Urban gangs evolving as criminal Netwar actors

The nature of conflict and crime is changing. Technology allows groups to spread their influence without regard to geographic limitations. A shift from hierarchies to network organizational forms is also occurring. As a consequence non‐state actors can extend their influence to gain social, political or economic power and challenge state institutions. This article examines the potential for gangs, transnational criminals and terrorists to embrace network forms and utilize technology to wage netwar. Factors which influence ‘third generation’ gang organization (politicization, internationalization and sophistication) are described to illustrate how a net‐based threat can mature. A move toward network organization within transnational criminal organizations and terrorist groups demonstrating the potential for these classic criminal entities to emerge as netwar actors is also reviewed. Finally, the need for state institutions such as the police and military to develop networked responses to combat networked threats is stated.     

Exact expected values of variance estimators for simulation

We formulate exact expressions for the expected values of selected estimators of the variance parameter (that is, the sum of covariances at all lags) of a steady‐state simulation output process. Given in terms of the autocovariance function of the process, these expressions are derived for variance estimators based on the simulation analysis methods of nonoverlapping batch means, overlapping batch means, and standardized time series. Comparing estimator performance in a first‐order autoregressive process and the M/M/1 queue‐waiting‐time process, we find that certain standardized time series estimators outperform their competitors as the sample size becomes large. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Deterrence and overseas stability

The use of conventional armed forces in a deterrent role merits close consideration. Instability in weak or failing states can have global ramifications, while efforts to build stability take time. In principle, conventional deterrence can be used to buy the time required for such stabilization efforts. Attempts at deterrence will, however, need to overcome credibility problems stemming from the technical limitations associated with conventional armed forces, and with the likely requirement for multiple external actors to deter multiple intrastate audiences. While deterrence might work under certain circumstances, it will not play as central a role in strategy as it did during the Cold War.     

A multilevel passenger screening problem for aviation security

Passenger prescreening is a critical component of aviation security systems. This paper introduces the Multilevel Allocation Problem (MAP), which models the screening of passengers and baggage in a multilevel aviation security system. A passenger is screened by one of several classes, each of which corresponds to a set of procedures using security screening devices, where passengers are differentiated by their perceived risk levels. Each class is defined in terms of its fixed cost (the overhead costs), its marginal cost (the additional cost to screen a passenger), and its security level. The objective of MAP is to assign each passenger to a class such that the total security is maximized subject to passenger assignments and budget constraints. This paper shows that MAP is NP‐hard and introduces a Greedy heuristic that obtains approximate solutions to MAP that use no more than two classes. Examples are constructed using data extracted from the Official Airline Guide. Analysis of the examples suggests that fewer security classes for passenger screening may be more effective and that using passenger risk information can lead to more effective security screening strategies. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006     

Single-period inventory models with demand uncertainty and quantity discounts: Behavioral implications and a new solution procedure

Quantity discounts are considered in the context of the single-period inventory model known as “the newsboy problem.” It is argued that the behavioral implications of the all-units discount schedule are more complex and interesting than the literature has suggested. Consideration of this behavior and the use of marginal analysis lead to a new method for solving this problem that is both conceptually simpler and more efficient than the traditional approach. This marginal-cost solution procedure is described graphically, an algorithm is presented, and an example is used to demonstrate that this solution procedure can be extended easily to handle complex discount schedules, such as some combined (simultaneously applied) purchasing and transportation cost discount schedules.