Deviant globalization: the application of strategic landpower*

In both Afghanistan and Iraq, US landpower was able to gain control rapidly over terrain. However, that control ebbed as US presence weakened. Non-state actors, such as the Taliban, the Haqqani network, the Islamic State, and Al Qaeda, gained control of segments of the population. Transnational Criminal Organizations capitalized on this permissive environment to strengthen their networks, often eroding the legitimacy of the host nation government, fueling regional instability, and, ultimately, undermining US policy objectives. The proliferation of deviant globalization, or the connectedness of subversive elements, is a key indicator of future conflict. Strategic landpower is uniquely positioned to influence the physical, psychological, economic, and social interactions of various non-state actors and their association with deviant globalization. It is no longer enough to seize and hold terrain. Landpower must also have the capability to influence the actions and attitudes of populations on that terrain wherever and whenever these interactions occur.     

Auctions in the post‐change‐order period

A change order is frequently initiated by either the supplier or the buyer, especially when the contract is long‐term or when the contractual design is complex. In response to a change order, the buyer can enter a bargaining process to negotiate a new price. If the bargaining fails, she pays a cancellation fee (or penalty) and opens an auction. We call this process the sequential bargaining‐auction (BA). At the time of bargaining, the buyer is uncertain as to whether the bargained price is set to her advantage; indeed, she might, or might not, obtain a better price in the new auction. To overcome these difficulties, we propose a new change‐order‐handling mechanism by which the buyer has an option to change the contractual supplier after bargaining ends with a bargained price. We call this the option mechanism. By this mechanism, the privilege of selling products or services is transferred to a new supplier if the buyer exercises the option. To exercise the option, the buyer pays a prespecified cash payment, which we call the switch price, to the original supplier. If the option is not exercised, the bargained price remains in effect. When a switch price is proposed by the buyer, the supplier decides whether or not to accept it. If the supplier accepts it, the buyer opens an auction. The option is exercised when there is a winner in the auction. This article shows how, under the option mechanism, the optimal switch price and the optimal reserve price are determined. Compared to the sequential BA, both the buyer and the supplier benefit. Additionally, the option mechanism coordinates the supply chain consisting of the two parties. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 62: 248–265, 2015     

The International Criminal Court and the Deterrence of Human Rights Atrocities

Research on human rights treaties has mostly reached depressingly similar conclusions – that such treaties and their resulting institutions have little or no impact on human rights. The International Criminal Court, however, possesses significant power to investigate and prosecute violations of international law that equip it with potentially more influence than previous human rights regimes. I suggest, however, that the impact of the ICC on human rights is conditioned by signatory governments’ commitment to good governance and acceptance of the role of the ICC in addressing violations of international law. I develop a two-stage model of ICC ratification and human rights abuse that shows that while many states have ratified the ICC Treaty, not all are committed to stopping the crimes under its jurisdiction. Rather, state commitment to human rights depends first on its commitment to the rule of law within its own borders. Second, commitment to human rights depends on states’ willingness to grant the ICC the powers necessary to carry out its mission. Through a number of statistical tests, I find strong support for these hypotheses on states’ human rights and propensity for violence.     

Screening multi-dimensional heterogeneous populations for infectious diseases under scarce testing resources,with application to COVID-19

Testing provides essential information for managing infectious disease outbreaks, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. When testing resources are scarce, an important managerial decision is who to test. This decision is compounded by the fact that potential testing subjects are heterogeneous in multiple dimensions that are important to consider, including their likelihood of being disease-positive, and how much potential harm would be averted through testing and the subsequent interventions. To increase testing coverage, pooled testing can be utilized, but this comes at a cost of increased false-negatives when the test is imperfect. Then, the decision problem is to partition the heterogeneous testing population into three mutually exclusive sets: those to be individually tested, those to be pool tested, and those not to be tested. Additionally, the subjects to be pool tested must be further partitioned into testing pools, potentially containing different numbers of subjects. The objectives include the minimization of harm (through detection and mitigation) or maximization of testing coverage. We develop data-driven optimization models and algorithms to design pooled testing strategies, and show, via a COVID-19 contact tracing case study, that the proposed testing strategies can substantially outperform the current practice used for COVID-19 contact tracing (individually testing those contacts with symptoms). Our results demonstrate the substantial benefits of optimizing the testing design, while considering the multiple dimensions of population heterogeneity and the limited testing capacity.