Spatial Distribution of Minority Communities and Terrorism: Domestic Concentration versus Transnational Dispersion

Qualitative studies of terrorist movements frequently highlight the importance of diaspora communities as important factors in producing and sustaining terrorist activity in countries. The underlying theoretical argument is that bifurcation of tight-knit minority communities between countries nurtures separatist or irredentist sentiments among affected community members, thus prompting terrorist activity, while minority community members in other countries might mobilize financial and political resources to support terrorist activity among their compatriots. In this study, we empirically test whether transnational dispersion, versus domestic concentration, of minority communities in countries produces higher incidents of terrorism. Conducting a series of negative binomial estimations on a reshaped database of around 170 countries from 1981 to 2006, derived from the Minorities at Risk database and the Global Terrorism Database, we determine that both transnational dispersion of kin minority communities and domestic concentration of minorities within countries increase terrorism and that transnational dispersion is a particularly robust predictor of terrorist attacks.     

Russia's pivot to China goes astray: the impact on the Asia-Pacific security architecture

High-level declarations in Moscow and Beijing on the steady progress in upgrading their strategic partnership depart increasingly far from the reality of shrinking economic ties and diverging political perspectives. In late 2014, the dynamic development of this partnership appeared to have the potential of becoming a major shift in the fluid security balance in the Asia-Pacific region; in late 2015, however, the concerned neighbours have more reasons to worry about the deformations in the development of Russia–China relations. President Vladimir Putin and President Xi Jinping are eager to demonstrate perfect personal rapport but their mutual trust is open to doubt and their views on priorities of domestic and international order are in fact strikingly dissimilar. The deep contraction of trade and the lack of interest from Chinese investors propels the Russian leadership towards increasing the emphasis on the security dimension of the partnership, and this makes Russia one of the key sources of instability in the Asia-Pacific region and a challenge to the East Asian peace. It is also entirely possible that the Russian challenge to the stability of the world system would result in strengthening of the key institutions of its governance, thus leaving the revisionist Russia in isolation.     

A robust sensor covering and communication problem

We consider the problem of placing sensors across some area of interest. The sensors must be placed so that they cover a fixed set of targets in the region, and should be deployed in a manner that allows sensors to communicate with one another. In particular, there exists a measure of communication effectiveness for each sensor pair, which is determined by a concave function of distance between the sensors. Complicating the sensor location problem are uncertainties related to sensor placement, for example, as caused by drifting due to air or water currents to which the sensors may be subjected. Our problem thus seeks to maximize a metric regarding intrasensor communication effectiveness, subject to the condition that all targets must be covered by some sensor, where sensor drift occurs according to a robust (worst‐case) mechanism. We formulate an approximation approach and develop a cutting‐plane algorithm to solve this problem, comparing the effectiveness of two different classes of inequalities. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 62: 582–594, 2015     

Strategic “defensivism” and post-reset blues: US–Russian nuclear arms reductions,missile defenses and minimum deterrence

US nuclear deterrence and arms control policy may be moving, by design and by inadvertence, toward a posture of strategic “defensivism”. Strategic “defensivism” emphasizes the overlapping and reinforcing impact of: (1) reductions in US, Russian and possibly other strategic nuclear forces, possibly down to the level of “minimum deterrence,” (2) deployment of improved strategic and/or theater antimissile defenses for the US, NATO allies and other partners; and (3) additional reliance on conventional military forces for some missions hitherto preferentially assigned to nuclear weapons. This article deals with the first two of these aspects only: the interaction between missile defenses and offensive force reductions in US–Russian strategy and policy. The findings are that stable deterrence as between the USA and Russia is possible at lower than New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty levels, but reductions below 1000 deployed long-range weapons for each state, toward a true minimum deterrent posture, will require multilateral as opposed to bilateral coordination of arms limitations. Missile defenses might provide some denial capability against light attacks by states with small arsenals, but they still fall short of meaningful damage limitation as between powers capable of massive nuclear strikes.     

Strategic obfuscation of production capacities

Recent supply‐chain models that study competition among capacity‐constrained producers omit the possibility of producers strategically setting wholesale prices to create uncertainty with regards to (i.e., to obfuscate) their production capacities. To shed some light on this possibility, we study strategic obfuscation in a supply‐chain model comprised of two competing producers and a retailer, where one of the producers faces a privately‐known capacity constraint. We show that capacity obfuscation can strictly increase the obfuscating producer's profit, therefore, presenting a clear incentive for such practices. Moreover, we identify conditions under which both producers' profits increase. In effect, obfuscation enables producers to tacitly collude and charge higher wholesale prices by moderating competition between producers. The retailer, in contrast, suffers a loss in profit, raises retail prices, while overall channel profits decrease. We show that the extent of capacity obfuscation is limited by its cost and by a strategic retailer's incentive to facilitate a deterrence. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 244–267, 2014     

Asymmetric information and third-party intervention in civil wars

I study a two-period model of conflict with two combatants and a third party who is an ally of one of the combatants. The third party is fully informed about the type of her ally but not about the type of her ally’s enemy. In a signaling game, I find that if the third party is unable to give a sufficiently high assistance to her ally, then there exists a unique separating equilibrium in which the third party’s expected intervention causes her ally’s enemy to exert more effort than in the absence of third-party intervention; this worsens the conflict.     

Fighting maritime piracy: three lessons from pompeius magnus

Piracy in international waters is on the rise again, in particular off the coast of Somalia. While the dynamic game between pirates, ship-owners, insurance firms and the military seems to have reached some kind of equilibrium, piracy risks generating significant negative externalities to third parties (e.g. in terms of environmental hazards and terrorism), justifying attempts to contain it. We argue that these attempts may benefit from a look back – through the analytical lens of rational choice theory – to the most successful counterpiracy campaign ever undertaken, namely, the one led by the Roman general Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus (Pompey the Great) in 67 BC.     

滑动导轨等部件的微动态特性

1.简介 这份报告给出了关于传统的滑动导轨系统的一些实验结果,同时论及了机构的精密运动控制。 这些年来,诸如导轨、丝杠和其他驱动机构等机械部件的微动态特性,换句话说,就是在很小位移范围内的非线性传递特性。已成为精密机械工程研究的首要问题。超精密仪器、机床和半导体生产系统都对机械部件的控制精度提出了越来越高的要求。对于精