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ABSTRACTThe practice of dispatching teams of police advisors to other states to build or train foreign security forces began at the end of the nineteenth century, yet there exists no definitive history of the practice, or any definitive theoretical approach underpinning why such missions succeed or fail. Drawing upon their recent edited book on expeditionary police advising, and by examining the donor or sending states, the host nations, and the use of police in counterinsurgency situations, the authors present some key reasons why such missions fail, and lay some groundwork for additional study of this important subject. 相似文献
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Joshua H. Pollack 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(2):155-164
ABSTRACTThe United States and China are testing boost-glide weapons, long-range strike systems capable of flying at Mach 5 or faster through the upper atmosphere. For the United States, these systems would provide a conventional prompt global strike capability, which, together with US ballistic missile defense programs, Chinese experts regard as a threat to China's ability to conduct nuclear retaliation. This perception is encouraging the Chinese military to modify its nuclear posture in ways that tend to create greater risks for both sides. If China's own boost-glide systems are meant to carry nuclear payloads only, their deployment would not fundamentally alter the current situation between the two states. However, if they were conventionally armed or dual-purpose, or if the United States could not determine the payloads they carried, the deployment of Chinese boost-glide systems could compound problems of strategic stability created by the introduction of ballistic missile defense, antisatellite, and antiship ballistic missile capabilities. If the technical hurdles can be overcome, it may be difficult for the two sides to refrain from these deployments in the absence of strong mutual trust or an established arms-control relationship. New confidence-building measures and expanded mutual transparency are warranted to avoid creating new dangers. 相似文献
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Reid B. C. Pauly 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(3-4):441-455
ABSTRACTThis article explores how two influential American policy makers—Paul Nitze and McGeorge Bundy—wrestled with the idea of a norm against the use of nuclear weapons. Existing scholarship has overlooked how both Bundy and Nitze came to understand the idea of nuclear non-use, especially related to the credibility of threats to use nuclear weapons. Using documentary evidence from their personal papers, this article illuminates the thinking of Bundy and Nitze, finding that both engaged with the idea of a norm of non-use of nuclear weapons in their strategic writing and thought. 相似文献
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Jonathan B. Tucker 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(3):363-384
In 2003, Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi agreed to eliminate his country's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and long-range Scud missiles under strict verification by U.S. and British experts and international inspectors. This article examines the negotiation and implementation of Libya's WMD rollback, with a primary focus on its chemical weapons program, and draws some lessons for the future. Although the Libyan case was unique in many ways, some aspects have relevance for other countries, including the critical role played by multilateral nonproliferation organizations, the utility of economic sanctions and export controls, the importance of a flexible U.S. disarmament funding mechanism, the value of rotating technical assistance teams in and out of the country that is disarming, and the desirability of remaining politically engaged with a former proliferator after rollback is complete. 相似文献