was perhaps the first, and certainly one of the earliest, of the modern ideological insurgencies. The conflict demonstrates the fatal weaknesses of a purely popular guerrilla movement deprived of sustained outside assistance. It also brings to the surface some less‐familiar aspects of the French Revolutionary regime. Most notably, that regime, determined to eradicate rather than conciliate the Vendean peasantry, employed methods that foreshadowed the techniques of National Socialism. 相似文献