Rent seeking and defence expenditure

A plethora of arguments from the ‘public choice school’ suggest that public goods are ‘under‐supplied’ by comparison with public sector provision of more private goods. The implication is that rent seeking by the ‘military‐industrial complex’ serves, in some measure, to offset potential allocative inefficiency. In this paper a comparison of rent seeking by producers of public goods and producers of private goods identifies a bias that favours public good supply. The bias results from the different way in which collective demand for public goods and for private goods is expressed. The prospect of larger rents to the ‘military‐industrial complex’ implies greater rent‐seeking expenditures in this sector. The extent to which public goods (and, in particular, defence) are ‘under supplied’ is much exaggerated.     

Strength in Numbers: The Labour Government and the Size of the Polaris Force

Previous historical accounts have simplified the Labour government's decision to commission a four-boat strategic nuclear deterrent, or ‘Polaris force’, in early 1965. Utilising previously classified sources, this article shows that a number of key strategic concerns led the decision-making process. Nevertheless, broader economic and diplomatic considerations were also important in determining the size of the Polaris force. A tremendous balance of payments deficit and ongoing debates regarding levels of conventional and nuclear involvement in NATO certainly influenced the government's final decision. Moreover, competing strategic and economic interests resulted in continued debate throughout the decision-making process.     

Book reviews

John Horsfield, The Art of Leadership in War. The Royal Navy From the Age of Nelson to the End of World War II. Westport, Conn. and London: Greenwood Press, 1980. Pp. 240; £14.75.

John Joseph Timothy Sweet, Iron Arm: The Mechanization of Mussolini's Army, 1920–1940. Westport, Connecticut &; London: Greenwood Press. 1980. Pp. 207; £15.50.

Peter H. Merkl, The Making of a Stormtrooper. Princeton, N.J: Princeton U.P., 1980. Pp. 328; £8.60.

Greg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War 1945–1950. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980. Pp. 425; $15.00.

Geoffrey Smith and Nelson W. Polsby, British Government and its Discontents. New York: Basic Books, and London: Harper and Row, 1981. Pp. 202; £7.95.

Seweryn Bialer (ed.), The Domestic Context of Soviet Foreign Policy. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press and London: Croom Helm, 1981. Pp. 441; £14.95.

Jerry F. Hough, Soviet Leadership in Transition. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution and Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1981. Pp. 175; £12.00 (hb.) and £3.95 (pb.)

Edward F. Mickolus, Transnational Terrorism: A Chronology of Events 1968–1979. London: Aldwych Press, 1980. Pp. 967; £39.95.

Barry Rubin, The Great Powers in the Middle East, 1941–47; The Road to the Cold War, London: Frank Cass, 1980. Pp. 254; £14.50;

Daniel Heradstveit, The Arab‐Israeli Conflict; Psychological Obstacles to Peace. Oslo: Universittsforlaget, 1979. Pp. 234; £11.60;

Janice Gross Stein, and Raymond Tanter, Rational Decision‐making; Israel's Security Choices 1967. Columbus. Ohio; Ohio State University Press, 1980. Pp. 399; $35.     

Production lot sizing under setup and worker learning

Previous lot-sizing models incorporating learning effects focus exclusively on worker learning. We extend these models to include the presence of setup learning, which occurs when setup costs exhibit a learning curve effect as a function of the number of lots produced. The joint worker/setup learning problem can be solved to optimality by dynamic programming. Computational experience indicates, however, that solution times are sensitive to certain problem parameters, such as the planning horizon and/or the presence of a lower bound on worker learning. We define a two-phase EOQ-based heuristic for the problem when total transmission of worker learning occurs. Numerical results show that the heuristic consistently generates solutions well within 1% of optimality.     

On estimating population characteristics from record-breaking observations II. Nonparametric results

Consider an experiment in which only record-breaking values (e.g., values smaller than all previous ones) are observed. The data available may be represented as X₁,K₁,X₂,K₂, …, where X₁,X₂, … are successive minima and K₁,K₂, … are the numbers of trials needed to obtain new records. Such data arise in life testing and stress testing and in industrial quality-control experiments. When only a single sequence of random records are available, efficient estimation of the underlying distribution F is possible only in a parametric framework (see Samaniego and Whitaker [9]). In the present article we study the problem of estimating certain population quantiles nonparametrically from such data. Furthermore, under the assumption that the process of observing random records can be replicated, we derive and study the nonparametric maximum-likelihood estimator F̂ of F. We establish the strong uniform consistency of this estimator as the number of replications grows large, and identify its asymptotic distribution theory. The performance of F̂ is compared to that of two possible competing estimators.