Deterministic chaos in a model of discrete manufacturing

A natural extension of the bucket brigade model of manufacturing is capable of chaotic behavior in which the product intercompletion times are, in effect, random, even though the model is completely deterministic. This is, we believe, the first proven instance of chaos in discrete manufacturing. Chaotic behavior represents a new challenge to the traditional tools of engineering management to reduce variability in production lines. Fortunately, if configured correctly, a bucket brigade assembly line can avoid such pathologies. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2009     

Inventory rotation policies for slow moving items

In this article we present a stochastic model for determining inventory rotation policies for a retail firm which must stock many hundreds of distinctive items having uncertain heterogeneous sales patterns. The model develops explicit decision rules for determining (1) the length of time that an item should remain in inventory before the decision is made on whether or not to rotate the item out of inventory and (2) the minimum sales level necessary for retaining the item in inventory. Two inventory rotation policies are developed, the first of which maximizes cumulative expected sales over a finite planning horizon and the second of which maximizes cumulative expected profit. We also consider the statistical behavior of items having uncertain, discrete, and heterogeneous sales patterns using a two-period prediction methodology where period 1 is used to accumulate information on individual sales rates and this knowledge is then used, in a Bayesian context, to make sales predictions for period 2. This methodology assumes that over an arbitrary time interval sales for each item are Poisson with unknown but stationary mean sales rates and the mean sales rates are distributed gamma across all items. We also report the application of the model to a retail firm which stocks many hundreds of distinctive unframed poster art titles. The application provides some useful insights into the behavior of the model as well as some interesting aspects pertaining to the implementation of the results in a “real-world” situation.     

An inventory model of incentives for on-time delivery in just-in-time purchasing contracts

This article formulates an analytic model of just-in-time purchasing contracts and compares the minimum cost solution with the cost attainable through vertical integration. The models use standard inventory theory cost parameters and decision variables. The results quantify the increase in cost of buying an item rather than making it. Optimal incentives are characterized when JIT purchasing contracts are used. When JIT purchasing is implemented, buffer inventories are typically reduced. This inventory reduction makes on-time delivery critical to the buyer; yet timeliness is controlled by the supplier. As an incentive to provide on-time delivery, the buyer offers the supplier a bonus for on-time delivery. The supplier chooses a flow time allowance based upon the bonus offered. First- and second-order conditions are characterized in general, and examples are provided for exponentially and uniformly distributed flow times. The delivery timeliness obtainable in a vertically integrated firm is determined and compared with timeliness obtainable between separate firms. This comparison indicates that buyers who choose to purchase materials from a separate firm are more likely to experience late deliveries. The relationship between the value of the bonus and the proportion of on-time deliveries is also considered. The bonus required to achieve the same probability of on-time delivery as under vertical integration is also determined. © 1993 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Scheduling prowler training

The U.S. Navy Prowler aircraft is designed for electronic surveillance and countermeasures. In this paper, we describe the problem of scheduling Prowler crew training, and we present two integer programming models to solve it. The first model maximizes the number of aviators trained above 75% in each mission area, subject to the available number of flights, over a single month. The second model distinguishes peacetime from mobilization, and minimizes the number of flights done in mobilization subject to the available number of flights in peacetime. Our models distinguish different types of crew and allow more than one qualification to be earned on a given flight. We give numerical results using real data, comparing our results to the actual readiness of a squadron. We found that crew readiness of Prowler squadrons can be increased by 10%, simply by better scheduling. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 50: 289–305, 2003.     

An Unlikely Alliance: Portuguese and South African Airpower in Angola, 1968–1974

The war that Portugal was obliged to fight in Africa began in 1961 and immediately stretched the resources of its armed forces. Nowhere was this thinness more apparent than in policing the vast territory of Angola. The east and southeast of Angola were particularly vulnerable, as the area was a vast, sparsely populated region characterised by enormous featureless plains or chanas covered in tall grass and broken by an extensive river system and mountainous forests. The only military solution to policing these immense spaces was aviation and specifically the helicopter that could carry troops into battle, protect them with a gunship and bring them home when the operation was concluded. The immediate problem for the Portuguese Air Force (Força Aérea Portuguesa or FAP) in Angola and elsewhere was a scarcity of helicopters. The solution was an alliance with South Africa, which had a strong inventory of Alouette IIIs, to help in policing the east. This move was likewise in the interest of South Africa, as its threat came from Zambia through south-eastern Angola. This article examines the strategic and tactical development of this unusual, cross-cultural alliance and the symbiotic relationship that resulted in destruction of the enemies of both in Angola.     

