The search for an intelligent evader: Strategies for searcher and evader in the two-region problem

This paper considers the search for an evader concealed in one of two regions, each of which is characterized by its detection probability. The single-sided problem, in which the searcher is told the probability of the evader being located in a particular region, has been examined previously. We shall be concerned with the double-sided problem in which the evader chooses this probability secretly, although he may not subsequently move: his optimal strategy consists of that probability distribution which maximizes the expected time to detection, while the searcher's optimal strategy is the sequence of searches which limits the evader to this expected time. It transpires for this problem that optimal strategies for both searcher and evader may generally be obtained to a surprisingly good degree of approximation by using the optimal strategies for the closely related (but far more easily solved) problem in which the evader is completely free to move between searches.     

Probabilistic formulations of the multifacility weber problem

The problem considered is to locate one or more new facilities relative to a number of existing facilities when both the locations of the existing facilities, the weights between new facilities, and the weights between new and existing facilities are random variables. The new facilities are to be located such that expected distance traveled is minimized. Euclidean distance measure is considered; both unconstrained and chance-constrained formulations are treated.     

A note on the stochastic shortest-route problem

This paper develops an algorithm for a “shortest route” network problem in which it is desired to find the path which yields the shortest expected distance through the network. It is assumed that if a particular arc is chosen, then there is a finite probability that an adjacent arc will be traversed instead. Backward induction is used and appropriate recursion formulae are developed. A numerical example is provided.     

One-person games of economic survival

This paper discusses the one-person economic survival game model with a discrete probability distribution for the contribution to surplus variable. The general game model and strategies in these games are examined, and necessary conditions which an undominated, stationary strategy must satisfy are obtained. For a special class of these games a mathematical formulation of the value of the game is given, and examples and theorems which relate to undominated strategies in this class are presented. This paper, in some sense, is a sequel to a portion of a paper by Shubik and Thompson [7] which appeared in this journal.     

CYLINDRICITY ERROR COMPENSATION IN DIAMOND TURNING VIA P－INTEGRATOR REPETITIVE CONTROL

ＣＹＬＩＮＤＲＩＣＩＴＹＥＲＲＯＲＣＯＭＰＥＮＳＡＴＩＯＮＩＮＤＩＡＭＯＮＤＴＵＲＮＩＮＧＶＩＡＰ－ＩＮＴＥＧＲＡＴＯＲＲＥＰＥＴＩＴＩＶＥＣＯＮＴＲＯＬＬｉＳｈｅｎｇｙｉ（ＤｅｐａｒｔｍｅｎｔｏｆＭｅｃｈａｎｔｒｏｎｉｃｓａｎｄＩｎｓｔｒｕｍｅｎｔ...