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John S. Croucher 《海军后勤学研究》1975,22(1):197-203
This paper considers a two sided resource allocation game in which both players initially have fixed resources which may be distributed over various targets. Their effectiveness depends on the manner of distribution and also on the strategy of the opponent, a natural payoff function for such a situation being used. The complete solution to the game is derived and a numerical example given. 相似文献
154.
Henrich John Malik 《海军后勤学研究》1970,17(3):327-330
In this paper the exact distribution of the product of two noncentral beta variates is derived using Mellin integral transform. The density function of the product is represented as a mixture of Beta distributions and the distribution function as a mixture of Incomplete Beta Functions. 相似文献
155.
John S. Maybee 《海军后勤学研究》1985,32(2):225-237
The mathematical theory necessary to solve combined arms models of military combat is presented here. We show how to apply the theory of positive operators to such models. Most of the results are purely qualitative in character showing that many properties of such systems are independent of the actual numerical values of the coefficients. Finally, we discuss in some detail an example of such a system. 相似文献
156.
John J. Kanet 《海军后勤学研究》1981,28(4):643-651
This paper considers a single-machine scheduling problem in which penalities occur when a job is completed early or late. The objective is to minimize the total penalty subject to restrictive assumptions on the due dates and penalty functions for jobs. A procedure is presented for finding an optimal schedule. 相似文献
157.
158.
We consider the problem of minimizing the sum of production, employment smoothing, and inventory costs over a finite number of time periods where demands are known. The fundamental difference between our model and that treated in [1] is that here we permit the smoothing cost to be nonstationary, thereby admitting a model with discounting. We show that the values of the instrumental variables are nondecreasing in time when demands are nondecreasing. We also derive some asymptotic properties of optimal policies. 相似文献
159.
John P. Bonin 《海军后勤学研究》1978,25(2):357-364
In a static environment, J. Hirschleifer's marginal cost solution to the transfer pricing problem is commonly accepted as analytically correct. However, actual pricing practice within Western corporations and socialist-planned economies generally deviates from marginal cost pricing. Some form of average cost pricing is more commonly chosen. Recently in this journal, H. Enzer has claimed to show that some form of average cost pricing is indeed the analytically correct solution to the transfer pricing problem when choice of technique and manipulation are allowed. Enzer claims that optimal decisions made by each of two divisions according to their individual self-interests are made compatible with overall firm optimization when the transfer price assigned to the internally-transferred commodity is any form of average cost. We show that the marginal cost solution is correct for Enzer's problem in the absence of manipulation by either division. Indeed, this was all that Hirschleifer claimed. In the process, we uncover a fundamental mathematical error in Enzer's argument. When manipulation of the transfer price by divisions is allowed, we demonstrate the faults with Enzer's average cost solution and conclude Hirschleifer's original statements on manipulation to be correct even in Enzer's environment. A final section briefly indicates the importance to the transfer pricing problem of a growing body of economic literature on incentive structures. 相似文献
160.
A cutting plane method, based on a geometric inequality, is described as a means of solving geometric programs. While the method is applied to the primal geometric program, it is shown to retain the geometric programming duality relationships. Several methods of generating the cutting planes are discussed and illustrated on some example problems. 相似文献