Search and the introduction of improved technologies

Modeling R&D as standard sequential search, we consider a monopolist who can implement a sequence of technological discoveries during the technology search process: he earns revenue on his installed technology while he engages in R&D to find improved technology. What is not standard is that he has a finite number of opportunities to introduce improved technology. We show that his optimal policy is characterized by thresholds ξ_i(x): introduce the newly found technology if and only if it exceeds ξ_i(x) when x is the state of the currently installed technology and i is the number of remaining introductions allowed. We also analyze a nonstationary learning‐by‐doing model in which the monopolist's experience in implementing new technologies imparts increased capability in generating new technologies. Because this nonstationary model is not in the class of monotone stopping problems, a number of surprising results hold and several seemingly obvious properties of the stationary model no longer hold. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011     

‘Backing the wrong horse’: Japan in British Middle Eastern Policy 1914–18

The course of Anglo‐Japanese relations prior to 1914 rendered senior British policymakers nervous regarding possible Japanese aggrandisement in the Middle East. This article explores the factors which precluded British acceptance of Japanese military involvement there when, both before and during World War I, the idea was discussed. Particular reference is made to the views of the India Office and to those of Lord Curzon and the subject is analysed in the broader context of British Middle Eastern policy.     

‘Winston has gone mad’: Churchill,the British Admiralty,and the Rise of Japanese Naval Power

As Chancellor of the Exchequer during the late 1920s, Winston Churchill was at the center of British strategic decision making about how to respond to the naval challenge posed by Japan's rise as a rival sea power. Churchill downplayed the likelihood of war with Japan. The leadership of the Royal Navy disagreed: they saw Japan as a dangerous threat to the security of the British Empire. Examining this dispute between Churchill and the Admiralty highlights the awkward political, economic, and strategic tradeoffs confronting British leaders between the world wars.