On equivalence between the proportionate flow shop and single‐machine scheduling problems

We derive sufficient conditions which, when satisfied, guarantee that an optimal solution for a single‐machine scheduling problem is also optimal for the corresponding proportionate flow shop scheduling problem. We then utilize these sufficient conditions to show the solvability in polynomial time of numerous proportionate flow shop scheduling problems with fixed job processing times, position‐dependent job processing times, controllable job processing times, and also problems with job rejection. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 62: 595–603, 2015     

Nicholas John Spykman,the Balance of Power,and International Order

Nicholas John Spykman was probably America’s finest geopolitical theorist of the twentieth century, even though he was an active participant over the course only of five years (1938–43). He is rightly viewed as a worthy intellectual successor to Sir Halford Mackinder in Britain. Spykman originated the (Eurasian) Rimland concept, which is of continuing political and strategic utility today. He was controversial and notably outspoken while his writings make it quite clear that his concern with the acquisition of power was contextualised by serious concerns for world order.     

Scheduling research and the first decade of NRLQ: A historical perspective

It is generally recognized that the first model involving job scheduling was presented by Selmer Johnson and published in the inaugural issue of Naval Research Logistics Quarterly (NRLQ) in 1954. NRLQ also published another seminal scheduling paper by Wayne E. Smith a short time later. In the present paper, we discuss the contribution of NRLQ and the role of the Office of Naval Research in the development of the scheduling literature during the first decade (1954–1963). We also provide a critical analysis of the papers by Johnson and Smith. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 62: 335–344, 2015     

Framing Protest and Insurgency: Boko Haram and MASSOB in Nigeria

Why do some protest movements erupt into rebellion, whereas others protest peacefully under similar circumstances? Addressing this question, this paper investigates the cases of Boko Haram (rebellion) and MASSOB (non-violent protest) in contemporary Nigeria. Conventional explanations of rebellion focusing on opportunity, inequality, and repression cannot explain why these movements have pursued different protest strategies. This paper tries to explain this puzzle by investigating the signifying work and meaning construction of both movements drawing on the framing approach from social movement studies. The framing analysis shows that the different protest behavior largely results from the differing cultural context of both movements, from the agency of the framers, and from successful frame alignment, which results in frame resonance and, thereby, the successful mobilization for collective action.     

China's Nuclear Forces and Their Significance to India

The Indian nuclear program is a response to a perceived politico-strategic threat from China as opposed to a military-operational one that New Delhi began after perceiving an “ultimatum” from China in 1965. Consequently, India is in the process of acquiring an assured second-strike capability vis-à-vis China to meet the requirements of general deterrence. While India has always been concerned about the Sino-Pakistani nuclear/missile nexus, China has become wary of the growing military ties between the United States and India in recent years, especially because of the military implications of the US-India civil nuclear deal. Given the growing conventional military gap between the two states, India is not lowering its nuclear threshold to meet the Chinese conventional challenge. Instead, India is upgrading its conventional military strategy from dissuasion to deterrence against China. While the overall Sino-Indian nuclear relationship is stable, it will be challenged as China acquires advanced conventional weapons that blur the distinction between conventional and nuclear conflict.     

The Relative Efficacy of the Biological and Chemical Weapon Regimes

The biological and chemical weapon nonproliferation and disarmament regimes are often put forward as models of what the nuclear nonproliferation regime could (or should) be. But are these regimes effective? If so, is one stronger and/or more effective than the other? What is it that makes them relatively stronger than the nuclear nonproliferation regime? In this article, we return to and expand upon a framework for assessing regime health and effectiveness. We utilize this framework to engage in a comparative analysis of the chemical weapon (CW) and biological weapon (BW) nonproliferation regimes, respectively. Our analysis reveals that these two regimes are comparatively healthier than their nuclear counterpart. While some of their behavioral features might be troubling—such as the disputes over stockpile destruction of CW—these tend to be mitigated by the presence of a strong norm against possession and proliferation of both CW and BW. This norm is adequately embedded into the existing institutional features of the regimes in ways that do not exist in the nuclear nonproliferation regime.