Deterrence and overseas stability

The use of conventional armed forces in a deterrent role merits close consideration. Instability in weak or failing states can have global ramifications, while efforts to build stability take time. In principle, conventional deterrence can be used to buy the time required for such stabilization efforts. Attempts at deterrence will, however, need to overcome credibility problems stemming from the technical limitations associated with conventional armed forces, and with the likely requirement for multiple external actors to deter multiple intrastate audiences. While deterrence might work under certain circumstances, it will not play as central a role in strategy as it did during the Cold War.     

Approximation schemes for single‐machine scheduling with a fixed maintenance activity to minimize the total amount of late work

We consider the problem of scheduling n independent and simultaneously available jobs without preemption on a single machine, where the machine has a fixed maintenance activity. The objective is to find the optimal job sequence to minimize the total amount of late work, where the late work of a job is the amount of processing of the job that is performed after its due date. We first discuss the approximability of the problem. We then develop two pseudo‐polynomial dynamic programming algorithms and a fully polynomial‐time approximation scheme for the problem. Finally, we conduct extensive numerical studies to evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithms. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 172–183, 2016