Comment: Why “an identified systemic model of the democracy‐peace nexus” does not persuade*

In their article in this journal, James, Solberg and Wolfson (1999) challenge our findings that two states are more likely to have peaceful relations if they are both democratic. They claim to develop a simultaneous system of two equations showing that peace and democracy foster each other, and that the effect of peace in encouraging democracy is stronger than that of democracy on peace. Their analysis, however, is flawed. Their research design employs measures of dispute and joint democracy that are inferior to those now common in the literature, and their equation for predicting peace is not properly specified. These problems distort their results. Even so, their results provide evidence of the pacific benefits of democracy. Analyses we conduct with a more completely specified model reveal stronger support for the democratic “ peace. Furthermore, a test of the effect of interstate conflict on democracy should be done at the national (or monadic) level of analysis; but James et al. perform a dyadic analysis. In a monadic test using vector autoregression, we find that disputes make no contribution to explaining the character of regimes. Even with their dyadic method, their finding that peace promotes democracy is not robust Including a crucial control variable, the ratio of militarily relevant national capabilities, that James et al. omitted, dramatically alters their findings.     

Boost-glide Weapons and US-China Strategic Stability

ABSTRACT

The United States and China are testing boost-glide weapons, long-range strike systems capable of flying at Mach 5 or faster through the upper atmosphere. For the United States, these systems would provide a conventional prompt global strike capability, which, together with US ballistic missile defense programs, Chinese experts regard as a threat to China's ability to conduct nuclear retaliation. This perception is encouraging the Chinese military to modify its nuclear posture in ways that tend to create greater risks for both sides. If China's own boost-glide systems are meant to carry nuclear payloads only, their deployment would not fundamentally alter the current situation between the two states. However, if they were conventionally armed or dual-purpose, or if the United States could not determine the payloads they carried, the deployment of Chinese boost-glide systems could compound problems of strategic stability created by the introduction of ballistic missile defense, antisatellite, and antiship ballistic missile capabilities. If the technical hurdles can be overcome, it may be difficult for the two sides to refrain from these deployments in the absence of strong mutual trust or an established arms-control relationship. New confidence-building measures and expanded mutual transparency are warranted to avoid creating new dangers.     

“GOOD COP/BAD COP” AS A MODEL FOR NONPROLIFERATION DIPLOMACY TOWARD NORTH KOREA AND IRAN

Scholarly and popular literature in the recent past has framed nonproliferation diplomacy toward both Iran and North Korea as an example of “good cop/bad cop,” a social-psychological strategy borrowed from law enforcement to describe a process for forcing a confession by subjecting a target to stressful emotional contrast. This article examines those two cases, roughly covering the period since 2003, when the most recent attempts to deal with the Iranian and North Korean proliferation threats began, in light of criteria for employment of the good cop/bad cop strategy. There is some evidence that within the framework of the six-party talks with North Korea and within the framework of the EU-3-U.S. diplomacy toward Iran, the players seeking nonproliferation have adopted good cop/bad cop roles to that end. The article concludes, however, that while there are similarities to the interrogation room technique, the complexity of the international political environment as compared to the interrogation room has prevented the states involved from successfully adopting or effectively exploiting good and bad cop roles. Substantial and exploitable differences of interest among them, and the availability of alternative “escape routes” for the target state, raise serious questions about the applicability of the good cop/bad cop strategy to these two nonproliferation cases, and even about its applicability in future nonproliferation challenges.     

Interchange fees for bank ATM networks

Banks have found it advantageous to connect their Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) in networks so that customers of one bank may use the ATMs of any bank in the network. When this occurs, an interchange fee is paid by the customer's bank to the one that owns the ATM. These have been set by historic interbank negotiation. The paper investigates how a model based on n-player game theory concepts of Shapley value and nucleolus could be used as an alternative way of setting such fees. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 45: 407–417, 1998     

Combat modeling of remotely targeted vehicles and a battery against a moving target

This paper considers a combined system composed of multiple stand-by remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) and a single battery against a single passive enemy target, where the target, if not killed, is allowed to change its location after each attack. The RPV has the duty to report on target acquisition, to confirm a target kill, and to pass information on any change in target location after each battery attack. The battery has the duty to attack the target on the basis of the target location information provided to it by the RPV. We develop a closed-form expression for the time-dependent state probabilities of the system, which can be used to compute several important combat measures of effectiveness, including (a) the time-varying mean and variance of the number of the RPVs being alive and of the surviving enemy target, (b) the mission success, mission failure, and combat draw probabilities, and (c) the mean and variance of the combat duration time. Illustrative numerical examples are solved for these combat measures, and sensitivity analyses are performed with respect to target acquisition time and target kill probability. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 45: 645–667, 1998     

Analysis of production lines with Coxian service times and no intermediate buffers

This paper uses the holding time model (HTM) method to derive an approximate analytic formula for the calculation of the mean throughput of a K-station production line with no buffers between any two successive stations. Service times follow the two-stage Coxian (C²) distribution at all stations. The paper provides a formula that relates the third moment of the service completion (or virtual service) time with the respective parameters of the service time, the repair time and the time to breakdown (the latter is assumed to follow the exponential distribution). In this way, it concludes that under certain conditions the two-stage Coxian distribution can be used to approximate any general distribution matching the first three moments of the service completion time distribution. The mean holding times (consisting of the service and blocking periods) of all stations of the line are obtained in an analytical form. Numerical results are provided for the mean throughput of lines with up to 20 stations. These results are shown to have a good accuracy compared against results obtained from the Markovian state method (for short lines) and results from simulation (for longer lines). © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 45: 669–685, 1998