Democracy for the rescue—of dictators? The role of regime type in civil war interventions

Intrastate conflicts, long eclipsing interstate conflicts, are often internationalized. This paper examines internationalized intrastate conflicts through the types of both the intervening and the embattled regimes. Do democracies, more or less than autocracies, support autocratic governments in their fights against rebels? This paper tests three hypotheses: (1) democracies support autocrats fighting rebels less than autocracies do. (2) Democracies support democratic governments fighting against rebels more than autocracies do. (3) The more democratic two states are, the higher the probability one would support the other’s fight against rebels. Covering all documented external support in intrastate wars (1975–2000), our findings support hypothesis one and two only partly and confirm hypothesis three. However, comparing the two major accounts of the Democratic Peace theory (DPT)—the normative and the structural—our findings corroborate only the former robustly. The paper thus helps enriching the insights of the DPT beyond interstate conflicts.     

Optimal resource allocation and redistribution strategy in military conflicts with Lanchester square law attrition

We address the problem of optimal decision‐making in conflicts based on Lanchester square law attrition model where a defending force needs to be partitioned optimally, and allocated to two different attacking forces of differing strengths and capabilities. We consider a resource allocation scheme called the Time Zero Allocation with Redistribution (TZAR) strategy, where allocation is followed by redistribution of defending forces, on the occurrence of certain decisive events. Unlike previous work on Lanchester attrition model based tactical decision‐making, which propose time sequential tactics through an optimal control approach, the present article focuses on obtaining simpler resource allocation tactics based on a static optimization framework, and demonstrates that the results obtained are similar to those obtained by the more complex dynamic optimal control solution. Complete solution for this strategy is obtained for optimal partitioning of resources of the defending forces. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Signature based analysis of m‐Consecutive‐k‐out‐of‐n: F systems with exchangeable components

In this article, we study reliability properties of m‐consecutive‐k‐out‐of‐n: F systems with exchangeable components. We deduce exact formulae and recurrence relations for the signature of the system. Closed form expressions for the survival function and the lifetime distribution as a mixture of the distribution of order statistics are established as well. These representations facilitate the computation of several reliability characteristics of the system for a given exchangeable joint distribution or survival function. Finally, we provide signature‐based stochastic ordering results for the system's lifetime and investigate the IFR preservation property under the formulation of m‐consecutive‐k‐out‐of‐n: F systems. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011     

Book Reviews

The purpose of this article is to analyse British strategic nuclear targeting between 1974 and 1979, prior to the successful completion of the sophisticated modification to Polaris submarine-missile system codenamed Chevaline. It will use as its starting point the parameters for UK strategic nuclear targeting, and the foundation of the ‘Moscow Criterion’, prior to the deployment of Britain's Polaris submarines which began in 1968. It will then discuss the recommendation by the Chiefs of Staff to retarget Polaris in 1975/76 and the implications of that recommendation in terms of the British approach to strategic nuclear deterrence. The article will conclude with an assessment of these retargeting decisions on the decision to replace Polaris with the US Trident system in 1980.     

How do sources of traditional legitimacy constrain popular uprisings? The case of the Kingdom of Swaziland

ABSTRACT

Research concerning authoritarian stability and peace usually investigates co-optation and repression. Recently, several studies argue that traditional legitimacy is also important for stability in monarchies. However, existing research rarely considers how legitimacy constrains rebellions and help the royal family to stay in power. Hence, this article explores the causal links between sources of traditional legitimacy and absence of uprisings. The study investigates the relationship with a case study of the Kingdom of Swaziland. In line with my expectations, I find a causal relationship between sources of traditional legitimacy and absence of popular uprisings. First, the royal family actively uses traditional legitimacy to justify their rule. Second, the Afrobarometer indicates that the Swazi people trust the King more than citizens in other African countries trust their head of state. Third, opposition actors have limited opportunities to mobilize the broader population against the monarchy. Fourth, traditional legitimacy dampens ongoing protests and thereby hinders their escalation into popular uprisings or political violence. Repression is clearly an important explanation for limited rebellion in Swaziland, but this article shows that also traditional legitimacy sources play a role.     

Planning versus Chaos in Clausewitz's On War

Clausewitz laid great emphasis on the planned construction of war, but this idea has received little attention from his commentators, who generally attach far greater importance to what he said about the chaotic elements of war, in particular its interactive nature and the friction inseparable from its conduct. This article gives long-overdue recognition to planning as a dominant theme of On War. The essential point Clausewitz makes concerning interaction is not that the enemy's responses are bound to disrupt our plans, but that our plans must aim to predict and incorporate his responses. Clausewitz acknowledges that friction creates enormous difficulties for the realization of any plan, but it is precisely in respect of this challenge that he develops the concept of military genius, whose capabilities are seen above all as the executive arm of planning.     

Moral Advantage,Strategic Advantage?

This article argues that Man is a moral being and strategy inherently is a human project. It follows that strategy has to have a moral dimension. All human beings have a moral compass, acquired by social–cultural necessity. The compass has survival value. The problem is that the human race does not possess only one such compass. Since will is key to strategic performance, and because that will requires as fuel a sufficient confidence in the justice of a cause, in principle at least one belligerent's moral armament may be usefully superior to another's. One can claim with confidence that strategic advantage can be secured by some moral advantage.