The one‐warehouse multiretailer problem with an order‐up‐to level inventory policy

We consider a two‐level system in which a warehouse manages the inventories of multiple retailers. Each retailer employs an order‐up‐to level inventory policy over T periods and faces an external demand which is dynamic and known. A retailer's inventory should be raised to its maximum limit when replenished. The problem is to jointly decide on replenishment times and quantities of warehouse and retailers so as to minimize the total costs in the system. Unlike the case in the single level lot‐sizing problem, we cannot assume that the initial inventory will be zero without loss of generality. We propose a strong mixed integer program formulation for the problem with zero and nonzero initial inventories at the warehouse. The strong formulation for the zero initial inventory case has only T binary variables and represents the convex hull of the feasible region of the problem when there is only one retailer. Computational results with a state‐of‐the art solver reveal that our formulations are very effective in solving large‐size instances to optimality. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

EXTRAORDINARY VISITS

North Korea has the bomb but not much of a nuclear arsenal. For fifty years, it pursued the plutonium path to the bomb in parallel with its pursuit of nuclear electricity. My visits to North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear complex provided a window to its plutonium capabilities. After having made six visits to North Korea, Pyongyang surprised me during my seventh visit last November by showing me a small, modern uranium enrichment plant, which I was told was needed for its new indigenous light water reactor program. However, the same capabilities can be used to produce highly enriched uranium bomb fuel. Following a pattern of having made poor risk-management decisions during much of the past twenty years of diplomacy dealing with the North Korean nuclear threat, Washington remains in a standoff with Pyongyang.     

An approximate planning model for distributed computing networks

We develop an approximate planning model for a distributed computing network in which a control system oversees the assignment of information flows and tasks to a pool of shared computers, and describe several optimization applications using the model. We assume that the computers are multithreaded, and have differing architectures leading to varying and inconsistent processing rates. The model is based on a discrete‐time, continuous flow model developed by Graves [Oper Res 34 (1986), 522–533] which provides the steady‐state moments of production and work‐in‐queue quantities. We make several extensions to Graves' model to represent distributed computing networks. First, we approximately model control rules that are nonlinear functions of the work‐in‐queue at multiple stations through a linearization approach. Second, we introduce an additional noise term on production and show its use in modeling the discretization of jobs. Third, we model groups of heterogeneous computers as aggregate, “virtual computing cells” that process multiple tasks simultaneously, using a judiciously selected control rule. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2005.     

Britain's Great Security Mirage: The Royal Navy and the Franco-Russian Naval Threat, 1898–1906

This article focuses on the relationship between the threat perception analyses of the British Admiralty and the strategic orientation of the Royal Navy at the outset of the twentieth century. The current view is that this was an era when fear of France and Russia drove British naval policy. However, as this article will show, Britain's Naval Intelligence Department formed a low opinion of French and Russian naval capabilities at this time and this negative evaluation exerted considerable influence over decision making. The belief that, owing to multiple qualitative deficiencies, these powers could definitely be beaten in battle lessened the standing of the Franco-Russian naval challenge and freed the Admiralty to consider the danger posed by other possible enemies, most notably Germany.     

Why Culture Matters: Revisiting the Sino-Indian Border War of 1962

This article examines the nuclear command and control (C²) system implemented in Pakistan since 1998, and discusses its potential consequences for the risk of inadvertent or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons. I argue that troubled civil-military relations and Pakistan's doctrine of ‘asymmetric escalation’ account for the creation of a command and control system with different characteristics during peacetime and military crises. Although the key characteristics of Pakistan's nuclear C² system allow relatively safe nuclear operations during peacetime, operational deployment of nuclear weapons during military standoffs is likely to include only rudimentary protections against inadvertent or unauthorised nuclear release. The implication of this study is that any shift from peacetime to wartime command and control procedures is likely to further destabilise Indo-Pakistani relations during the early stages of a diplomatic or military standoff, and introduce a non-trivial risk of accidental escalation to the nuclear level.     

Nuclear opportunism: A theory of how states use nuclear weapons in international politics

How do states use nuclear weapons to achieve their goals in international politics? Nuclear weapons can influence state decisions about a range of strategic choices relating to military aggression, the scope of foreign policy objectives, and relations with allies. The article offers a theory to explain why emerging nuclear powers use nuclear weapons to facilitate different foreign policies: becoming more or less aggressive; providing additional support to allies or proxies, seeking independence from allies; or expanding the state’s goals in international politics. I argue that a state’s choices depend on the presence of severe territorial threats or an ongoing war, the presence of allies that provide for the state’s security, and whether the state is increasing in relative power. The conclusion discusses implications of the argument for our understanding of nuclear weapons and the history of proliferation, and nonproliferation policy today.     

More military base closure? Considering the alternatives*

Despite multiple base closing rounds, the United States Department of Defense still has excess base capacity, and thus President Trump and high-level Defense Department officials are calling for more base closure through the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process. However, another BRAC may not be the optimal solution, because simple base closure is not an efficient way to reduce surplus base capacity. Thus, Defense Department officials should consider other methods to reduce surplus capacity, including reduction in base size, leasing excess base property, or transferring it to another government agency for a variety of alternative uses. The surplus capacity issue also offers an opportunity to DOD to reassess base utilization, to update base requirements with current and future force structure. While BRAC focuses on American military bases, the process and alternatives also have international applications.