Using real options analysis to value reoptimization options in the shifting bottleneck heuristic

The reoptimization procedure within the shifting bottleneck (SB) involves reevaluation of all previously scheduled toolgroup subproblems at each iteration of the SB heuristic. A real options analysis (ROA) model is developed to value the option to reoptimize in the SB heuristic, such that reoptimization only occurs when it is most likely to lead to a schedule with a lower objective function. To date, all ROA models have sought to value options financially (i.e., in terms of monetary value). The ROA model developed in this paper is completely original in that it has absolutely no monetary basis. The ROA methodologies presented are shown to greatly outperform both full and no reoptimization approaches with respect to both computation time and total weighted tardiness. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006     

Requirements planning for modular products

The focus of this paper is on determining the requirements of different component options of a modular end‐product in an uncertain environment. We explicitly model two distinct sources of uncertainty: stochastic end‐product demand and unknown market proportions for the different product options available. Our cost minimizing model focuses on determining the optimal requirements policies for component options that meet a pre‐set service level. We show that simple common‐sense requirements policies are not generally optimal; there is a non‐linear connection between service level and component requirements that is hard to characterize without a detailed analysis. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006     

Enhancing Political Cohesion in NATO during the 1950s or: How it Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the (Tactical) Bomb

This article argues that the perceived need by NATO to nurture political cohesion within the Alliance during the 1950s resulted in the adoption of strategic concepts that were out-of-step with the military environment in which it was operating. It maintains that the Alliance acquiesced to American leadership on nuclear issues which led to the development of tactical nuclear capabilities at the expense of conventional war-fighting capabilities for the defence of the European Central Front. This resulted in a strategic concept that enhanced political cohesion but was militarily unviable.     

An index policy for a stochastic scheduling model with improving/deteriorating jobs

We consider stochastic scheduling models which have the natural character that jobs improve while being processed, but deteriorate (and may possibly leave the system altogether) while processing is diverted elsewhere. Such restless bandit problems are shown to be indexable in the sense of Whittle. A numerical study which elucidates the strong performance of the resulting index policy is complemented by a theoretical study which demonstrates the optimality of the index policy under given conditions and which develops performance guarantees for the index heuristic more generally. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 49: 706–721, 2002; Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/nav.10036     

Operational Combat Analysis of the Al Qaeda Network

Contemporary network organizational structures have gradually developed over the last decades of the twentieth century. These new structures are challenging the traditional hierarchical structure form in a number of venues. In conflict and war, they made their potentials unequivocally known on 11 September 2001 via Al Qaeda's strategic suicide bombings against the United States. To better understand the military potentials of networks, an operational combat analysis of the Al Qaeda network was conducted. This analysis, a modification of weapons systems analysis, focused on network speed, along with offensive, defensive and combat multiplier attributes. Such analysis allows for a better understanding of the military capabilities and vulnerabilities of non-state OPFORs (opposing forces) and our own emergent counter-insurgency networks.