America's Secret Power: the CIA in a Democratic Society. By Loch K. Johnson. Oxford University Press, New York (1989), ISBN 0–19–505490–3, $24.95
The Bundeswehr and Western Security. Edited by Stephen F. Szabo. Houndmills, Basingstoke, and Macmillan, London (1990), ISBN 0–333–49880–1, £45.00
Symbolic Defense: the Cultural Significance of the Strategic Defense Initiative. By Edward Tabor Linenthal. University of Illinois Press, Chicago, IL (1989), ISBN 0–252–01619‐X, $19.95
Rethinking European Security. Edited by Furio Cerutti and Rodolfo Ragionieri. Crane Russak, New York (1990), £29.00
Alternative Conventional Defense Postures in the European Theater, Vol. 1: The Military Balance and Domestic Constraints. Edited by Hans Günter Brauch and Robert Kennedy, Crane Russak, New York (1990), £32.00
The Gulf War. Edited by Hanns Maull and Otto Pick. Pinter, London (1989), ISBN 0–86187–763–2, £36.00 相似文献
Certain zero-sum games are examined in which an individual player is opposed by a two-man team. The members of the team have identical interests, but must act separately during play. Most of the paper is devoted to instances in which one teammate has an opportunity to communicate to the other about their mutual opponent's strategy; but he may only be able to transmit a limited amount of information and his choice of a “message” may affect the payoff. The team must thus make economically efficient use of a limited communication opportunity. The present paper treats a variety of models, all of which are formulated as rectangular (matrix) games. Related models, some of which cannot be so formulated either because of restrictions on the team's opportunities to use mixed strategies or because they are non-zero-sum games, will be treated in another paper. 相似文献
ABSTRACTA call for innovation as a means to outpace the acceleration of technological change and to bolster capabilities quickly is a central theme of contemporary U.S. Naval Strategy. The need for innovation is accepted, but the integration of readily available technologies into the Fleet is slow. Innovation unfolds according to “Navy-Time,” a cycle lasting between a long-decade and thirty-years. To accelerate the innovation process in the U.S. Navy, the article offers a Concept of Operations for Innovation that outlines how a deliberate process of analysis, weaponisation and integration can move new ideas and weapons into the Fleet in a strategically relevant time-frame. 相似文献