The theory of combined-arms lanchester-type models of warfare

The mathematical theory necessary to solve combined arms models of military combat is presented here. We show how to apply the theory of positive operators to such models. Most of the results are purely qualitative in character showing that many properties of such systems are independent of the actual numerical values of the coefficients. Finally, we discuss in some detail an example of such a system.     

Book reviews

Small Wars Manual. United States Marine Corps 1940, with introduction by Ronald Schaffer, Sunflower University Press, Manhattan, Kansas, (1990), ISBN: 0-89745-112-0.

Military Mindlessness: an Informal Compendium. Edited by Raymond Horricks. Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick and London, (1993), ISBN: 1-56000-105-4. Price $26.95

Sipri Yearbook 1993: World Armaments and Disarmament, Oxford University Press, Oxford, (1993) ISBN 0-19-829166-3 - Price £50.00

Nigeria: The Politics of Adjustment and Democracy. By Julius O. Ihonvbere. Transaction Publishers, London & New Brunswick (1994), ISBN 1-56000-093-7, Price £34.95     

Minimizing the average deviation of job completion times about a common due date

This paper considers a single-machine scheduling problem in which penalities occur when a job is completed early or late. The objective is to minimize the total penalty subject to restrictive assumptions on the due dates and penalty functions for jobs. A procedure is presented for finding an optimal schedule.     

A linear programming approach to geometric programs

A cutting plane method, based on a geometric inequality, is described as a means of solving geometric programs. While the method is applied to the primal geometric program, it is shown to retain the geometric programming duality relationships. Several methods of generating the cutting planes are discussed and illustrated on some example problems.     

The constrained shortest path problem

The shortest path problem between two specified nodes in a general network possesses the unimodularity property and, therefore, can be solved by efficient labelling algorithms. However, the introduction of an additional linear constraint would, in general, destroy this property and the existing algorithms are not applicable in this case. This paper presents a parametric approach for solving this problem. The algorithm presented would require, on the average, a number of iterations which is polynomially bounded. The similarity of this approach to that of the generalized Lagrange multiplier technique is demonstrated and a numerical example is presented.     

An algorithm for 0-1 multiple-knapsack problems

The 0-1 multiple-knapsack problem is an extension of the well-known 0-1 knapsack problem. It is a problem of assigning m objects, each having a value and a weight, to n knapsacks in such a way that the total weight in each knapsack is less than its capacity limit and the total value in the knapsacks is maximized. A branch-and-bound algorithm for solving the problem is developed and tested. Branching rules that avoid the search of redundant partial solutions are used in the algorithm. Various bounding techniques, including Lagrangean and surrogate relaxations, are investigated and compared.     

On the manipulation of transfer prices in a static environment

In a static environment, J. Hirschleifer's marginal cost solution to the transfer pricing problem is commonly accepted as analytically correct. However, actual pricing practice within Western corporations and socialist-planned economies generally deviates from marginal cost pricing. Some form of average cost pricing is more commonly chosen. Recently in this journal, H. Enzer has claimed to show that some form of average cost pricing is indeed the analytically correct solution to the transfer pricing problem when choice of technique and manipulation are allowed. Enzer claims that optimal decisions made by each of two divisions according to their individual self-interests are made compatible with overall firm optimization when the transfer price assigned to the internally-transferred commodity is any form of average cost. We show that the marginal cost solution is correct for Enzer's problem in the absence of manipulation by either division. Indeed, this was all that Hirschleifer claimed. In the process, we uncover a fundamental mathematical error in Enzer's argument. When manipulation of the transfer price by divisions is allowed, we demonstrate the faults with Enzer's average cost solution and conclude Hirschleifer's original statements on manipulation to be correct even in Enzer's environment. A final section briefly indicates the importance to the transfer pricing problem of a growing body of economic literature on incentive structures.     

Application of the fundamental theorem of games to an example concerning antiballistic missile defense

This paper considers a two sided resource allocation game in which both players initially have fixed resources which may be distributed over various targets. Their effectiveness depends on the manner of distribution and also on the strategy of the opponent, a natural payoff function for such a situation being used. The complete solution to the game is derived and a numerical example given.