Differential game theoretic analysis of a problem of warfare

The present article considers a problem of missile warfare. It is formulated as a problem of economics and treated as a differential game. Some optimal strategies of targeting and firing of missiles are derived. Conditions under which such a war can be prevented are also developed.     

Optimum quantiles for the linear estimation of the parameters of the extreme value distribution in complete and censored samples

The present study is concerned with the determination of a few observations from a sufficiently large complete or censored sample from the extreme value distribution with location and scale parameters μ and σ, respectively, such that the asymptotically best linear unbiased estimators (ABLUE) of the parameters in Ref. [24] yield high efficiencies among other choices of the same number of observations. (All efficiencies considered are relative to the Cramér-Rao lower bounds for regular unbiased estimators.) The study is on the asymptotic theory and under Type II censoring scheme. For the estimation of μ when σ is known, it has been proved that there exists a unique optimum spacing whether the sample is complete, right censored, left censored, or doubly censored. Several tables are prepared to aid in the numerical computation of the estimates as well as to furnish their efficiencies. For the estimation of σ when μ is known, it has been observed that there does not exist a unique optimum spacing. Accordingly we have obtained a spacing based on a complete sample which yields high efficiency. A similar table as above is prepared. When both μ and σ are unknown, we have considered four different spacings based on a complete sample and chosen the one yielding highest efficiency. A table of the efficiencies is also prepared. Finally we apply the above results for the estimation of the scale and/or shape parameters of the Weibull distribution.     

A test for the hypothesis that two extreme-value scale parameters are equal

A statistic is determined for testing the hypothesis of equality for scale parameters from two populations, each of which has the first asymptotic distribution of smallest (extreme) values. The probability distribution is derived for this statistic, and critical values are determined and given in tabular form for a one-sided or two-sided alternative, for censored samples of size n₁ and n₂, n₁ = 2, 3, …. 6, n₂ = 2, 3, …. 6. The power function of the test for certain alternatives is also calculated and listed in each case considered.     

A note on cycling in the simplex method

Although cycling in the simplex method has long been known, a number of theoretical questions concerning cycling have not been fully answered. One of these, stated in [3], is to find the smallest example of cycling, and Beale's example with three equations and seven variables is conjectured to be the smallest one. The exact bounds on dimensions of cycling examples are established in this paper. We show that Beale's example is the smallest one which cycles at a non-optimal solution, that a smaller one can cycle at the optimum, and that, in general (including the completely degenerate case), a cycling example must have at least two equations, at least six variables, and at least three non-basic variables. Examples and geometries are given for the extreme cases, showing that the bounds are sharp.     

Heuristic modeling of supply availabilities in large networks

The objective of this article is to describe heuristic solutions to the problem of modeling inventories at each node of a large network in the context of a computer simulation model of that network. The heuristic solutions are compared with the mathematical solution which is too unwieldy for use in a simulation model. The Weibull cumulative distribution is used as an approximation for the heuristic models. We question whether the good performance of the Weibull is coincidence or perhaps mathematically justifiable.     

Lateral capacity exchange and its impact on capacity investment decisions

We study the problem of capacity exchange between two firms in anticipation of the mismatch between demand and capacity, and its impact on firm's capacity investment decisions. For given capacity investment levels of the two firms, we demonstrate how capacity price may be determined and how much capacity should be exchanged when either manufacturer acts as a Stackelberg leader in the capacity exchange game. By benchmarking against the centralized system, we show that a side payment may be used to coordinate the capacity exchange decisions. We then study the firms' capacity investment decisions using a biform game framework in which capacity investment decisions are made individually and exchange decisions are made as in a centralized system. We demonstrate the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium capacity investment levels and study the impact of firms' share of the capacity exchange surplus on their capacity investment levels.© 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

A note on the constrained shortest-path problem

The subject of this note is the validity of the algorithm described by Aneja and Nair to solve the constrained shortest-path problem.     

Scheduling stochastic jobs on a single machine subject to breakdowns

A single machine is available to process a collection of stochastic jobs. There may be technological constraints on the job set. The machine sometimes breaks down. Costs are incurred and rewards are earned during processing. We seek strategies for processing the jobs which maximize the total expected reward earned.