Application of the fundamental theorem of games to an example concerning antiballistic missile defense

This paper considers a two sided resource allocation game in which both players initially have fixed resources which may be distributed over various targets. Their effectiveness depends on the manner of distribution and also on the strategy of the opponent, a natural payoff function for such a situation being used. The complete solution to the game is derived and a numerical example given.     

Minimax trees,paths, and cut sets

The notions of minimax paths, trees, and cut sets are defined for undirected graphs; and relationships between these entities are established. Simple solution procedures based on these relationships are presented.     

The distribution of the product of two noncentral beta variates

In this paper the exact distribution of the product of two noncentral beta variates is derived using Mellin integral transform. The density function of the product is represented as a mixture of Beta distributions and the distribution function as a mixture of Incomplete Beta Functions.     

Toward a study of bidding processes part IV - games with unknown costs

This paper represents a continuation of three previous papers [1-.3] in the study of competitive bidding processes. It treats the case where a bidder's knowledge of his competitor's cost i s given by a probability distribution over a certain interval. The results obtained extend the work of Vickrey [4] to the case where the cost intervals a r e not necessarily symmetric.     

A tactical warfare simulation program

The Tactical Warfare Simulation Program is a procedure by which the major interactions among opposing military units and terrain features can be treated in a tactical limited warfare situation. It is a critical-area, sequence-of-event model and is programmed in SIM-SCRIPT. In this program a military unit is described by such properties as strength, size, location, velocity, and attrition rates. Some of the events which can occur to a military unit are entering/leaving terrain features, becoming engaged/disengaged with opposing units, retreating, reaching an objective, and breaking. Following a discussion of the general features of the program, a study of a hypothetical war is presented.     

Landmarks in defense literature

The Weapons Acquisition Process: An Economic Analysis By M.J. Peck and F.M. Scherer Boston: Harvard University Press, (1962).     

Book reviews

Export or Die: Britain's Defence Trade with Iran and Iraq. by Davina Miller, London: Cassell, 1996, ISBN 0-304-33852-4 (hbk), £40.00, 04-33853-2 (pbk), £11.99.

The Storm Passed By: Ireland and the Battle of the Atlantic, 1940-1941. by Trevor Allen, Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1996, ISBN 0-7165-2616-6, (hbk) £17.50.

Arms Control Toward the 21st Century. by Jeffrey A. Larsen and Greqory J. Rattray (eds). Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996.

Asia-Pacific Security, Less Uncertainty, New Opportunities. Edited by Gary Klintworth. Melbourne: Addison Wesley Longman, 1996, ISBN 0-582-80321-7, £24.99.

Masters of War, Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era. by Robert Buzzanco, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, ISBN 0-521-48046-9 (hbk), £29.95

Controlling the Arms Trade: the West Versus the Rest. By Paul Cornish, London: Bowerdean Publishing Co., 1996, ISBN 0-906097-44-4 (pbk), £9.99.

Secret Agencies: US Intelligence in a Hostile World. by Loch K. Johnson, London: Yale University Press, 1997, ISBN 0-300-06611-2 (hbk), £22.50.     

Discounted production scheduling and employment smoothing

We consider the problem of minimizing the sum of production, employment smoothing, and inventory costs over a finite number of time periods where demands are known. The fundamental difference between our model and that treated in [1] is that here we permit the smoothing cost to be nonstationary, thereby admitting a model with discounting. We show that the values of the instrumental variables are nondecreasing in time when demands are nondecreasing. We also derive some asymptotic properties of optimal policies.     

Economic impact and the notion of compensated procurement

The paper consists essentially of two parts. In the first part a linear economic impact model is presented whose structure is based on subcontracting flows. The structural coefficients are defined in terms of flows per area. The model is derived from two identities that are analogous to the income and expenditure identities of national income accounting. The parameters are prime contracts and when one or several of the prime contracts are changed, the model determines the impacts of such changes on the various regions that have been selected. The impacts can be combined with regional multipliers to derive changes in regional income and regional employment. Fragmentary data for this kind of model have been collected on a one-time basis by DOD in 1965 and some results based on the data are presented. The second part of the paper is concerned with normative economics. A scheme is suggested, called compensated procurement, that outlines how the Department of Defense might employ the impact model in a macroeconomic setting. The basic idea is that a stabilization fund be established to finance an array of potential projects which are contracted for to balance sudden shifts in defense demand. Only short-run stabilization is advocated.