US technological collaboration for nonproliferation: key evidence from the Cold War

ABSTRACT

Although the existing international-relations scholarship argues that technological assistance in the nuclear domain increases the probability of nuclear proliferation, the historical account indicates otherwise. Congressional legislation for nonproliferation, economic sanctions, and poor state capacity—specifically, inept managerial capabilities of the recipient state—explain merely part of the puzzle, but overlook the role of positive inducements offered to impede nuclear proliferation. Historical evidence shows that the United States often provided technological assistance with the deliberate intent to inhibit proliferation. In other words, Washington employed its technological leverage to attain nonproliferation goals. American technological preponderance since the end of World War II made such an approach feasible. This study examines key Cold War cases—Israel/Egypt, India, and West Germany—where the United States offered technological assistance with the deliberate intent to stall nuclear proliferation, thereby underscoring the role of assistance for inhibitive ends.     

The military recruiting productivity slowdown: The roles of resources,opportunity cost and the tastes of youth*

After a decade of successful recruiting, the US military began experiencing recruiting difficulties in the 1990s. Cyclical factors as well as trend factors may have played a role. This paper uses monthly data by state over the period 1989-1997 to estimate models of enlistment and evaluate the various explanations for the recruiting slowdown. Estimates of the impact of economic variables - relative military pay and unemployment - and recruiting resource variables - recruiters and advertising - are similar to those in previous studies. Two trend factors, rising college attendance and declining adult veteran population (influencers), are found to be important factors explaining the decline in enlistment.     

The right place at the right time,or the right person in the right place?

South Africa's military has, since the First World War, been an oft-used and effective tool in the conduct of South African foreign policy, but this role has not always translated into power for Defence Department principals in its formulation. South African Defence Ministers for most of the country's history have played a minor role in the making of foreign policy; despite a change in this dynamic between approximately 1975–1990, the post-apartheid era has once again seen a diminishment of Defence's power in this arena. This article examines why Defence Ministers have generally been such weak players, with an eye toward disaggregating whether this was a product of interpersonal relationships with Cabinet and – most importantly – the Head of State, or whether this influence (or lack thereof) was more a function of South Africa's international standing. While determining who has influence on this process is difficult given the primacy of the national leader in making foreign policy and a lack of insider accounts by participants in the process, this article relies upon several interviews with participants and knowledgeable observers that help illuminate the process and Defence's role in it.     

Defence closure and job loss: The case of swan hunter on tyneside

Recently in this journal Hooper and Butler (1996) drew attention to the scale of job loss associated with restructuring in the defence sector in the aftermath of the Cold War. They noted that there is comparatively little knowledge of the experiences of workers following the closure of defence plants. This research communication attempts to shed further light on this issue by reporting the results of a survey of the experiences of former Swan Hunter shipyard workers who were made redundant after the firm went into receivership. The results confirm the complex but generally negative effect of redundancy on the workers involved.     

The inherent propensity toward peace or war embodied in weaponry

Thomas Schelling argues that armed adversaries face an inherent propensity toward peace or war embodied in their weaponry, geography and military organizations. Inherent propensity is the idea that there are characteristics embodied in the weapons that push adversaries toward peace or war, independent of the goals of the decision‐makers, the political disagreement between adversaries, and misperceptions about mutual resolve and hostility. We theoretically illustrate inherent propensity in conventional and nuclear arms settings using Lanchester and Intriligator war models. Our work extends the Intriligator‐Brito model, identifies when the competing Richardson and Intriligator‐Brito views of the relationship between arms races and war are correct, illustrates the stabilizing/destabilizing effects of alliances, and highlights the importance of arms quality control in the US‐USSR relationship.     

Britain and the chevaline project: The hidden nuclear programme, 1967–82

With the words quoted above, the new Secretary of State for Defence in the Thatcher government revealed for the first time the existence of a project that have remained a closely guarded secret, even from amny Cabinet members of four governments, since the late 1960s. Despite the passage of more thatn 20 years since Mr Pym's announcement, the story of the Chevaline project still remains largely unknown outside a small group of select politicians, officials and scientists. This article sets out to use recently declassified documents and what is in the public domain to tell the story of Chevaline from the secret debates about the need to improve Britain's Polaris deterrent force shortly after it was deployed in the late 1960s to the official announcement of the project in 1980 and its eventual operational deployment in 1982. In particular, attention is focused on three main questions: Why was the project kept secret for so long? Why did the improvement programme take so long to come to fruition? Why, given the spiralling costs involved, was it not cancelled? In order to consider these questions relating to what Pym described as ‘the front end’ of the Poaris missile, it is necessary to begin by looking at the background to the project.     

Churchill's naval holiday: Arms control and the Anglo‐German naval race, 1912–1914

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