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651.
    
This study examines whether the exclusion of ethnic groups from political power is an important contributing factor to domestic terrorism. To empirically test this question, we employ a negative binomial regression estimation on 130 countries during the period from 1981 to 2005. We find that countries in which certain ethnic populations are excluded from political power are significantly more likely to experience domestic terrorist attacks and to suffer from terrorist casualties; furthermore, ethnic group political exclusion is a more consistent and substantive predictor of domestic terrorist activity than general political repression or economic discrimination.  相似文献   
652.
    
Recent supply‐chain models that study competition among capacity‐constrained producers omit the possibility of producers strategically setting wholesale prices to create uncertainty with regards to (i.e., to obfuscate) their production capacities. To shed some light on this possibility, we study strategic obfuscation in a supply‐chain model comprised of two competing producers and a retailer, where one of the producers faces a privately‐known capacity constraint. We show that capacity obfuscation can strictly increase the obfuscating producer's profit, therefore, presenting a clear incentive for such practices. Moreover, we identify conditions under which both producers' profits increase. In effect, obfuscation enables producers to tacitly collude and charge higher wholesale prices by moderating competition between producers. The retailer, in contrast, suffers a loss in profit, raises retail prices, while overall channel profits decrease. We show that the extent of capacity obfuscation is limited by its cost and by a strategic retailer's incentive to facilitate a deterrence. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 244–267, 2014  相似文献   
653.
US nuclear deterrence and arms control policy may be moving, by design and by inadvertence, toward a posture of strategic “defensivism”. Strategic “defensivism” emphasizes the overlapping and reinforcing impact of: (1) reductions in US, Russian and possibly other strategic nuclear forces, possibly down to the level of “minimum deterrence,” (2) deployment of improved strategic and/or theater antimissile defenses for the US, NATO allies and other partners; and (3) additional reliance on conventional military forces for some missions hitherto preferentially assigned to nuclear weapons. This article deals with the first two of these aspects only: the interaction between missile defenses and offensive force reductions in US–Russian strategy and policy. The findings are that stable deterrence as between the USA and Russia is possible at lower than New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty levels, but reductions below 1000 deployed long-range weapons for each state, toward a true minimum deterrent posture, will require multilateral as opposed to bilateral coordination of arms limitations. Missile defenses might provide some denial capability against light attacks by states with small arsenals, but they still fall short of meaningful damage limitation as between powers capable of massive nuclear strikes.  相似文献   
654.
    
I study a two-period model of conflict with two combatants and a third party who is an ally of one of the combatants. The third party is fully informed about the type of her ally but not about the type of her ally’s enemy. In a signaling game, I find that if the third party is unable to give a sufficiently high assistance to her ally, then there exists a unique separating equilibrium in which the third party’s expected intervention causes her ally’s enemy to exert more effort than in the absence of third-party intervention; this worsens the conflict.  相似文献   
655.
    
In this article, we study the design and control of manufacturing cells with a mix of manual and automated equipment, operating under a CONWIP pull protocol, and staffed by a single agile (cross‐trained) worker. For a three‐station line with one automated station, we fully characterize the structure of the optimal control policy for the worker and show that it is a static priority policy. Using analytical models and extensive simulation experiments, we also evaluate the effectiveness of practical heuristic control policies and provide managerial insights on automation configuration design of the line. This characterization of the worker control policy enables us to develop managerial insights into the design issues of how best to locate and concentrate automation in the line. Finally, we show that, in addition to ease of control and greater design flexibility, the CONWIP protocol also offers higher efficiency and robustness than does the push protocol. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2009  相似文献   
656.
    
We consider the two‐machine open shop scheduling problem in which the jobs are brought to the system by a single transporter and moved between the processing machines by the same transporter. The purpose is to split the jobs into batches and to find the sequence of moves of the transporter so that the time by which the completed jobs are collected together on board the transporter is minimal. We present a ‐approximation algorithm. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2009  相似文献   
657.
    
We present a computationally efficient procedure to determine control policies for an infinite horizon Markov Decision process with restricted observations. The optimal policy for the system with restricted observations is a function of the observation process and not the unobservable states of the system. Thus, the policy is stationary with respect to the partitioned state space. The algorithm we propose addresses the undiscounted average cost case. The algorithm combines a local search with a modified version of Howard's (Dynamic programming and Markov processes, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1960) policy iteration method. We demonstrate empirically that the algorithm finds the optimal deterministic policy for over 96% of the problem instances generated. For large scale problem instances, we demonstrate that the average cost associated with the local optimal policy is lower than the average cost associated with an integer rounded policy produced by the algorithm of Serin and Kulkarni Math Methods Oper Res 61 (2005) 311–328. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2009  相似文献   
658.
    
A natural extension of the bucket brigade model of manufacturing is capable of chaotic behavior in which the product intercompletion times are, in effect, random, even though the model is completely deterministic. This is, we believe, the first proven instance of chaos in discrete manufacturing. Chaotic behavior represents a new challenge to the traditional tools of engineering management to reduce variability in production lines. Fortunately, if configured correctly, a bucket brigade assembly line can avoid such pathologies. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2009  相似文献   
659.
    
The signature of a system with independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) component lifetimes is a vector whose ith element is the probability that the ith component failure is fatal to the system. System signatures have been found to be quite useful tools in the study and comparison of engineered systems. In this article, the theory of system signatures is extended to versions of signatures applicable in dynamic reliability settings. It is shown that, when a working used system is inspected at time t and it is noted that precisely k failures have occurred, the vector s [0,1]nk whose jth element is the probability that the (k + j)th component failure is fatal to the system, for j = 1,2,2026;,nk, is a distribution‐free measure of the design of the residual system. Next, known representation and preservation theorems for system signatures are generalized to dynamic versions. Two additional applications of dynamic signatures are studied in detail. The well‐known “new better than used” (NBU) property of aging systems is extended to a uniform (UNBU) version, which compares systems when new and when used, conditional on the known number of failures. Sufficient conditions are given for a system to have the UNBU property. The application of dynamic signatures to the engineering practice of “burn‐in” is also treated. Specifically, we consider the comparison of new systems with working used systems burned‐in to a given ordered component failure time. In a reliability economics framework, we illustrate how one might compare a new system to one successfully burned‐in to the kth component failure, and we identify circumstances in which burn‐in is inferior (or is superior) to the fielding of a new system. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009  相似文献   
660.
    
Reliability Economics is a field that can be defined as the collection of all problems in which there is tension between the performance of systems of interest and their cost. Given such a problem, the aim is to resolve the tension through an optimization process that identifies the system which maximizes some appropriate criterion function (e.g. expected lifetime per unit cost). In this paper, we focus on coherent systems of n independent and identically distributed (iid) components and mixtures thereof, and characterize both a system's performance and cost as functions of the system's signature vector (Samaniego, IEEE Trans Reliabil (1985) 69–72). For a given family of criterion functions, a variety of optimality results are obtained for systems of arbitrary order n. Approximations are developed and justified when the underlying component distribution is unknown. Assuming the availability of an auxiliary sample of N component failure times, the asymptotic theory of L‐estimators is adapted for the purpose of establishing the consistency and asymptotic normality of the proposed estimators of the expected ordered failure times of the n components of the systems under study. These results lead to the identification of ε‐optimal systems relative to the chosen criterion function. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007  相似文献   
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