A linear programming approach to geometric programs

A cutting plane method, based on a geometric inequality, is described as a means of solving geometric programs. While the method is applied to the primal geometric program, it is shown to retain the geometric programming duality relationships. Several methods of generating the cutting planes are discussed and illustrated on some example problems.     

On the manipulation of transfer prices in a static environment

In a static environment, J. Hirschleifer's marginal cost solution to the transfer pricing problem is commonly accepted as analytically correct. However, actual pricing practice within Western corporations and socialist-planned economies generally deviates from marginal cost pricing. Some form of average cost pricing is more commonly chosen. Recently in this journal, H. Enzer has claimed to show that some form of average cost pricing is indeed the analytically correct solution to the transfer pricing problem when choice of technique and manipulation are allowed. Enzer claims that optimal decisions made by each of two divisions according to their individual self-interests are made compatible with overall firm optimization when the transfer price assigned to the internally-transferred commodity is any form of average cost. We show that the marginal cost solution is correct for Enzer's problem in the absence of manipulation by either division. Indeed, this was all that Hirschleifer claimed. In the process, we uncover a fundamental mathematical error in Enzer's argument. When manipulation of the transfer price by divisions is allowed, we demonstrate the faults with Enzer's average cost solution and conclude Hirschleifer's original statements on manipulation to be correct even in Enzer's environment. A final section briefly indicates the importance to the transfer pricing problem of a growing body of economic literature on incentive structures.     

An algorithm for 0-1 multiple-knapsack problems

The 0-1 multiple-knapsack problem is an extension of the well-known 0-1 knapsack problem. It is a problem of assigning m objects, each having a value and a weight, to n knapsacks in such a way that the total weight in each knapsack is less than its capacity limit and the total value in the knapsacks is maximized. A branch-and-bound algorithm for solving the problem is developed and tested. Branching rules that avoid the search of redundant partial solutions are used in the algorithm. Various bounding techniques, including Lagrangean and surrogate relaxations, are investigated and compared.     

The stochastic U‐line balancing problem

A U‐line arranges tasks around a U‐shaped production line and organizes them into stations that can cross from one side of the line to the other. In addition to improving visibility and communication between operators on the line, which facilitates problem‐solving and quality improvement, U‐lines can reduce the total number of operators required on the line and make rebalancing the line easier compared to the traditional, straight production line. This paper studies the (type 1) U‐line balancing problem when task completion times are stochastic. Stochastic completion times occur when differences between operators cause completion times to vary somewhat and when machine processing times vary. A recursive algorithm is presented for finding the optimal solution when completion times have any distribution function. An equivalent shortest path network is also presented. An improvement for the special case of normally distributed task completion times is given. A computational study to determine the characteristics of instances that can be solved by the algorithms shows that they are able to solve instances of practical size (like the 114 Japanese and U.S. U‐lines studied in a literature review paper). © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2003     

Polaris,East of Suez: British Plans for a Nuclear Force in the Indo-Pacific, 1964–1968

This article investigates the little-known plans formulated by Harold Wilson's Labour government to deploy Polaris submarines in the Indo-Pacific region. The scheme was first proposed in 1965 as a response to several problems faced by British policy-makers, including China's acquisition of a nuclear capability, Britain's wish to maintain a meaningful position ‘East of Suez’ at reduced cost, and German pressure for equal treatment within NATO on nuclear matters. Despite extensive high-level discussion, the plans were finally abandoned in mid-1968, as Labour moved more decisively to forsake the world role.     

The road not taken: Conflict termination and guerrillaism in the American Civil War

Irrespective our views on the rationality of our opponent's continuing to conduct operations against us, unless utterly extirpated, he retains a vote on when and how conflict will end. This is because war is about power — compelling another actor to do something he would not otherwise do, or to cease doing something he would otherwise prefer to do. In planning for conflict termination we should account for the peculiarities of opponents who may decide not to quit when we have beat them fair and square. We do not desire that they cease conventional fighting, but that they cease fighting altogether.     

Storming to partition: Croatia,the United States,and Krajina in the Yugoslav War

To many scholars and policymakers, ‘partition’ offers the most efficacious means of resolving ethnic-civil wars. Others reject partition as a solution, citing flaws (both logical and empirical) and harmful international implications should such an approach become commonplace. What has been missing from this debate is an understanding of how the process of partition unfolds. In this article we examine such a process, the case of the Krajina in the war in Yugoslavia, 1994–1995. The US aligned itself with Croatia against Serbs rebelling in the Krajina region of Croatia. The culmination of this alignment occurred in August 1995 when Croatian forces initiated ‘Operation Storm’ (Oluja) against Croatian Serb insurgents. Croatian forces effectively cleansed the Krajina of its Serbian population. Eager to initiate a diplomatic peace process, Washington welcomed the Croatian operation, and largely because of Operation Storm, negotiations at Dayton became possible.