Urban gangs evolving as criminal Netwar actors

The nature of conflict and crime is changing. Technology allows groups to spread their influence without regard to geographic limitations. A shift from hierarchies to network organizational forms is also occurring. As a consequence non‐state actors can extend their influence to gain social, political or economic power and challenge state institutions. This article examines the potential for gangs, transnational criminals and terrorists to embrace network forms and utilize technology to wage netwar. Factors which influence ‘third generation’ gang organization (politicization, internationalization and sophistication) are described to illustrate how a net‐based threat can mature. A move toward network organization within transnational criminal organizations and terrorist groups demonstrating the potential for these classic criminal entities to emerge as netwar actors is also reviewed. Finally, the need for state institutions such as the police and military to develop networked responses to combat networked threats is stated.     

ON RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF TERRORISM

When rational choice theory is applied to the study of terrorism, it is important that attention be given to the derived principles of constrained utility maximization. Particularly useful is the Slutsky equation, which rigorously analyzes the quantity response in one activity to a price change in another. By directing attention to assumptions and/or information about compensated cross price elasticities, expenditure shares, and income elasticities, the Slutsky equation can provide critical guidance in both theoretical and empirical analysis.     

FINANCIAL VERSUS HUMAN RESOURCES IN THE GREEK–TURKISH ARMS RACE 10 YEARS ON: A FORECASTING INVESTIGATION USING ARTIFICIAL NEURAL NETWORKS

This paper looks into the Greek–Turkish arms race a decade after an earlier contribution to the issue that relied heavily on artificial neural networks. The time period between the two papers contributes to the reliability of the results derived, not just by increasing the number of observations, but also mainly by incorporating the progress made in the realm of artificial intelligence. The focus on the case of both countries unlike the paper mentioned above that dealt with just the Greek side provides ample room for comparative purposes regarding the determinants of defense expenditure on both sides. The results derived in terms of input significance estimation support the findings of the earlier research as indicated above, pointing to the leading role of the demographic preponderance of Turkey over Greece. The paper also points to the fact that 10 years later, Turkey continues to set the arms race rules against its rival by determining the defense expenditure of Greece, whereas the role of the latter in affecting the military spending of Turkey is non‐existent.     

Military Expenditure,Endogeneity and Economic Growth

Abstract

While not always a concern for the general economic growth literature, the debate over the effects of military spending on growth continues to develop, with no consensus, but a deepening understanding of the limitations of previous work. One important issue that has not been adequately dealt with is the endogeneity of military spending in the growth equation, mainly because of the difficulty of finding any variables that would make adequate instruments. This paper considers this issue, using an endogenous growth model estimated on a large sample of 109 non-high-income countries for the period 1998–2012. The empirical analysis is framed within an instrumental variable setting that exploits the increase in military spending that occurs when unrest in a country escalates to turmoil. The estimation results show that endogeneity arising from reverse causality is a crucial issue, with the instrumental variable estimates providing a larger significant negative effect of military spending on growth than OLS would. This result is found to be robust to different sources of heterogeneity and different time periods.     

TWENTY YEARS OF CYBERWAR

For many years after its introduction in the early 1990s, the cyberwar concept - which outlined a new mode of conflict that would emphasize disruption of information systems and flows - was given little credence. Over the past several years, however, cyberwars of both irregular and somewhat more conventional types have erupted (e.g., see respectively Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008). Global awareness of cyberwar has risen sharply, and many nation-states are preparing their defenses, as well as their capabilities for mounting offensive operations. The American military's declaration in 2011 that cyberspace is a 'warfighting domain' highlights a need to explore the ethical implications and nuances of cyberwar. This article finds that classic jus ad bellum constructs come under great pressure from cyberwar, while jus in bello concerns may prove more manageable. Another key theme is that disproportionate attention is given to the notion of employing cyberwar 'strategically' (i.e., to strike directly at other nations' infrastructures), where its use is less likely to achieve 'victory' and is more problematic ethically. Instead, a focus on the application of cyberwar techniques in battle may lead to shorter, less bloody, 'more ethical' conflicts.     

Evaluating appointment postponement in scheduling patients at a diagnostic clinic

Diagnostic clinics are among healthcare facilities that suffer from long waiting times which can worsen medical outcomes and increase patient no-shows. Reducing waiting times without significant capital investments is a challenging task. We tackle this challenge by proposing a new appointment scheduling policy that does not require significant investments for diagnostic clinics. The clinic in our study serves outpatients, inpatients, and emergency patients. Emergency patients must be seen on arrival, and inpatients must be given next day appointments. Outpatients, however, can be given later appointments. The proposed policy takes advantage of this by allowing the postponement of the acceptance of appointment requests from outpatients. The appointment scheduling process is modeled as a two-stage stochastic programming problem where a portion of the clinic capacity is allocated to inpatients and emergency patients in the first stage. In the second stage, outpatients are scheduled based on their priority classes. After a detailed analysis of the solutions obtained from the two-stage stochastic model, we develop a simple, non-anticipative policy for patient scheduling. We evaluate the performance of this proposed, easy-to-implement policy in a simulation study which shows significant improvements in outpatient indirect waiting times.     

Deterrence and overseas stability

The use of conventional armed forces in a deterrent role merits close consideration. Instability in weak or failing states can have global ramifications, while efforts to build stability take time. In principle, conventional deterrence can be used to buy the time required for such stabilization efforts. Attempts at deterrence will, however, need to overcome credibility problems stemming from the technical limitations associated with conventional armed forces, and with the likely requirement for multiple external actors to deter multiple intrastate audiences. While deterrence might work under certain circumstances, it will not play as central a role in strategy as it did during the Cold War.