Insurgency in amber: ethnic opposition groups in Myanmar

Multiple ethnic insurgencies have existed in Myanmar since independence. The military junta's response has been extremely brutal at the tactical level, but has shown some political astuteness at the strategic level, with a series of ceasefires with most of the ethnic groups. Despite these ceasefires – most of which have resulted in the continued existence of quasi-independent armed groups – other ethnic movements have continued their armed operations. The overall strategic picture is one of stalemate, with the ethnic movements continuing to exist, but with few realistic prospects of expanding their operations.     

Countering the effects of IED systems in Afghanistan: an integral approach

The current approach to countering the threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Afghanistan has met with limited success. The relative lack of success may be in part because the current approach is not holistic and discounts the social systems that foster the IEDs. Insurgents are using IEDs as a tool to further their strategic aims, but the coalition and to a lesser extent the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) are attacking the IEDs as if they are an end in and of themselves. Combining network disruption with information change maximizes the opportunities for mitigating the IED threat. More specifically, to mitigate the IED threat requires disrupting the social and economic systems associated with IEDs, and at the same time providing alternative economic opportunities and improving rule of law and governance at the local level. In other words, counter-IED (C-IED) must be Counter-Insurgency (COIN) centric to be successful. This paper reviews the current state of C-IED efforts, identifies five main problems with the current approach, and suggests changes to reduce or mitigate the IED threat in Afghanistan.     

Auxiliary Force or National Army? Afghanistan's ‘ANA’ and the Counter-Insurgency Effort, 2002–2006

Afghanistan's fifth effort to form a central army started in 2002, following the fall of the Taleban regime. Mainly run by the US armed forces, the formation of the so-called ‘Afghan National Army’ run into several difficulties, ranging from initially slow recruitment, low educational level of troops and officers, high attrition rates. As the new army began to take shape, it lacked many of the characteristics which had been associated by the promoters with a ‘national’ army. It also showed a low level of commitment and a lax discipline. As of 2006, it looked more like an auxiliary force at the service of the US army and its allies than like a ‘national’ army.     

The artful use of national power: Portuguese Angola (1961–1974)

In its colony of Angola, Portugal during its colonial wars (1961–1974) was able to exploit the economic dependence and divided population loyalties of its hostile neighbours the Congo and Zambia as well as the cleavages within the nationalist movements to prevent a crippling insurgency. The rulers of both countries were largely dependent on Angola for trade, and were eager to have the side effects of the robust Angolan economy with its 11% annual growth brush off on their own moribund ones. While relationships were never comfortable, the sponsors of revolution were forced to reign in their ‘freedom fighters’ in order to maintain the functioning of their export-dependent economies. Portuguese leadership also played a vital role, as it was able to bring together diverse elements of national power in a concerted policy for dealing with these enemies, whether they were insurgents or their sanctuary countries. This policy of leveraging national power and playing on the vulnerabilities of its opponents worked well during its war in Angola and still holds valuable lessons for countries that find themselves in similar circumstances.     

Small states and their armies: Restructuring the militia framework of the Israel defense force

The British provided unprecedented shelter, training and supplies that made possible the revival of a new and better Belgian Army after the crushing German victories in 1940. Starting in Wales in 1940 as a small and disunited group, the Belgians improved more than any of the Allied exile ground forces. By 1944, their independent brigade fought well in Normandy and Belgium, restoring national pride and proving the worth of British help. The parallel and interdependent processes between the British and their Continental guests allows this analysis of the Anglo‐Belgian experience to be useful in considering British Army interactions with the other exiles as well.     

Reconsidering Truman's claim of ‘half a million American lives’ saved by the atomic bomb: The construction and deconstruction of a myth

This essay, based on substantial archival research, critically examines President Harry S. Truman's often‐cited post‐World War II claim that he had received pre‐Hiroshima counsel in 1945 that the invasion(s) of Japan could cost ‘half a million American lives’. This essay concludes that there is no 1945 archival evidence supporting Truman's postwar contention, and that there is substantial evidence undercutting his claim. Moreover, in view of the total size of American forces scheduled for 1945–46 operations against Japan, any claim of 500,000 American dead seems implausible. This essay also critically examines how Truman's postwar memoir claim of ‘half a million American lives’ was constructed, and this essay discusses the many and rather varied casualty/fatality numbers that Truman presented during his White House and post‐presidential years. Such an analysis also focuses on the numbers he privately provided in the construction of his memoirs by ‘ghost’ writers. Reaching beyond the specific question of Truman's claims, this essay also discusses the dangers of analysts relying heavily upon post‐event memoir and interview sources, and this essay emphasises the need generally to instead privilege contemporaenous archival materials. Otherwise, analysts risk letting policymakers, often in self‐serving recollections, shape the history of crucial events.     

Book reviews

John Lawrence Tone, The Fatal Knot: The Guerrilla War in Navarre and the Defeat of Napoleon in Spain. Chapel Hill and London; The University of North Carolina Press 1994. Pp.vii + 239, 1 map, biblio., index. $34.95 (cloth). ISBN 0–8078–2169–1.

Robert Holland (ed), Emergencies and Disorder in the European Empires after 1945. London: Frank Cass, 1994. Pp.x + 256; index. £32 (cloth); £15 (paper). ISBN 0–7146–4516–8 and 4109 X

Deborah L. Norden, Military Rebellion in Argentina: Between Coups and Consolidation. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1996. Pp.242, index, $35/$17.50 (paper). ISBN 0–8032–8369–5.

William M. Minter, Apartheid's Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique. London and Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books Ltd; Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1994. Pp. xii +308, 3 maps, biblio., index. $69.95/£39.95 (cloth); $29.95/£16.95(paper). ISBN 1–85649–266–4 and 266–4.