On a Markov‐modulated shock and wear process

We present transient and asymptotic reliability indices for a single‐unit system that is subject to Markov‐modulated shocks and wear. The transient results are derived from the (transform) solution of an integro‐differential equation describing the joint distribution of the cumulative degradation process and the state of the modulating process. Additionally, we prove the asymptotic normality of a properly centered and time‐scaled version of the cumulative degradation at time t. This asymptotic result leads to a simple normal approximation for a properly centered and space‐scaled version of the systes lifetime distribution. Two numerical examples illustrate the quality of the normal approximation. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2009     

A characterization of optimal base‐stock levels for a multistage serial supply chain

In this article, we present a multistage model to optimize inventory control decisions under stochastic demand and continuous review. We first formulate the general problem for continuous stages and use a decomposition solution approach: since it is never optimal to let orders cross, the general problem can be broken into a set of single‐unit subproblems that can be solved in a sequential fashion. These subproblems are optimal control problems for which a differential equation must be solved. This can be done easily by recursively identifying coefficients and performing a line search. The methodology is then extended to a discrete number of stages and allows us to compute the optimal solution in an efficient manner, with a competitive complexity. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 32–46, 2016     

Can Torture Be Justified?

Torture requires careful definition, because of the degree to which its definition often entails its moral condemnation. Torture involves the deliberate infliction of (intense) pain for coercive or punishment reasons. While emphasizing that the act of torture is indeed naturally seen as repulsive and ideally should not take place, I offer a non-utilitarian argument to ethically justify torture in specific kinds of interrogative cases. This argument closely examines the moral isomorphism between cases of immediate and delayed self-defense, showing that in both cases lethal force is justified. I further show that, once one’s life is forfeit, one’s other rights pertaining to the defense of one’s intended victims are likewise forfeit. As such, any form of interrogative torture necessary to procuring relevant information from persons involved in a lethal attack upon innocent persons is ethically justified. However, that an action is strictly ethically justified does not entail that it ought to be generally adopted. Several potent constitutional and sociological concerns are raised and considered.     

Military autonomy: its origins,limits, and the politico-military dialectic of war

Military officers often oppose political interference in the conduct of war. Political leaders respond by citing Clausewitz’s contention that “war is the continuation of politics with the addition of other means.” Scholarship in security studies and civil-military relations argues that civilians are right to oppose military autonomy because it serves the parochial interests of the military. However, through the dialectical relationship between the violent essence of war and its political nature, Clausewitz provides an alternative explanation for military demands for autonomy. He shows that military and political leaders are prone to an incomplete understanding of war that can undermine strategy and policy.     

Risk pooling in a two-period,two-echelon inventory stocking and allocation problem

The object of this article is to investigate the risk-pooling effect of depot stock in two-echelon distribution system in which the depot serves n retailers in parallel, and to develop computationally tractable optimization procedures for such systems. The depot manager has complete information about stock levels and there are two opportunities to allocate stock to the retailers within each order cycle. We identify first- and second-order aspects to the risk-pooling effect. In particular, the second-order effect is the property that the minimum stock available to any retailer after the second allocation converges in probability to a constant as the number of retailers in the system increases, assuming independence of the demands. This property is exploited in the development of efficient procedures to determine near-optimal values of the policy parameters.     

The optimal linear combination of control variates in the presence of asymptotically negligible bias

The optimal linear combination of control variates is well known when the controls are assumed to be unbiased. We derive here the optimal linear combination of controls in the situation where asymptotically negligible bias is present. The small-sample linear control which minimizes the mean square error (MSE) is derived. When the optimal asymptotic linear control is used rather than the optimal small-sample control, the degradation in MSE is c/n³, where n is the sample size and c is a known constant. This analysis is particulary relevant to the small-sample theory for control variates as applied to the steady-state estimation problem. Results for the method of multiple estimates are also given.     

Robust preallocated preferential defense

The problem is to protect a set of T identical targets that may come under attack by A identical weapons. The targets are to be defended by D identical interceptors, which must be preallocated to defend selected targets. The attacker is aware of the number of interceptors, but is ignorant of their allocation. The size of the attack is chosen by the attacker from within a specified range. The robust strategies developed in this article do not require the defender to assume an attack size. Rather, the defender chooses a strategy which is good over a wide range of attack sizes, though not necessarily best for any particular attack size. The attacker, knowing that the defender is adopting a robust strategy, chooses the optimal attack strategy for the number of weapons he chooses to expend. The expected number of survivors is a function of the robust defense strategy and optimal attack strategy against this robust defense.