A linear programming approach to geometric programs

A cutting plane method, based on a geometric inequality, is described as a means of solving geometric programs. While the method is applied to the primal geometric program, it is shown to retain the geometric programming duality relationships. Several methods of generating the cutting planes are discussed and illustrated on some example problems.     

An algorithm for 0-1 multiple-knapsack problems

The 0-1 multiple-knapsack problem is an extension of the well-known 0-1 knapsack problem. It is a problem of assigning m objects, each having a value and a weight, to n knapsacks in such a way that the total weight in each knapsack is less than its capacity limit and the total value in the knapsacks is maximized. A branch-and-bound algorithm for solving the problem is developed and tested. Branching rules that avoid the search of redundant partial solutions are used in the algorithm. Various bounding techniques, including Lagrangean and surrogate relaxations, are investigated and compared.     

On convexity proofs in location theory

It is often assumed in the facility location literature that functions of the type ø_i(x_i, y) = β_i[(x_i-x)²+(y_i-y)²]^K/2 are twice differentiable. Here we point out that this is true only for certain values of K. Convexity proofs that are independent of the value of K are given.     

On the manipulation of transfer prices in a static environment

In a static environment, J. Hirschleifer's marginal cost solution to the transfer pricing problem is commonly accepted as analytically correct. However, actual pricing practice within Western corporations and socialist-planned economies generally deviates from marginal cost pricing. Some form of average cost pricing is more commonly chosen. Recently in this journal, H. Enzer has claimed to show that some form of average cost pricing is indeed the analytically correct solution to the transfer pricing problem when choice of technique and manipulation are allowed. Enzer claims that optimal decisions made by each of two divisions according to their individual self-interests are made compatible with overall firm optimization when the transfer price assigned to the internally-transferred commodity is any form of average cost. We show that the marginal cost solution is correct for Enzer's problem in the absence of manipulation by either division. Indeed, this was all that Hirschleifer claimed. In the process, we uncover a fundamental mathematical error in Enzer's argument. When manipulation of the transfer price by divisions is allowed, we demonstrate the faults with Enzer's average cost solution and conclude Hirschleifer's original statements on manipulation to be correct even in Enzer's environment. A final section briefly indicates the importance to the transfer pricing problem of a growing body of economic literature on incentive structures.     

Application of the fundamental theorem of games to an example concerning antiballistic missile defense

This paper considers a two sided resource allocation game in which both players initially have fixed resources which may be distributed over various targets. Their effectiveness depends on the manner of distribution and also on the strategy of the opponent, a natural payoff function for such a situation being used. The complete solution to the game is derived and a numerical example given.     

A linear programming solution to the generalized rectangular distance weber problem

The Weber Problem generalized to the location of several new points with respect to existing points is formulated as a linear programming problem under the assumption that distances are rectangular. The dual problem is then formulated and subsequently reduced to a problem with substantially fewer variables and constraints than required by an existent alternative linear programming formulation. Flows may exist between new as well as between new and existing points. Linear constraints can be imposed to restrict the location of new points. Pairwise constraints limiting distances between new points and between new and existing points can also be accommodated.     

“simple-approximate” battle-outcome-prediction conditions for variable-coefficient lanchester-type equations of modern warfare

This article considers combat between two homogeneous forces modeled by variable- coefficient Lanchester-type equations of modern warfare and develops new “simple-approximate” battle-outcome-prediction conditions for military engagements terminated by two different types of prescribed conditions being met (fixed-force-level-breakpoint battles and fixed-force-ratio-breakpoint battles). These battle-outcome-prediction conditions are sufficient (but not necessary) to determine the outcome of battle without having to explicitly compute the force-level trajectories, and they are characterized by their simplicity, requiring no advanced mathematical knowledge or tabulations of “special functions” for their application. Integrability properties of the Lanchester attrition-rate coefficients figure prominently in their results, and involved in their development is a generalization of Lanchester's famous square law to variable-coefficient Lanchester-type combat and several other novel mathematical developments for the analysis of ordinary differential equations. Examples are given, with the attack of a mobile force against a static defensive position (both sides armed with weapons whose firepower is range dependent) being examined in detail.     

The distribution of the product of two noncentral beta variates

In this paper the exact distribution of the product of two noncentral beta variates is derived using Mellin integral transform. The density function of the product is represented as a mixture of Beta distributions and the distribution function as a mixture of Incomplete Beta Functions.     

Toward a study of bidding processes part IV - games with unknown costs

This paper represents a continuation of three previous papers [1-.3] in the study of competitive bidding processes. It treats the case where a bidder's knowledge of his competitor's cost i s given by a probability distribution over a certain interval. The results obtained extend the work of Vickrey [4] to the case where the cost intervals a r e not necessarily symmetric.