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161.
162.
Thomas H. Johnson 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(1):3-31
This article describes and analyzes a little understood Afghan Taliban propaganda tool: chants or taranas . These melodic refrains effectively use historical narratives, symbology, and iconic portraits. The chants are engendered in emotions of sorrow, pride, desperation, hope, and complaints to mobilize and convince the Afghan population of the Taliban's worldview. The chants represent culturally relevant and simple messages that are communicated in a narrative and poetic form that is familiar to and resonates with the local people. They are virtually impossible for the United States and NATO to counter because of Western sensitivities concerning religious themes that dominate the Taliban narrative space, not to mention the lack of Western linguistic capabilities, including the understanding and mastering the poetic nature of local dialects. 相似文献
163.
This article aims to review some of the key lessons learnt by the Royal Ulster Constabulary's (RUC) Special Branch in the 37 years of the troubles in Northern Ireland. Above all counter-terrorism is an intelligence led operation and Special Branch are the key agency for this in all UK police forces, who have now benefited enormously from the expertise that the RUC's Special Branch built up over the years and have passed on to their colleagues throughout the UK. Intelligence is more often than not a human role and relies on human agencies, which was the case in Northern Ireland. The bulk of intelligence gathering was carried out at quite low levels although the sifting and analysing of it became a more specialist skill. Electronic intelligence and computerised systems were often quite low down in the order of priorities and uses, which tends to confound popular impressions. Agents, informers and good old fashioned ‘coppers’ who knew their patch were much more important both in terms of gathering information and in terms of undermining the terrorists morale from within and it was these factors that fundamentally defeated the IRA in Northern Ireland. 相似文献
164.
James K. Wither 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(3-4):611-635
This article examines British Army operations in Iraq. It focuses on the causes of the army's apparent failure to live up to its reputation for the conduct of small wars. The paper discusses the British experience of small wars in the context of Iraq, the influence of doctrine and strategy, and the political and moral factors that shaped the army's performance. The paper's conclusions suggest that the Iraq War may cause a significant reappraisal, not just of military doctrine and strategy, but also of Britain's role in future small wars. 相似文献
165.
Casualty figures suggest that the US/Allied Counter Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) policy and the present allocation of national assets, resources, and intellectual capital have not been very successful. A number of explanations for why this has been the case are discussed and critiqued here. 相似文献
166.
167.
James J. Hentz 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(5-6):839-862
ABSTRACTThe debate concerning the Nigerian terrorist Boko Haram is typically simplified across two false dichotomies. First, it is treated as either a local conflict in northeast Nigeria with its epicentre in Borno State or part of a broader conflict in Northwest Africa (and beyond), encompassing northern Cameroon, southern Chad, Niger, and reaching into Libya and Mali. The second dichotomy concerns whether it is animated by local material conditions on the ground, or is part of a broader anti-West jihad. The Boko Haram insurgency is not that simple. It is, rather, a multidimensional conflict and can change overtime. 相似文献
168.
James A Joseph 《African Security Review》2013,22(3):15-19
Abstract The article evaluates the security challenges that are likely to occur along international borders in East Africa with the advent of the East African Community Common Market in July 2010. In an attempt to illustrate the porosity of borders and the likelihood that criminals could take advantage of the situation, the author describes the ease with which transnational crime could thrive (in the absence of efficient border security measures) under the guise of informal cross-border trade that derives its basis largely from the customs and historical linkages in the region. Border towns in the region are considered zones of risk but also opportunities for quick money-making ventures and deals that tend to attract a variety of criminals. While the danger is not alarmingly high, there is a likelihood that with the opening up of the East African Community to the free movement of goods and people, criminals will exploit this freedom to commit crimes such as human trafficking, drug smuggling and moving terrorists and contraband goods unless mechanisms are put in place to curtail these activities. Should this not happen, the mission of the East African Community could be jeopardised. 相似文献
169.
James A. Russell 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(2):263-278
The United States faces a series of strategic and policy conundrums as it attempts to promote strategic stability in the Persian Gulf and the wider Middle East. This article examines the relationship between a reduced US nuclear arsenal and strategic stability in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. It argues that a series of interrelated political and military factors play a much more significant role in regional security and stability than the US strategic arsenal, which has never, with a few extraordinary exceptions, played a direct role in maintaining regional security. The United States has constructed a system of regional stability based on conventional deterrence and defense that has seen it forward base forces at various installations in the region in combination with efforts to arm, train, and equip host-nation militaries. Nuclear weapons have never played a prominent role in this regional system. Evidence presented in this article suggests that there is no compelling reason for the United States to abandon and/or modify the defensive system of conventional deterrence and defense by adding nuclear-backed guarantees to the mix. 相似文献
170.
James Clay Moltz 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(3):183-186
Tritium on ice: the dangerous new alliance of nuclear weapons and nuclear power by Kenneth D. Bergeron 相似文献