One size does not fit all: personalized incentives in military compensation

A critical element in implementing a compensation scheme including nonmonetary incentives (NMIs) is recognizing that preferences vary widely across Service members. There are at least three sources of variability: across different population classes, across individuals within a population class, and across NMI packages for a particular individual. Surveys across different military communities, ranks, and years of Service show the difficulty of identifying any NMI that has significant value for even 50% of the active duty force. At the same time, approximately 80% of the surveyed Service members expressed a significant positive value for at least one NMI. Therefore, one-size-fits-all incentive packages will not be nearly as effective as more personalized incentive packages. The authors discuss variability in Service member NMI preferences and outline an approach to implementing personalized NMI packages in military compensation through a sealed-bid reverse auction, where Service members select individual NMIs from a “cafeteria-style” menu of options.     

Warranty design under buyer and seller risk aversion

This paper provides a framework in which warranty policies for non-repairable items can be evaluated according to risk preferences of both buyers and sellers. In particular, a warranty price schedule is established such that sellers are indifferent among the policies. Given this schedule, a buyer's response is expressed by selecting the price-warranty combination that minimizes disutility. Within this framework, a warranty can be viewed as an instrumet of risk management that can induce more sales and greater profitability. For given utility functions, analytical results for the development of a price schedule are developed. Numerical results illustrate the substitution effects between warranty terms, prices, and risk parameters.     

Landmarks in defense literature

Strategy in the Missile Age. By Bernard Brodie. RAND Corporation, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1959. Paperback editions 1965, 1967.     

A dynamic nonlinear constrained optimal replacement model

A stochastically constrained optimal replacement model for capital equipment is constructed. Each piece of capital equipment, or machine, is characterized by its age and “utility” or “readiness” class. The readiness of a machine at any age is a stochastic function of its initial utility class and its age. The total discounted replacement cost of several replacement streams, each commencing with an initial machine, is minimized with respect to the replacement age and initial utility class of each machine, subject to a readiness constraint stating the lower bound on the expected number of machines in each utility class at any time. A general solution procedure is outlined and a specific case is solved in detail.     

Book reviews

European Security in the New Political Environment by James H. Wyllie, London: Addison, Wesley Longman, 1997, ISBN 0-582-24403-X (pbk), £13.99

Russia and Europe: The Emerging Security Agenda edited by Vladimir Baranovsky, Oxford: Oxford University Press, SIPRI, 1997, ISBN 0-19-829201-5 (hbk), £45.00

The Defeat of Japan by David Rees, Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger, ISBN 0-275-95955-4 (hbk), £46.50

The Collective Naval Defence of the Empire, 1900-1940 by Nicholas Tracy (ed.), London: Ashgate, for the Navy Records Society, 1997, ISBN 1859-284-027 (hbk), £59.50

Knights in White Armour The New Art of War and Peace by Christopher Bellamy, London: Pimlico Press, 1997, ISBN 0-7126-739-03 (pbk), £12.50

Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World by avid A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan (eds), University Park: Penn State Press, 1997, ISBN 0-271-01703-i (hbk), £49.50/$55, ISBN 0-271-01704-X (pbk), £7.95/$19.95

Contested Social Orders and International Politics by David Skidmore (ed.), Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1997, ISBN 0-8265-1284-4 (hbk), $32.95

The Politics of Threat: Minuteman Vulnerability in American National Security Policy by David H. Dunn. London: Macmillan Press, 1997, ISBN 0-333-67816-8 (hbk), £45.00

The Sociology of the Military by Guiseppe Caforio (ed.), Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998, ISBN 1-85898-619-2, 704 pp., £150

The Nordic Nations in the New Western Security Regime by Ingemar Dorfer, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997, ISBN 0-943875-83-8 (hbk), £27, ISBN 0-943875-82-X (pbk), £13     

A targeting model that minimizes collateral damage

This paper considers the problem of allocating weapons to achieve targeting objectives while simultaneously minimizing aggregate damage to surrounding nonmilitary facilities, each of which has an upper limit to the damage it is permitted to incur. A model is formulated which assumes only that damage to individual targets or associated facilities does not decrease as the number of allocated weapons increases. An implicit enumeration algorithm, based on that of Lawler and Bell is described that yields optimal integer solutions. An example is presented.     

Cost analysis and extension of a simple maintenance-scheduling heuristic

Practitioners of maintenance scheduling sometimes use a simple analytic formula, derived based on inspection scheduling, as a heuristic to determine the length of the preventive maintenance period. The sensitivity of this heuristic solution is analyzed and the cost penalties are calculated compared to the exact solution that utilizes the lifetime distribution in the derivation of the optimal preventive maintenance period. A simple extension of the heuristic is suggested to improve the approximation with a slightly increased computational effort. The sensitivity and cost analysis of the improved heuristic are discussed as well. © 1994 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.