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831.
Lawrence E. Cline 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(2):275-287
The insurgency in southern Thailand has proven to be intractable over the last few years. The insurgents, who comprise several different groups, have largely retained the initiative in a series of relatively unsophisticated operations. Although involving ethnic Malay Muslims – and marked by an increasingly strong Islamist ideology – the insurgency has been predominantly ethnic rather than religious. External jihadist involvement has been minimal at best. The recent coup in Thailand may improve the odds of reaching some form of accommodation with the southern insurgents; but it is likely that the south will remain a continuing security problem for Bangkok. 相似文献
832.
In this paper, we examine the current state of knowledge in the economics literature on the conduct of reconstruction activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. As stabilisation and reconstruction missions grow in importance for units deployed to these regions, it becomes more important to understand what activities can promote economic growth at the local level. While military operations focus on interdicting the insurgency, successful counter-insurgency campaigns have typically addressed the conditions conducive to the insurgency. Mitigating the incentives for individuals to participate in an insurgency is imperative. Well-crafted and timed reconstruction activities can, we argue, attenuate these incentives. 相似文献
833.
Sean M. Maloney 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(2):404-408
The belief that the insurgency in southern Afghanistan is a singular entity and the assumption that negotiations with that entity can bring an end to the conflict are simplistic and do not take into account the other insurgent partners, nor the role of local power brokers. Care must be taken when providing advice in the public domain on how to end or limit conflict in Afghanistan. 相似文献
834.
Thomas I. Parks 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(1):185-202
While separatist-related conflict has re-emerged in southern Thailand, there is one predominantly Muslim border province that has remained outside of the conflict. Satun province has been conspicuously unaffected by the Malay-Muslim separatist movement, despite its shared history and ethnic origins with the conflict-affected provinces. In contrast to Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, the process of state penetration in Satun was gradual and comparatively less coercive, leading to relative stability and encouraging political and economic integration. This comparative study analyzes the history of cooperative state–minority relations and political stability in Satun province, and draws important lessons directly applicable to the unrest in neighbouring provinces. 相似文献
835.
Lawrence E. Cline 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(3-4):574-591
Multiple ethnic insurgencies have existed in Myanmar since independence. The military junta's response has been extremely brutal at the tactical level, but has shown some political astuteness at the strategic level, with a series of ceasefires with most of the ethnic groups. Despite these ceasefires – most of which have resulted in the continued existence of quasi-independent armed groups – other ethnic movements have continued their armed operations. The overall strategic picture is one of stalemate, with the ethnic movements continuing to exist, but with few realistic prospects of expanding their operations. 相似文献
836.
837.
A. Steven Dietz 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(2):385-401
The current approach to countering the threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Afghanistan has met with limited success. The relative lack of success may be in part because the current approach is not holistic and discounts the social systems that foster the IEDs. Insurgents are using IEDs as a tool to further their strategic aims, but the coalition and to a lesser extent the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) are attacking the IEDs as if they are an end in and of themselves. Combining network disruption with information change maximizes the opportunities for mitigating the IED threat. More specifically, to mitigate the IED threat requires disrupting the social and economic systems associated with IEDs, and at the same time providing alternative economic opportunities and improving rule of law and governance at the local level. In other words, counter-IED (C-IED) must be Counter-Insurgency (COIN) centric to be successful. This paper reviews the current state of C-IED efforts, identifies five main problems with the current approach, and suggests changes to reduce or mitigate the IED threat in Afghanistan. 相似文献
838.
Dr. Antonio Giustozzi 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(1):45-67
Afghanistan's fifth effort to form a central army started in 2002, following the fall of the Taleban regime. Mainly run by the US armed forces, the formation of the so-called ‘Afghan National Army’ run into several difficulties, ranging from initially slow recruitment, low educational level of troops and officers, high attrition rates. As the new army began to take shape, it lacked many of the characteristics which had been associated by the promoters with a ‘national’ army. It also showed a low level of commitment and a lax discipline. As of 2006, it looked more like an auxiliary force at the service of the US army and its allies than like a ‘national’ army. 相似文献
839.
John P. Cann 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(1):196-225
In its colony of Angola, Portugal during its colonial wars (1961–1974) was able to exploit the economic dependence and divided population loyalties of its hostile neighbours the Congo and Zambia as well as the cleavages within the nationalist movements to prevent a crippling insurgency. The rulers of both countries were largely dependent on Angola for trade, and were eager to have the side effects of the robust Angolan economy with its 11% annual growth brush off on their own moribund ones. While relationships were never comfortable, the sponsors of revolution were forced to reign in their ‘freedom fighters’ in order to maintain the functioning of their export-dependent economies. Portuguese leadership also played a vital role, as it was able to bring together diverse elements of national power in a concerted policy for dealing with these enemies, whether they were insurgents or their sanctuary countries. This policy of leveraging national power and playing on the vulnerabilities of its opponents worked well during its war in Angola and still holds valuable lessons for countries that find themselves in similar circumstances. 相似文献
840.
Stuart A. Cohen 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(4):78-93
The British provided unprecedented shelter, training and supplies that made possible the revival of a new and better Belgian Army after the crushing German victories in 1940. Starting in Wales in 1940 as a small and disunited group, the Belgians improved more than any of the Allied exile ground forces. By 1944, their independent brigade fought well in Normandy and Belgium, restoring national pride and proving the worth of British help. The parallel and interdependent processes between the British and their Continental guests allows this analysis of the Anglo‐Belgian experience to be useful in considering British Army interactions with the other exiles as well. 相似文献