An Investigation of the Weights of Pattern 1907 Bayonets made in the UK around the First World War Period

The standard issue bayonet of the British Army immediately preceding and during the First World War was the Pattern 1907. This was manufactured at different times and in varying numbers during that period by one official body, the Royal Small Arms Factory at Enfield, and by five private contractors. These bayonets were made according to published official specifications issued by the War Department and based on a ‘pattern example’ provided by the Royal Small Arms Factory. The specifications indicate, inter alia, the quality of metal used in making the bayonets, methods of inspection and proofing, and the required maximum and minimum weight range of the completed bayonet. However, examination of a series of these bayonets in a private collection suggested that their weights varied considerably from the mid-point values of the allowed weight ranges in the original and amended specifications (16.5 oz. and 17 oz., respectively). To establish if this was a common feature among this class of bayonet as opposed to a chance factor, the weights of other surviving Pattern 1907 bayonets were determined and compared to establish the degree of variance from the official specifications as originally set out by the Royal Small Arms Factory. Seventy-six percent of the 142 bayonets surveyed were found to be above the mid-point of the allowed weight range given in the amended manufacturing specifications, with many being at the upper end of the allowed range. This is a statistically unusual result. It is speculated that the target weight may have been deliberately set higher by the individual manufacturers to eliminate the possibility of rejection of any underweight bayonets by the Royal Small Arms Factory inspectors and so a refusal of acceptance and payment for the work.     

TWENTY YEARS OF CYBERWAR

For many years after its introduction in the early 1990s, the cyberwar concept - which outlined a new mode of conflict that would emphasize disruption of information systems and flows - was given little credence. Over the past several years, however, cyberwars of both irregular and somewhat more conventional types have erupted (e.g., see respectively Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008). Global awareness of cyberwar has risen sharply, and many nation-states are preparing their defenses, as well as their capabilities for mounting offensive operations. The American military's declaration in 2011 that cyberspace is a 'warfighting domain' highlights a need to explore the ethical implications and nuances of cyberwar. This article finds that classic jus ad bellum constructs come under great pressure from cyberwar, while jus in bello concerns may prove more manageable. Another key theme is that disproportionate attention is given to the notion of employing cyberwar 'strategically' (i.e., to strike directly at other nations' infrastructures), where its use is less likely to achieve 'victory' and is more problematic ethically. Instead, a focus on the application of cyberwar techniques in battle may lead to shorter, less bloody, 'more ethical' conflicts.     

ON RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF TERRORISM

When rational choice theory is applied to the study of terrorism, it is important that attention be given to the derived principles of constrained utility maximization. Particularly useful is the Slutsky equation, which rigorously analyzes the quantity response in one activity to a price change in another. By directing attention to assumptions and/or information about compensated cross price elasticities, expenditure shares, and income elasticities, the Slutsky equation can provide critical guidance in both theoretical and empirical analysis.     

FINANCIAL VERSUS HUMAN RESOURCES IN THE GREEK–TURKISH ARMS RACE 10 YEARS ON: A FORECASTING INVESTIGATION USING ARTIFICIAL NEURAL NETWORKS

This paper looks into the Greek–Turkish arms race a decade after an earlier contribution to the issue that relied heavily on artificial neural networks. The time period between the two papers contributes to the reliability of the results derived, not just by increasing the number of observations, but also mainly by incorporating the progress made in the realm of artificial intelligence. The focus on the case of both countries unlike the paper mentioned above that dealt with just the Greek side provides ample room for comparative purposes regarding the determinants of defense expenditure on both sides. The results derived in terms of input significance estimation support the findings of the earlier research as indicated above, pointing to the leading role of the demographic preponderance of Turkey over Greece. The paper also points to the fact that 10 years later, Turkey continues to set the arms race rules against its rival by determining the defense expenditure of Greece, whereas the role of the latter in affecting the military spending of Turkey is non‐existent.     

Military Expenditure,Endogeneity and Economic Growth

Abstract

While not always a concern for the general economic growth literature, the debate over the effects of military spending on growth continues to develop, with no consensus, but a deepening understanding of the limitations of previous work. One important issue that has not been adequately dealt with is the endogeneity of military spending in the growth equation, mainly because of the difficulty of finding any variables that would make adequate instruments. This paper considers this issue, using an endogenous growth model estimated on a large sample of 109 non-high-income countries for the period 1998–2012. The empirical analysis is framed within an instrumental variable setting that exploits the increase in military spending that occurs when unrest in a country escalates to turmoil. The estimation results show that endogeneity arising from reverse causality is a crucial issue, with the instrumental variable estimates providing a larger significant negative effect of military spending on growth than OLS would. This result is found to be robust to different sources of heterogeneity and different time periods.