THE HARD CASES

Many countries received Soviet-origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) for civilian nuclear research purposes. Because of inadequate nuclear security at a number of the research sites, U.S. policy has sought to remove or otherwise safely dispose of their HEU stocks as quickly as possible. Although the pace of HEU disposition has accelerated significantly in recent years, several sites have posed formidable technical, economic, and political challenges. This article identifies the major obstacles to HEU removal at two key installations—Kharkiv in Ukraine, and Sosny in Belarus—and recommends a strategy for overcoming these impediments. Key components for a successful disposition strategy include: treating these cases with the urgency they deserve, expanding potential compensation packages, explicitly addressing the institutional and political issues involved, engaging high-level political leaders, working with third parties, and promoting these efforts as part of a nondiscriminatory initiative to phase out HEU in the civilian nuclear sector globally.     

UNDER THE RADAR?

Missile Contagion: Cruise Missile Proliferation and the Threat to International Security, by Dennis M. Gormley. Praeger Security International, 2008. 272 pages, $54.95.     

Japan's plutonium policy: Consequences for nonproliferation

ABSTRACT

What do we mean by nuclear proliferation? What does it mean to proliferate? This article investigates both the literal and figurative meaning of the term “proliferation.” It argues that many of the definitions and conceptualizations of nuclear proliferation often used by scholars are either limited in their utility or logically inconsistent. It then reconceptualizes and redefines the term, incorporating an understanding of both its etymological origins and the geopolitical context in which the phenomenon occurs. It concludes by exploring the potential impact that the politicization of the phenomenon may have on the identification of occurrences of proliferation, from both an academic and a policy-making perspective.     

THE MORAL PERMISSIBILITY OF AUTOMATED RESPONSES DURING CYBERWARFARE

Automated responses are an inevitable aspect of cyberwarfare, but there has not been a systematic treatment of the conditions in which they are morally permissible. We argue that there are three substantial barriers to the moral permissibility of an automated response: the attribution, chain reaction, and projection bias problems. Moreover, these three challenges together provide a set of operational tests that can be used to assess the moral permissibility of a particular automated response in a specific situation. Defensive automated responses will almost always pass all three challenges, while offensive automated responses typically face a substantial positive burden in order to overcome the chain reaction and projection bias challenges. Perhaps the most interesting cases arise in the middle ground between cyber-offense and cyber-defense, such as automated cyber-exploitation responses. In those situations, much depends on the finer details of the response, the context, and the adversary. Importantly, however, the operationalizations of the three challenges provide a clear guide for decision-makers to assess the moral permissibility of automated responses that could potentially be implemented.     

A three‐stage procurement optimization problem under uncertainty

This article examines a problem faced by a firm procuring a material input or good from a set of suppliers. The cost to procure the material from any given supplier is concave in the amount ordered from the supplier, up to a supplier‐specific capacity limit. This NP‐hard problem is further complicated by the observation that capacities are often uncertain in practice, due for instance to production shortages at the suppliers, or competition from other firms. We accommodate this uncertainty in a worst‐case (robust) fashion by modeling an adversarial entity (which we call the “follower”) with a limited procurement budget. The follower reduces supplier capacity to maximize the minimum cost required for our firm to procure its required goods. To guard against uncertainty, the firm can “protect” any supplier at a cost (e.g., by signing a contract with the supplier that guarantees supply availability, or investing in machine upgrades that guarantee the supplier's ability to produce goods at a desired level), ensuring that the anticipated capacity of that supplier will indeed be available. The problem we consider is thus a three‐stage game in which the firm first chooses which suppliers' capacities to protect, the follower acts next to reduce capacity from unprotected suppliers, and the firm then satisfies its demand using the remaining capacity. We formulate a three‐stage mixed‐integer program that is well‐suited to decomposition techniques and develop an effective cutting‐plane algorithm for its solution. The corresponding algorithmic approach solves a sequence of scaled and relaxed problem instances, which enables solving problems having much larger data values when compared to standard techniques. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

Inequality‐based reliability estimates for complex systems

Full‐system testing for large‐scale systems is often infeasible or very costly. Thus, when estimating system reliability, it is desirable to use a method that uses subsystem tests, which are often less expensive and more feasible. This article presents a method for bounding full‐system reliabilities based on subsystem tests and, if available, full‐system tests. The method does not require that subsystems be independent. It accounts for dependencies through the use of certain probability inequalities. The inequalities provide the basis for valid reliability calculations while not requiring independent subsystems or full‐system tests. The inequalities allow for test information on pairwise subsystem failure modes to be incorporated, thereby improving the bound on system reliability. We illustrate some of the properties of the estimates via an example application. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

Training US Army Peacekeepers

In Chechnya a protracted conflict only seemingly quieted down, but it still smolders and as the conflict is suppressed by coercion, it is inevitable that it will flare up at some time in the near future. The root causes of the conflict can be understood by use of globalization theory, which dialectically brings together the clashing forces from above and below. Civil society in Chechnya deteriorated, is politically curtailed, and has no resilience left. It thus results in a frozen conflict and an excluded and victimized society. Russian-style reconstruction does alleviate living conditions, but does not remediate the frozen conflict character of the present situation. The dynamics of the globalizing forces from below and above, summarized in the glocalization concept, not only explains the resistance by the Chechen people, for whom revolt, rebellion, and terrorism remain attractive options, but also serves as a model for other insurgencies. Reflecting on the two recent Chechen–Russian wars results in a paradigmatic case study.     

Notes on contributors

In 1897 and 1898, Winston Churchill participated in what late Victorian Britain termed ‘small wars’, first on India's northwest frontier and then in the vast wasteland of the Sudan. Churchill chronicled his experiences in these conflicts in personal letters, dispatches to newspapers, and in his first two books, The Story of the Malakand Field Force and The River War. These writings provide a snapshot of a particular period in the formative years of the great statesman, demonstrating through Churchill's eloquent analyses many of the contradictions concerning the conduct of small wars that have emerged in the present era.