A Doctrine without Dogma

ABSTRACT

In No Use: Nuclear Weapons and U.S. National Security Policy, Thomas M. Nichols calls for a constructive rethinking about the history of nuclear weapons and the attitudes that have grown up around them. Despite dramatic reductions since the end of the Cold War, the United States still maintains a robust nuclear triad that far exceeds the needs of realistic deterrence in the twenty-first century. Nichols advocates a new strategy of minimum deterrence that includes deep unilateral reductions to the US nuclear arsenal, a no-first-use pledge, withdrawing US tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, and ending extended nuclear deterrence for allies. The weakest part of his argument eschews nuclear retaliation against small nuclear states that attack the United States, opting instead to use only conventional weapons to guarantee regime change. He admits this will entail enormous cost and sacrifice, but cites the “immorality” of retaliating against a smaller power with few targets worthy of nuclear weaponry, which totally ignores the massive underground facilities constructed to shield military facilities in many of these states. Despite this, Nichols's thoughtful approach to post-Cold War deterrence deserves thoughtful consideration.     

The collection depots location problem on networks

In this paper we investigate the collection depots location problem on a network. A facility needs to be located to serve a set of customers. Each service consists of a trip to the customer, collecting materials, dropping the materials at one of the available collection depots and returning to the facility to wait for the next call. Two objectives are considered: minimizing the weighted sum of distances and minimizing the maximum distance. The properties of the solutions to these problems are described. © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 49: 15–24, 2002; DOI 10.1002/nav.10000     

On valuing appreciating human assets in services

This paper derives optimal policies for when to hire, train, and lay off employees in service organizations when worker productivity appreciates deterministically or stochastically under constant, monotonic, and cyclic service demand. The model, an extension of the machine replacement problem from the engineering economy literature, uses infinite horizon linear programming to produce optimal personnel planning strategies and dual prices that characterize the workforce's economic value. The effect of employee attrition is also considered. In its valuation of human assets, unlike pure accounting approaches that only try to measure, this paper proposes an approach to capture the interaction between firm decisions pertaining to human resources and human resource value. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

A queuing model for due date control in a multiserver repair shop

This paper deals with a repair shop with multiple parallel servers, which has to carry out planned overhauls. Each overhaul consists of a large number of maintenance jobs. The overhaul process is interrupted by randomly arriving emergency jobs. To control the delivery performance of the overhauls, knowledge about the overhaul makespan distribution should be available. Using a 2‐dimensional Markov model, we derive the first and second moment of the overhaul makespan analytically for the case that the repair times of all overhaul jobs are identically and exponentially distributed. For the case of nonidentical repair time distributions, an approximation is presented. Simulation shows that the makespan distribution fitted on these moments gives an excellent approximation. © John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48: 281–282, 2001     

India’s nuclear counter-revolution: nuclear learning and the future of deterrence

ABSTRACT

The India–Pakistan near war of February–March 2019 highlights India’s ongoing evolution in strategic thought and practice since its emergence in 1998 as an overt nuclear-weapon possessor. These changes, involving an increasing willingness to engage in the intentional escalation of conflict with a nuclear-armed rival willing to be the first to use nuclear weapons, challenge certain academic assumptions about the behavior of nuclear-weapon states. In particular, they undermine the expectations of the nuclear-revolution theory—which anticipates nuclear and conventional restraint among nuclear-armed rivals through fear of mutual assured destruction—and the model of nuclear learning which underpins this theory, in which new nuclear-weapon states gradually absorb this restraint through policy-maker learning. This article explores how India’s learning pathway since 1998 has deviated from these expectations. India is instead pursuing its own “revolution,” in the direction of creating capabilities for flexible response and escalation dominance. It concludes by illuminating the similarities between Indian strategic behavior and contemporary practices of other nuclear-armed states, and suggests that New Delhi’s emerging de facto nuclear doctrine and posture is part of a broader empirical challenge to our current conceptions of the nuclear revolution and of nuclear learning.